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On the Publication Series We are pleased to present the latest volume in the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna’s 
publication series. The series, published in cooperation with our highly com-
mitted partner Sternberg Press, is devoted to central themes of contemporary 
thought about art practices and theories. The volumes comprise contribu-
tions on subjects that form the focus of discourse in art theory, cultural studies, 
art history, and research at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna and represent 
the quintessence of international study and discussion taking place in the  
respective fields. Each volume is published in the form of an anthology, edited 
by staff members of the academy. Authors of high international repute are  
invited to make contributions that deal with the respective areas of emphasis. 
Research activities such as international conferences, lecture series, institute-
specific research focuses, or research projects serve as points of departure for 
the individual volumes.
All books in the series undergo a single blind peer review. International re-
viewers, whose identities are not disclosed to the editors of the volumes, give 
an in-depth analysis and evaluation for each essay. The editors then rework 
the texts, taking into consideration the suggestions and feedback of the reviewers 
who, in a second step, make further comments on the revised essays. The  
editors—and authors—thus receive what is so rare in academia and also in art 
universities: committed, informed, and hopefully impartial critical feedback 
that can be used for finishing the work.
We thank the editor of this volume, Marina Gržinić, for proposing this volume on 
“border thinking.” Migration, decolonial critique, and necropolitics (a line of 
discourse Gržinić has helped to shape over the last few years) have been central 
issues of much theoretical debate and artistic work at the Academy of Fine 
Arts Vienna for a long time. In this volume, Gržinić brings together a heteroge-
neous set of authors who deal with many different topics, ranging from the 
refugee movement in Austria, to the Tunisian Revolution, to the establishment 
of new borders in Turkey and Hungary. Moreover, this book links discussions 
of old and new borders with ideas originating from a specific subset of the 
“former east” (i.e., south-central Europe). We are deeply indebted to Gržinić, an 
artist and theorist who has been professor for conceptual art practices at the 
academy for many years and has always emphasized the importance of raising 
a critical voice, for her impeccable editorial work on this volume. We would 
also like to thank the authors for their commitment. As always, we are grateful 
to all the partners contributing to the book, especially Sternberg Press.
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This book has a precise history. It was conceived in the Studio of Conceptual Art 
at the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, which I renamed Post-conceptual Art 
Practices (PCAP) immediately after being appointed as a professor at the acad-
emy in 2003, to open up the intrinsic relationship between art and politics.  
At the start of the new semester in the winter of 2015, I posed a not-so-rhetorical 
question: Are we capable of pulling out a narrative that is close to a counter-
history of the refugee movement in Austria, which started with the Refugee 
Protest Camp in Vienna in 2012? It was politically necessary to pose this ques-
tion, because in 2015 we had many students who were actively engaged with 
the Refugee Protest Camp in Vienna in 2012. They gave their time, ideas,  
engagement, empathy, and political convictions to the cause. In 2015 we also 
had some refugees studying with us, including some who had entered the 
study program after being granted asylum. In addition, we had students from 
“third” countries (meaning students coming from countries outside of the  
European Union), that is, a pejorative description from the EU institutional frame 
when looking over the walls of its “fortress.” 
There were many different scholars who took part in the discussions, including 
art students, MA students in critical studies, doctoral candidates in philoso-
phy, and post-doctoral researchers. Studying art in PCAP or being affiliated with 
the program means revealing the social and political line of contemporary  
art, where formally speaking the artwork can be a poem, text, or an image. 
What matters is that these works support and engage with antiracist, anti- 
homophobic, and anti-capitalist perspectives. It is important considering the 
border, both on the border and against the border.
The Refugee Crisis as the Crisis of Fortress Europe
Central to this book, Border Thinking, is the investigation of the refugee crisis 
in Europe that is increasingly presented as a crisis of European (and global)  
occidental capitalism, with its deadly structural racism, coloniality, disposses-
sion, war, and oppressive social, political, and economic violence. In global 
neoliberal capitalism, borders seem to have disappeared, yet they are none-
theless present through deportations, segregations, marginalization, and crimi-
nalization. 
Therefore, the question is how to think about these relations and how much 
the act of thinking itself is bordered; or, to question if it is possible to develop 
a border thinking that will aim to radically transform the sociopolitical and 
economic logics of the border that segregate and ghettoize people, lives, prac-
tices, histories, and thoughts. These harsh ills are becoming visible with the  
increasing number of refugees escaping the proxy war in Syria; with the com-









to understand accurately with the old, modernist, or even postmodernist con-
cepts of agency, community, and democracy. 
It is clear that in order to encircle these processes of ultra-exploitation, dispos-
session, and racialization that present themselves as the opposite, we need 
new methodologies, intervention politics, and different historical conceptual-
izations that will bring class, race, gender, and border thinking back to the 
center of political action. This should be a mixture of potentiality, and a radical 
engagement with proper history and praxis that will give a new dimension  
not only to the topic but also to the old ossified disciplines of Western Euro-
centric epistemologies.
There are several focal points of investigation in this book. We can extract at 
least three common lines of research that appear through many of the writings. 
The first tackles life and its management and is conceptualized as the shift 
from biopolitics to necropolitics. The second line conceptualizes capitalism 
by rethinking how it formulates itself in the form of the state. The final focus is 
on racism as it enters into a new and perverted form that now reigns in neo-
liberal global capitalism.
The Shift from Biopolitics to Necropolitics
Nataša Velikonja, a Slovenian writer and lesbian activist, brilliantly stated that 
“Europe is boring” on the eve of the capitalist financial crisis in 2008.1 Then, 
with the crisis and the subsequent rescue of banks rather than people, Étienne 
Balibar proclaimed, “Europe is dead.”2 Though he did not reference Achille 
Mbembe’s essay “Necropolitics,” it is clear that in the last decade, life, its modes, 
and the social and political space of global capitalism, have been managed 
and organized by the logic of death. In “Necropolitics,” Mbembe discusses this 
new logic of capital and its processes of geopolitical demarcation of world 
zones based on the mobilization of the war machine.3 He claims that the concept 
of biopolitics—one of the major logics of contemporary societies, due to the 
war machine and the state of exception—should be replaced with necropolitics. 
Biopolitics is the horizon of articulating contemporary capitalist societies 
from the so-called politics of life, where life is seen as the zero degree of inter-
vention of each and every politics into contemporary societies, but today 
capital’s surplus value is based on the capitalization of death (in Latin: necro) 
worlds.
secular and that currently suffer from militias, terrorists, and the deaths of  
civilians who are killed by the thousands, and where the only “secure enclaves” 
are the capitalist multinational “oases” for wild extractions of oil safeguarded 
by private military mercenaries. The outcome is that millions of people are 
forced to leave and that whole cities and regions end up in a state of absolute 
immobility. The old Western world, the bastion of whiteness and the force  
of colonialism and present coloniality, steadily and brutally continues its work 
of expropriation. The bloody face of neoliberal global capitalism makes aus-
terity, precarity, privatization, and debt the only conditions of our lives, while 
engaging in (neo)colonial relations with those who (re)“joined” the big brave 
world of neoliberal democracy. 
Europe is divided more than ever between the “former” West and the “rest”  
in the EU and Europe. At the center of the Western world, we see the old pro-
cesses of discrimination, exploitation, and exclusion of those who are not  
refugees but rather full citizens of the EU and onto whom mechanisms of dif-
ferentiation, marginalization, and exclusion are imposed. Currently there  
are right-wing populist parties and citizens, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, antiblack 
and anti-POC, homophobic squadrons that are pressing heavily to enter the 
national parliaments in Europe; and there are those who oppose such situations 
and try to change them, though the changes are minimal, because Fortress 
Europe and the EU bureaucracy constantly increase the system of ghettoization 
and seclusion. 
Racism and the rhetoric of protection of “our” way of life is suffocating people 
that already have to deal with class-based exploitation. They are divided 
through the constructed category of race, and eviscerated and subjugated 
through racialization that imposes brutal divisions and criminalization based on 
skin color. Among all these trajectories of violent realities and brutalities, 
which includes people being killed because of their ethnicity, those who are 
ghettoized as citizens or will never become citizens and are just left to die, 
we face one of the worst crises of humanity imaginable, with millions in search 
of a better life elsewhere, fleeing war, poverty, and destruction by imperial, 
hegemonic war-states. 
Thousands are trapped in countries bordering Fortress Europe, or are aban-
doned in Greece, which is being transformed into a threshold state of European 
(Western) democracy. Millions are held against their will in border states  
outside of Europe. Those in power—that is, hierarchical, imperial, connoted with 
a vicinity and servility to NATO and other regional military formations that 
work only for the interest of capital and processes of financialization—are fully 
subcontracting themselves to formalities, normativity, and “legalities” to  
such a degree that we need new expressions, terminologies, methodologies, 
and strategies for thinking and acting. What is going on today is not possible 
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The proposed shift from biopolitics to necropolitics is a measure of the radical 
recapturing of the biopolitical, in the light of its production of apolitical  
ideological subjects, or stylish biopolitical ones (not political subjects at all), 
predominantly in the first capitalist world. Within such a context, it is therefore 
necessary to ask how the political can be conceptualized in the light of neo-
liberal processes of governmentality within capitalism (which today constitute 
a state of exception imposed on subjectivities) that regulate, subjugate, and 
systematically control us. Moreover, how are we to reconcile the overarching 
political and social structures of global capitalism and turbo-powered neo-
liberalism with the autonomy (i.e., freedom) of conceiving art projects, which 
is seen so fitting to the current configuration of the originary biopolitical 
character of the paradigm of contemporary art? This question leads us toward 
a bizarre complicity based, on the one hand, on a struggle for rights that 
makes us even more “commodified subjects” (and therefore hopefully less dis-
pensable), and, on the other, to retake a “license to kill,” performing necro-
politics as the politics par excellence of the first world.
Nation-State, War State
The transformations that I have outlined—from biopolitics to necropolitics—
lead us to another fundamental question when engaging with borders: How is 
the contemporary state constituted today within global capitalism, and what 
has changed and what has been lost? In the trajectory of capitalism’s devel-
opment, we can grasp as well the notion of a transition from nation-state sover-
eignty to transnational institutions of power and war state politics. With the  
fall of the Berlin Wall, and enabled by it, came the disintegration of the West-
phalian power principle. Established by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the 
principle of a nation-state’s sovereignty is recognized by international-relations 
scholars as the fundamental basis of the modern Western global system of 
states, multinational corporations, and organizations as sovereign subjects. 
When the Berlin Wall fell, the Westphalian principle disintegrated and new states 
proliferated in the so-called post–Cold War era. The old-world powers (colo-
nial, occidental, and anti-Semitic), in an attempt to control the new and multi-
plying (nation-)states, transformed themselves from imperial nation-states  
to war states (as brilliantly envisioned by Santiago López Petit).6 It was this logic 
that enabled the major international powers to maintain order and hegemonic 
The term “biopolitics” (bio in Latin means life) was coined by Michel Foucault 
in the 1970s.4 For him the word meant to “make live and let die.” It is obvious 
that Foucault’s biopolitics, originating at the time of the Cold War, is a specific 
con ceptualization of capitalist liberal governmentality exclusively reserved  
for the first capitalist world. It presented the liberal capitalism of the 1970s  
as “taking care”—but only of the citizens of first-world nation-states. What was 
going on in the second (the Eastern European) and third worlds was not  
at the center of the management of life in the first-world. The title of the 1973 
James Bond film is an accurate description of biopolitics: Live and Let Die.
As with biopolitics, I propose a short definition of necropolitics in order to  
understand Mbembe’s conceptualization of it. The idea behind necropolitics is: 
let live and make die. Necropolitics presents a management of life for the 
global neoliberal capitalist world. It transforms the aim to “make live” into “let 
live,” but “let live” is a form of life that is far from the cozy structures of better 
life (“make live”). To let live means pure abandonment. You can live if you 
have the means (with the help of a lineage or pedigree of money and power) 
and all those who cannot live in the situation of pure abandonment by the 
neoliberal public capitalist structures are left to die, or in many other occasions 
made to die; for example, in New Orleans, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and in 
many other places and times around the world.
Though Mbembe elaborated on necropolitics in order to describe the intensi-
fied subjugation of life in Africa to capital exploitation and governmentality of 
the social, political, and economic through the war machine (named the 
“post colony” by Mbembe in 2010, proposing a view on Africa different from that 
of postcolonialism),5 necropolitics was palpably shaped throughout the world 
by the war on terror, launched by the United States (supported by the United 
Kingdom and NATO) as a response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the 
Twin Towers in New York.
Necropolitics precisely defines the forms taken by neoliberal global capitalist’s 
cuts in financial support for public health and social and education struc-
tures. These extreme cuts present intensive neoliberal procedures of rational-
ization and civilization. The outcome is the privatization of all public services,  
a policy that brings together structural racism, massive poverty, and class  
divisions. It is possible to argue that in global capitalism, the institutions— 
primarily—of the ideological state apparatuses function as biopower; therefore, 
art and culture as well as theory and criticism and education are today pure 
biopolitical machines (dedicated solely to protecting themselves and their 
hegemonic interests) while the social and the political (with an allegedly auton-
omous judicial system) are pure instruments of necropolitical global 
capitalism.
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What is the racial state? Benjamin Stora talks of it as “ethnoracial regulation.”9  
It is necessary to position racism as a central category within the parameters 
of the abstract state. The denunciation of racism is not adequate; nor is it suffi-
cient to say that the repressive apparatuses of the state have ameliorated the 
harsh treatment of migrants, second- and third-generations migrant youths 
(as the war on terror that was launched in 2001 imposed radicalized discrimina-
tion procedures against those identified as Muslims), and refugees and asylum 
seekers. Therefore we need to recognize that we have a fully constructed  
racial state in the form of European and global capitalism. Today the nation-
state rests upon a foundation of structural racism, and it is a racial state that 
has to be put at the center of the analysis. We have also to be alert to Ann Laura 
Stoler’s contention that “the racial states can be innovative and agile beasts, 
their categories flexible, and their classifications protean and subject to 
change. They thrive on ambiguities and falter on rigidities. […] Racial forma-
tions have long marked differences by other names.”10
In such a situation it is necessary to incorporate—in every art and cultural 
project and even more in every and each analysis that deals with the concep-
tualization of the state—three formations: the nation-state, the war state,  
and the racial state. Racism is also central to (re)constructing national history, 
by silencing histories of art and culture made by migrant intellectuals, and  
by silencing gay and lesbian groups and movements, and so on. Therefore it is 
necessary to include a systematic presentation of racism and anti-Semitism 
(as a genuine racism) within the genealogy of a contemporary neoliberal state 
and all projects that aim to counter racism.
I would argue that this process of racialization develops a racist basis for prac-
tices, structures, and discourses in the field of culture and art, and is being  
reproduced in the contemporary division of labor and in new forms of exploi-
tation and expropriation. Racialization, which has colonialism at its core, is  
today enabled through new forms of neo-colonialism; that is, coloniality made 
operative on the level of knowledge, theory, and practice. Therefore this book 
in the most concise way rethinks forced racializations and enclosure and dis-
closure, exploitation, and expropriations of those who are seen as and made to 
be marginal in neoliberal global capitalism. 
control over the new states born into the post–Cold War world. This transition 
has curbed the sovereignty of nation-states, which prevailed until the 1990s, 
and more importantly it has considerably limited the sovereignty of the  
new nation-states constituted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This allowed for 
the proliferation of numerous new states but without the old nation-state  
sovereignty and also implemented the transition of the old colonial, imperial 
nation-states into war states. Today, nation-states can no longer give am nesty, 
at least in theory, to those who have committed war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide.7
This change in sovereignty and hegemony that happened in the transition from 
nation-state to a new form of state, the war state, in global neoliberal capitalism 
enabled the old colonial and imperial powers of the West to stay in power 
without recourse to direct military intervention (this is used only when no other 
friendly mediation by major powers is effective, as for example in the case  
of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and so on). It was necessary to use a certain “veil” to 
conceal this transition from nation-state to war state. It is at this point that,  
as stated by Pierre Hazan, global or transitional justice enters the equation. 
In the war state, the state apparatus exists only to maintain the illusion of social 
harmony, rather than actually taking care of the lives and needs of a proper 
population. Being characterized by its biopolitical features, manifest in the 
politics of taking care though systematically controlling the life of the popula-
tion, the contemporary state is transformed into a necropolitical regime, 
where its politics is solely concerned with taking part in the war of transnational 
capital, leaving its citizens to fend for themselves.
The civilizing mission of the old bourgeois, colonial Western European states at 
the core of today’s EU is not a benevolent attempt to help the other former 
Eastern European states to “progress”; it is the way in which the new regulation 
is made effective. Capital, within global neoliberal capitalism, specifically  
impinges on the legal and/or political barriers between states. The fact that we 
live in one world, as it is so often said, does not mean that we are exempted 
from borders, but that certain obsolete forms are removed so that the mobility 
of transnational capital might flourish, while at the same time new and other 
forms of borders are erected.
In this change from the nation-state to the war state, we have to take into  
account the missing link; that is, the racial state. In this case, however, the link 
is not missing as much as it is unspoken. As pointed out by Ann Laura Stoler, 
the racial state exists but is unnamed.8
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Göksun Yazıcı, in her contribution “Differential Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in 
Turkey: Institutions of Migration Management and Temporary Protection Regu-
lation,” talks about borders that do not aim to exclude but are used to control 
migration. Migration management is the new form of control and a new notion 
that has changed the exclusive nature of borders. Governments try to select 
migrants, not only in terms of those who are considered “regular” and “irregular,” 
but also in terms of migrants who are considered “qualified” and “unquali-
fied.” In 2011, Turkey opened the borders for Syrian refugees without calling 
them refugees, and it established new institutions to manage migration. In this 
case, migration was not meant to be stopped, but to be managed. This new 
phenomenon, however, belongs to our age and not just to Turkey.
Rubia Salgado and Gergana Mineva, in their contribution “Stream of Memory,” 
echo the long history of hopes and disappointments connected with the 
inten sification of processes of institutional and social racializations. The text 
is written in an anaphoric form, which means that each of the successive  
sentences repeats the phrase “we remember.” The result is a poetic-political 
litany of betrayals and promises to migrant communities in Austria, promises 
that are today made obsolete by the Austrian state and the EU. Therefore  
we remember historical events and constellations where participation and 
transformation of and for the migrant communities had promising emancipa-
tory futures.
Stanimir Panayotov, in his essay, “Necropolitics in the East,” considers, as a point 
of departure, necropolitics in Eastern Europe, which he connects to a sort  
of racial-colonial silencing that was able to both maintain civic peace and sup-
press ethnic warfare (respectively in the capitalist West and in the Ottoman/
socialist East). When ethnicity reveals itself as race, class is deployed as racial-
ized, and peace is illuminated as property qualification, then it is no longer 
possible to maintain that racism is not a useful analytic category to analyze what 
is going on in the Balkans. Thus race becomes central for the study of nec-
ropolitics as well in the east of Europe and opens up the gates for its analytical 
and retroactive use.
Khaled Ramadan, in his contribution “Set City—Post-snuff Film and the New 
Age of Reality Cinematography,” reflects on ISIS, the Jihadist militant group in 
Iraq and Syria (also known as Islamic State) that produces videos of behead-
ings as a form of terror and propaganda. ISIS’s videos did not bring about a 
new film ing technique, yet they did expand the political propaganda-film genre. 
These videos introduced a new era in the film arena—a contemporary cate-
gory of violent visualization that challenges any Hollywood production, which 
Structure of the Book
The title of the book, Border Thinking, is not an unknown topic; the idea stems 
from postcolonial and decolonial studies. But why not reappropriate the border, 
recontextualize it, and remobilize it? It is obvious that the fields of theory,  
philosophy, and cultural studies are also racialized, where emancipations are 
only seen inside the Eurocentric agendas that marginalize the power of post-
colonial studies. 
Border Thinking comprises twenty-six contributions by thirty authors (theore-
ticians, writers, artists, activists, curators, etc.). These authors do not share 
the same space of struggle, but their analysis, their views, their discourses, their 
visual materials, and their words form a space of struggle through transverse 
connections empowered by antagonistic encounters. Each contributor demon-
strates what it means to take a political, theoretical, and artistic stance.
We could certainly point out that the place of management of refuges im-
posed by Fortress Europe and the machination of the EU is in Turkey. It is impor-
tant to understand what is to be expected by the EU with all these violently 
and shamefully orchestrated procedures of total abandonment of the refugees. 
Göksun Yazıcı and Çetin Gürer were invited to take part in the project “Gezi  
Before and After” (2013–16), organized by the PCAP, at the Academy of Fine Arts 
Vienna in 2016.11 Yazıcı and Gürer, along with other participants, spoke on the 
transformative potentials after the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and 
were invited to contribute to this book. 
Border Thinking consists of theoretical analyses as well as artistic projects that 
are posited in parallel to theoretical analysis. These works are ex amples of  
interventional art-political works that use images and text to engage with polit-
ical questions rather than being descriptive art works. These con tributions  
enter directly into debates of border thinking by taking into account the division 
in neoliberal global work that goes along the line of a colonial/racial divide. 
The structure of this five-part book follows a trajectory of what I describe as 
“intervention politics.” 
Part 1 is titled “Exposing” and identifies the status of refugees, migrants, queer/ 
trans people of color, and last but not least the humanities and sub jec tivities  
at state-border regimes in the global capitalist world, as well as looking inside 
different institutional, visual, performative, cinematic, and memory disposi-
tives. The first part includes the following contributions:
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a romanticized version of possible futures and when the freedom is (ab)used as 
a key notion of the neoliberal society? Petrović therefore discusses the false 
choice between the meaning of legality and illegality when it comes to difficult 
questions of today’s global war on terror(ism) that creates a state of perma-
nent crisis.
Marika Schmiedt conveys in her Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental 
Right to a Better Life! a political commentary on the asylum and refugee policies 
in Austria that are displayed in five posters. She centers her critique on the 
Refugee Guide issued by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior in 2016. The 
guide, as stated by Schmiedt, is “a ridiculous rule-of-conduct picture-book 
guide” that is supposed to provide guidance about rules and values in Austria, 
but on the contrary, it reproduces clichéd resentments. The only thing this 
guide delivers is that the EU will never manage to grow beyond its Eurocentric 
thought processes. 
Maira Enesi Caixeta illustrates in “Racialized Dysphoria” the disconnection to her 
own blackness because of racism and colorism. This disconnection is called 
racialized dysphoria, or colonial detachment, and is described by Caixeta as a 
state of unease and as a feeling of not being comfortable in one’s body, a for-
mulation often used in transgender contexts. She articulates autobiographically 
the procedure when “mixed” black people are being torn apart from their 
blackness in what she recognizes a very powerful colonial tool. It is rooted in 
colonial history of the white supremacist system. Its goal is to whitewash the 
“other” that as not being white is being presented as something bad and unde-
sirable, as something to be eliminated.
Part 3 is titled “Get Down To” and seeks to get down to the bottom of obfus-
cated, veiled, normalized, rhetorical, and increasingly domesticated academic 
rationales, and therefore insists on the question: What kinds of bodies are 
abandoned and made superfluous along and with/in borders in neoliberal global 
capitalism, and under what conditions? It comprises the following contributions:
Shirley Anne Tate, in her “Border Bodies: Mixedness and Passing in Prison 
Break,” explores the runaway hit Prison Break, an American TV drama created 
by Paul Scheuring, which was broadcast on Fox from 2005 to 2009. The main 
character, Michael Scofield, who is played by Wentworth Miller, takes a key 
place in her analysis. UK-born Miller is black/white mixed race. His father is of 
African- American and Jamaican descent, which is already a mixed category 
because of enslavement histories, while his mother is a white American. Tate 
explores the positioning of Miller as the lead protagonist in all five series  
specifically because of his passing as white. The main question is what this 
might mean for skin color borders in “post-race” states. His passing as white 
makes us note that although whiteness is more than skin color, the recognition 
are commonly produced for profit, while ISIS’s video are strictly produced for  
political propaganda and for recruitment. The real death of the protagonist  
at the execution set gave birth to a new notion of political propaganda produc-
tion, which Ramadan calls “reality cinematography.”
Betül Seyma Küpeli, in her artwork RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION?, questions the 
hyper-consumption of (im)migration as a new resource for art and culture 
presented at numerous international art exhibitions and events. Küpeli provides 
connections and poses questions on historical, political, and ideological  
levels about architecture, city planning, and artworks that take advantage of 
migration and refugees.
Part 2 is titled “Mobilization” and discusses who the (non-)individuals, (non-)
communities, (non-)subalterns, and (non-)citizens are that can mobilize trans-
formations of openly evident inequalities, exploitations, and dispossessions. 
It includes the following contributions:
Fieke Jansen (Tactical Technology Collective), in her “Smarter Borders: Chal-
lenges and Limitations of Data-Driven Borders,” takes a critical look at borders. 
Questions to do with travel, migration, and the refugee crisis are no longer 
limited to the physical crossing of borders. Data about people is collected, 
stored, and analyzed before the individual even arrives at a border. Jansen pres-
ents examples of data being shared between airlines and border patrol, bio-
metric data programs that track refugees across countries or social-media 
comments that can result in denial of entry. She questions the data practices, 
the actors, and motives behind it. 
Musawenkosi Ndlovu, in his contribution “Borderless Global Public Sphere? 
Western and Southern News Media in Africa,” exposes the media expansions by 
dominant neoliberal global capitalist countries into Africa through programs 
such as CCTV Africa (China), SABC Africa (South Africa), E News Channel Africa 
(South Africa), and Africa News Network (South Africa). These expansions  
reproduce new defensive borders of “us” and “them.” It is not only that all of 
these international media are creating new borders, but they are based on  
internal social class distinctions. Africa is shaped by Western forms of exclusion-
ary global capitalism, which reproduces itself at local-national and regional 
levels in Africa. 
Jelena Petrović, in her contribution “What Does Freedom Stand for Today?,” 
argues that the simultaneous and paradoxical act of reproducing and resisting 
dominant social structures puts us in the position to rethink what the politics 
of liberation or what its revolutionary practices are today. Such social practices 
are revolutionary in that they are politically and socially transformative in a 
very concrete context. But what happens, she asks, when these facts become 
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Nietzsche in his book The Gay Science (1882) as starting point: “We have left 
the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us. [...] 
Now, little ship, look out!” The quote is also used as an epigraph to Paul Gilroy’s 
formative remapping of global modernity titled The Black Atlantic (1993), in 
which Gilroy discussed the slave ship as the ambiguous artifact of modernity 
and mobility. 
Breaks with the usual responses within the terrain of struggle are explored  
in Part 4, titled “Demasking,” which demands to know what are the ways and 
means of attacking contemporary genealogies of discrimination, while de-
masking past colonialism and anti-Semitism. It comprises the following contri-
butions:
Zoltán Kékesi, in his “Transpositions: Jews, Roma, and Other Aliens in the Radical-
Right Culture in Hungary,” contends that racist imaginations about different 
“Others” do not simply replace, but rather, reinforce each other. His paper is a 
case study on racism in contemporary Hungary, and examines cultural prac-
tices connected to an anti-Semitic memorial site. He discloses how public 
performances at memorial sites create—through references to symbolic topog-
raphies and radical popular culture—a constellation of anti-Jewish, anti-Roma, 
and anti-immigrant discourses. He addresses the topic of different Others, 
employing notions of “white places,” ethnic territories, borders, and (im)migration. 
C.A.S.I.T.A. (Loreto Alonso, Eduardo Galvagni, Diego del Pozo Barriuso) in  
conversation with Juan Guardiola, in their contribution “Diffractions at Borders,” 
uncovers the complexities that happen and appear around the passage be-
tween Morocco and Spain and its representations, using Vallas de la frontera 
en Ceuta y Melilla 1985–2014 (Infografías) [Fences at the border in Ceuta and 
Melilla 1985–2014 (Infographics)] as a point of departure. This work appropriates 
a set of existing prints and facsimiles from the workshops of the Spanish Army 
Geographical Service, and uses printed images to intervene with them. The 
work was presented in 2014 as part of the exhibition “Colonia Apócrifa: Imágenes 
de la Colonialidad en España” [Apocryphal colony: Images of coloniality in 
Spain], which questioned the meaning, production, and diffusion of colonial im-
ages in the history of Spanish art from the fifteenth century to the present day.
Neda Hosseinyar’s Politics of Fear is a critical reflection of slogans found  
on posters from political campaigns by different political parties in the EU. All 
parties use direct Islamophobic and anti-Muslim content to communicate 
their different Far Right political positions. The parties that use such rhetoric and 
are exposed by Hosseinyar include the National Front (France), Lega Nord  
(Italy), Dawn—National Coalition (Czech Republic), National Democracy (Spain), 
Freedom Party of Austria, pro NRW (Germany), National Democratic Party of 
Germany, Swiss People’s Party, and Vlaams Belang (Belgium).
as white still dictates which agents can transform injustice and subvert dis-
possession in the twenty-first century. 
Tjaša Kancler, in their contribution “Interrogating Silences: Crisis, Borders, and 
Decolonial Interferences,” focuses on the European space as a bordered 
space to rethink the silenced colonial/imperial history of European migration 
politics and reconfiguration of internal and external borders in relation to  
the coloniality of gender, the control of subjectivity and knowledge, and politics 
of death today. The main idea here is to bring into discussion the ways in 
which the coloniality of power is challenged by queer/trans*. The term “trans*” 
with an asterisk is being used as an umbrella concept to include many differ-
ent gender expressions and identities, such as trans, transsexual, transgen-
der, queer, and so on, and emphasizes the heterogeneity of bodies, identities, 
and experiences that go beyond the imposed gender-binary social norms. 
This means that we have to re-conceptualize Europe and European city spaces 
differently. 
Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, in her contribution “Toward a Construction of the 
History of a (Dis)encounter: The Feminist Reason and the Antiracist and  
Decolonial Agency in Abya Yala,” articulates, from a decolonial point of view, a 
construction of a genealogy of the relationship between feminist politics  
and black and indigenous antiracist struggles in Abya Yala. Abya Yala, which 
in the Kuna language means “land in its full maturity” or “land of vital blood,” is 
the name used by the ancient Kuna people to refer to the American continent 
before the arrival of Columbus. Espinosa Miñoso explores the late emergence 
of antiracist, decolonial, and ethno-racial movements and struggles in Latin 
America, understanding mestizaje (the process of racial mixture) ideology and 
the processes of broad Westernization as obstacles to overcome and face  
the racist imperial reason, even by feminism, in its attempt to decolonize such 
a reason. 
Njideka Stephanie Iroh, in her poem “A Diva’s Dish Darling and You Wish You Had 
It,” deals with the politics of radicalization in current times, reflecting on  
social media (such as the narrative of resistance in hashtag culture), exotifica-
tion, and body culture. Language remains a powerful medium of commu-
nication in its ever-changing form, utilized in mainstream media to belittle the 
realities of those constructed as other (no matter their social, political status, 
or their class).
Suvendrini Perera, in her contribution “Now, Little Ship, Look Out!,” reflects 
on the asylum boat as a go-between land and sea, origin and destination, free-
dom and unfreedom. She considers the asylum boat in the context of other  
illegalized voyages and trafficked bodies and through unfinished movements of 
slavery, empire, and capital. Perera uses the cryptic exclamation by Friedrich 
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presently widespread worldwide, especially since 2001. The condition of Israel-
Palestine continues and intensifies through a mechanism of heightened and 
contradictory internal relations. This intense political reality—in which every-
thing cancels out everything else—is seen by Simon as a form of hyper -
neutrality, where repetitions and contradictions seem to dictate the conditions 
for a heightened standstill. 
Ilya Budraitskis, in his contribution “The Russian Revolution in Dreams and  
Reality,” reflects on the one-hundred-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution 
of 1917 on today’s post-Soviet Russia and Europe. Budraitskis en visions a crisis 
characterized not only as an economic and social crisis, but also as an ideo-
logical crisis of the ruling elite, which has no vision of the future or the social 
and political evolvement of the country. The lack of understanding by the  
ruling elite of its own place in the ongoing history, as well as the deepening gap 
between the ruling elite on one side and most of Russian society on the other, 
is now overshadowed by an imaginary continuity with the historical idea of 
“great Russia.”
Adla Isanović, in her contribution “Sarajevo, Rotten Heart of Europe,” discloses 
the major European commemoration in 2014 to mark the one-hundredth an ni-
versary of the outbreak of the First World War in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The commemoration was organized as a multidisciplinary festival that 
included a number of cultural, sporting, educational, and scientific events, all 
presented under the same banner: “Sarajevo, Heart of Europe.” This title was 
given to Sarajevo by EU states to present the city as the center of European 
concerns and emotions, though this is not the case. Isanović contends that the 
present social, economic, and political reality of Sarajevo today is the reality  
of pure abandonment of Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU to the 
extent that it is possible to state that the proclamation of Sarajevo as a heart  
is rather that of a “rotten heart.”
Hiroshi Yoshioka, in his contribution “Hiroshima, Fukushima and Beyond: Bor-
ders and Transgressions in Nuclear Imagination,” reviews the history of Japan 
since 1945 with regard to the collective and ambivalent imagination about  
the nuclear disaster, by revisiting several important representations in ar tistic 
expressions as well as in the popular culture. Yoshioka examines a couple  
of recent examples of art projects closely related to nuclear issues, especially 
the photographic series Hiroshima by Miyako Ishiuchi, and the video/ 
performance works Japan Syndrome by Tadasu Takamine, which focuses on 
the question of Fukushima.
Aneta Stojnić, in her contribution “(Dis)embodied Subjectivities and Technol-
ogies of Control,” analyzes the technologies of control in the context of con-
temporary Europe. Taking into the account the genealogy of global changes 
that have led to the current mass migrations, commonly known as the refugee 
crisis, she looks at processes of dehumanization that precede the mecha-
nisms of subjugation. Contesting the “post-human hype,” she examines possi-
bilities of detecting new subjectivities and embodied politics against the 
framework of biopolitics and necropolitics. She exposes the potentialities of 
liminal bodies and liminal spaces. 
Çetin Gürer, in his contribution “A Stateless People against the State: The 
Kurdish Autonomy as a Limitation of Nation-State Power,” analyzes democratic 
autonomy as a model to limit the power of the Turkish state and discusses the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey. The movement proposes democratic autonomy 
as a framework to establish a new democratic administrative structure for 
Turkey and at the same time to solve the Kurdish question. This model assumes 
a historical paradox between (nation-)state and society, and it stands for  
defending society against the state. In this sense, the democratic autonomy 
looks like a model that limits the Turkish state to three spheres: administrative-
ly, constitutionally, and within society.
The book concludes with Part 5, titled “Disconnecting,” that aims to disconnect 
from the obvious mischievous state of bloody laissez faire neoliberal global 
capitalism to disclose hidden neoliberal imperial regimes of coloniality, subju-
gation, and subordination. When breaking with such regimes, we (re)connect 
to other struggles, materialities, imaginaries, and futures, reestablishing 
changed theoretical, epistemological, critical, and political horizons. The last 
part includes the following contributions:
Miguel González Cabezas questions, in Plus Ultra, the motto of the Spanish 
government that includes the words “plus ultra” (“further beyond”), and refers 
to agreements signed between Spain and several countries in Africa in order  
to control refugees and migrant influx in the EU. This plus ultra, that is a hege-
monic externalization of the (Spain/EU) border, started with a special col la-
boration with Morocco for the control of the Spanish borders and the European 
ones within it. Morocco, in return, received financial support. This control  
has been also implemented by other countries, such as Italy, and the most recent 
case has been the 2016 EU polemical agreement with Turkey.
Joshua Simon, in his contribution “Phantom Politics in Palestine-Israel: From 
Double Negation to Double Erasure,” explores the current condition of deadlock 
in Israel and the unique regime that has been established since the occupation 
of Palestinian territories. This condition in Simon’s analysis highlights several 
characteristics of contemporary models of neoliberal sovereignty that are 
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From Thinking to Striking the Border 
This publication brings together a whole spectrum of ways in which to think of 
the political, economic, social, and legal structures that are organizing the  
life and death of refugees and the life and death of citizens and noncitizens. It 
shows how these two distinctive categories are produced, while second-  
and third-grade citizens are left somewhere in between. It shows the imperial-
geopolitical administration and the way media and technology work these 
days to produce a specific hyper-digitalization. Palpably present on one side 
are the narratives of deportation, evacuation, marginalization, racialization, 
and the ways of empowering, counter-attacking, and thinking radically against 
such policies on the other. Finally, we see that the border is a construction 
that rapidly changes the relation between the center and the margin, and that 
when looking from the border, the hegemonic and ossified center easily 
collapses.
Therefore logic of the interrelation of these five parts in the book is from think-
ing to striking. I refer to the notion of “striking the border” to mean to strike 
against the border in order to clash with the border and to eventually destroy it. 
Striking the border was formulated inside the Transitional Social Strike Platform, 
which regroups different organizations, collectives, groups, and initiatives  
in Europe to try to find different ways of crossing the border and obstructing it 
(the platform meetings were held in Poznań in 2015, and London and Ljubljana 
in 2017). The border prevents freedom of movement and prevents the trans-
national connection of labor that counters militarized capital.
The Migrant and Migration
In conclusion, through all parts of the book a new subjectivity can be detected—
this is the migrant who, though under huge processes of dehumanization, 
ghettoization, and exploitation, encapsulates powerful agency for changing the 
ossified, exploitative Europe. The migrant and migration present a force of 
crossing over the border that demands a radical change of all old-modernity 
notions of community, democracy, subjectivity, representation, organization, and 
labor. Strikingly powerful is the relation between migrants and refugees and 
the perversely violent ways in which the imperial powers relate to different 
managements of migration and of refugees.
The migrant today is the fundamental category through which to rethink the 
meaning of citizenship, non-citizenship, management of life, and manage-
ment of death, as well as the relationship between governmentality and sover-
eignty. Central to all these notions is the colonial/racial divide, the processes  
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of discrimination, ghettoization, and seclusions directly connected to racializa-
tion, historical colonialism, and contemporary coloniality.
At the border, through the border, and beyond the border, here and now, we 
think of a revolt, shift, transformation, insubordination, reversal, radical change, 
and even a revolution.
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People are not made to live in borderline situations; they avoid them or 
to try to flee them as quickly as possible. And yet man1 encounters them 
everywhere, sees and feels them everywhere. Let us take the atlas of 
the world: it is all borders. Borders of oceans and continents. Deserts and 
forests. […] And the borders of monarchies and republics? Kingdoms 
remote in time and lost civilizations? Human migration? The borders to 
which the Mongols reached. The Khazars. The Huns. How many victims, 
how much blood and suffering are connected with this business of 
borders! 
—Ryszard Kapuściński, Imperium2
Ryszard Kapuściński, the famous journalist and historian who reported on the 
decolonization process of most African countries and birth of new nation-
states, defines borders as both natural (borders of oceans and continents) and 
historical (the borders of monarchies and republics); however, he tends to  
naturalize the existence of borders. According to him, border defense creates 
an endless country in this world called cemetery: “There is no end to the 
cemeteries of those who have been killed the world over in the defense of 
borders.”3 These words are written in Kapuściński’s 1994 book, Imperium, which 
is a report from two different historical periods of Russia as the USSR and as  
a post -Soviet country. 
In the 1990s Kapuściński witnessed the birth of new nation-states and their 
wars. This is the historical background of his definition of borders; it exclusively 
belongs to the nation-state. That is why he defines them as perfectly exclu-
sive and bloody. His definition of border defense also reveals the characteristics 
of the 1990s. Although the period was called the age of globalization, the 
framework for basic concepts was still in the context of nation-state. Ten years 
after he wrote these words, the face of the world had changed. The term  
“globalization,” which explains the period and obscures it at the same time, did 
not destroy nation-states but it altered them and the functions of borders.  
Migration also has new content—new management features are added to the 
whole process to create new in-between spaces, new practices, new statuses, 
and so forth. It is not just about crossing borders, but it is more about a  
management process for both: for migrants and those managing the borders. 
Differential  
Inclusion of  
Syrian Refugees 
in Turkey
Institutions of  
Migration 




1 Although the word “man” could refer to 
the human race in general, we should be 
critical of a gender-neutral language that 
minimizes assumptions about the social 
gender.
2  Ryszard Kapuściński, Imperium (New York: 
Vintage International, 1994), 20.
3  Ibid., 57. 
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Exclusive / Inclusive Border 
As the labor regime changes, the definition of migration and borders changes 
as well. The idea of a migration regime emerges to open up a space for  
negotiating practices. It is obvious that a migration regime does not target the 
exclusion of migrants, but rather reduces them to their economic dimension 
and in so doing exploits them. In other words, the aim is not to close the border 
of rich countries but to build up a system of barriers that ultimately serves  
to include migrant work. Borders are characterized by an ambivalence that de-
rives from their internal and external functions. The crisis of the nation-state 
continuously dislocates borders: “Borders are never purely local institutions, 
never reducible to a simple history of conflicts and agreements between neigh-
boring powers and groups, but in fact are always global, a way of dividing  
the world into regions, therefore places, therefore a way of configuring the world 
or making it representable, as the history of maps and mapping techniques 
testifies. Borders are constitutive of the transindividual relationship to the 
world, or being in the world, when it is predicated on a plurality of subjects.”4
In the global world, borders do not function for total exclusion, but for regulated 
inclusion: “Differential inclusion describes how inclusion in a sphere, society  
of realm can involve various degrees of subordination, rule, discrimination, rac-
ism, disenfranchisement, exploitation, and segmentation.”5 And what’s more, 
“differential inclusion registers the multiplication of migration control devices 
within, at and beyond the borders of nation-state (point systems, externaliza-
tion, conditional freedom of movement, fast-tracked border crossing for elites, 
short term labor contracts) and the multiplication of status they imply. Link 
between migration control and regimes of labor management that create dif-
ferent degrees of precarity, vulnerability, and freedom by granting and closing 
access to resources and rights according to economic, individualizing, and 
racist rationales. New internal borders.”6
Turkey’s open-border policy ended in March 2015, after it accepted almost 
three million Syrians. Accepting them into the country did not mean including 
them in the country; on the contrary, Turkey has its own limitations to define 
the refugee status, as will be discussed below, and was reluctant to see Syrians 
According to Kapuściński, this attitude toward borders is part of human nature. 
However, as post-structural philosophy has shown us, human nature has  
no essence but has historical content: it is historically constructed; it is not an 
ahistorical, eternal entity. In other words, human attitude toward borders  
reveals nothing but a new global-labor regime. Yes, people still try to avoid or 
try to flee their own countries under threatening circumstances in an attempt 
to reach safe and sustainable lives. Kapuściński sees borders as absolutely  
exclusive, absolutely human-proof; however, today we see that thousands of 
people are crossing borders. 
Nowadays, borders do not aim to exclude people but are used to try to control 
migration. They are porous, and governments try to select migrants not only 
in terms of “regular” and “irregular” but in terms of “qualified” and “unqualified.” 
This essay aims to discuss the case of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. In  
2011 Turkey opened borders for Syrian refugees without calling them refugees, 
and it established new institutions to manage migration. “Migration man age-
ment” was the new term that changed the exclusive nature of borders. In the 
case of Turkey, migration was not meant to be stopped but to be managed. 
However, as we will see, this new phenomenon belongs to our time and not 
just to Turkey: migration management does not aim to stop but to slow down 
the speed of migration and to control it. 
The difference between the terms “refugee” and “migrant” is quite controversial. 
Refugees are defined as people who have to migrate because of “political” 
reasons, such as war or other deadly political events, however, migrants are 
defined as people who are looking for better economic opportunities without 
having political problems. This division echoes the strict border between  
the economic and political that was drawn up by classical economics itself.  
Its aim was to “liberate” economy from political intervention while claiming that 
the economy is not political in order to hide class distinctions. However, like 
the feminist motto that suggests the private is political, class status is political, 
lack of better economic opportunities is political, and poverty political. In 
other words, the border between political and economic is political. That is why 
this essay will attempt to break down this border and the terms “refugees” 
and “migrants” will be used interchangeably, since political disasters destroy 
livelihoods and are therefore economic events, and because a lack of eco-
nomic opportunity and class status are political events, too. 
Although Turkey was proud of its “open-border” policy (the Turkey-Syria border 
was closed in March 2015), this case revealed that a border is never a local  
institution in this global world. As we need to think of the EU-Turkey refugee 
deal that extends EU borders toward Turkey and shifts the responsibility of 
bordering to a third country. Before starting to discuss the case, we need to 
define a basic term: “differential inclusion.”
4  Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border 
as Method; or, The Multiplication of Labor 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 
316. 
5  Maribel Casas-Cortes et al., “New 
Keywords: Migration and Borders,” 




collaborative writing project aimed at 
developing a nexus of terms and concepts 
that fill-out the contemporary problematic 
of migration. The paper is organized in 
four parts: (i) Introduction, (ii) Migration, 
Knowledge, Politics, (iii) Bordering, and 
(iv) Migrant Space/Times.
6  Ibid., 27.
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secure and protective country that means there is no need for international 
protection. Most of the Syrian refugees who have tried to escape from Turkey— 
termed “irregular migrants”—are those that try to reach the Greek islands to 
apply for international protection. 
That said, the provincial DGMM directorates have only recently become fully 
operational and have so far delivered only a small number of procedure and 
status decisions on international protection applicants. The UNHCR assumes 
a key role in Turkey as a “complementary” protection actor.8
The DGMM is the agency in charge of registering and granting status to refu-
gees from Syria within the scope of the temporary protection regime. Turkey’s 
Disaster and Relief Management Agency (AFAD) is in charge of the camps set 
up for refugees from Syria, and also assumes a coordinating role regarding 
the provision of rights and services to the non-camp population of temporary 
protection refugees. UNHCR in Turkey assumes a limited supplementary role  
in relation to the population subject to the temporary protection regime. All  
nationals of Syria and stateless Palestinians originating from Syria are eligible 
for temporary protection in Turkey. In other words, the TPR entails ground  
for exclusion from temporary protection as well as the cancellation of temporary 
protection status. 
In order to access temporary protection status, prospective beneficiaries must 
register with DGMM and obtain a Temporary Protection Identification Card. 
Persons benefitting from temporary protection are barred from making a sep-
arate individual “international protection” request. The LFIP provides three 
types of individual international protection status in accordance with Turkey’s 
“geographical limitation” policy on the 1951 Refugee Convention: 1. Persons 
who fall within the refugee definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention and 
come from a “European country of origin” qualify for refugee status;9 2. Persons 
who fall within the refugee definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention but 
come from a so-called non-European country of origin are instead offered 
as refugees. Turkey invented new institutions for migration management.  
In other words, Turkey became an experimental case for differential inclusion 
and its institution. Below, we are discussing how Turkey invented migration- 
management institutions, new legal frameworks, temporary protection, and a 
protection regime that help to include and exclude Syrians at the same time,  
and that resulted in differentiated inclusion.
Turkish Case: Institutions of Migration Management and 
Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) 
Turkey maintains a “geographical limitation” to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
and denies refugees from non-European countries. In April 2013, Turkey  
adopted an EU-inspired new Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
(LFIP), which established a legal framework for asylum in Turkey and affirms the 
country’s obligations toward all persons in need of international protection, 
regardless of country of origin. Article 91 of LFIP envisioned the possibility of 
the implementation of a “temporary protection” regime in situations of a 
“mass influx” of refugees. Therefore LFIP for the first time introduced a legal 
concept of temporary protection under Turkish law and thereby provided  
the basic underpinning for Turkey’s de facto temporary protection practices 
with regard to refugees from Syria since March 2011. While the LFIP itself fully 
came into force in April 2014, it was not until October 22, 2014, that the  
Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) was finally published.7
The LFIP also created Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) 
to take charge of migration. Turkey implements a temporary protection regime 
for refugees from Syria that grants them the legal right to stay as well as ac-
cess to basic rights and services. DGMM is responsible for the registration and 
status decisions within the scope of the temporary protection regime, which  
is based on Article 91 of the LFIP and the TPR.
There is a problem regarding this temporary protection: Syrians refugees under 
temporary protection cannot apply for international protection, because they 
are “treated” as being accepted under protection anyway. So, they cannot  
apply to UNHCR for international protection if they have an AFAD card—which 
shows they are settled in Turkey and that Turkey is a safe third country. (Just 
to state that Turkey as a safe third country that provides protection is just a 
European dream that Europe invented for its own sake—and this point will be 
elaborated on later in this text.)
Therefore the impossibility to apply for international protection while having 
temporary protection is the most controversial point of the temporary protec-
tion refugee deal between the EU and Turkey. This deal accepts Turkey as a 
7  “Türkiye’de Geçici Koruma” (Temporary 
protection in Turkey), last modified 
December 22, 2015, http://www.goc.gov 
.tr/icerik3/turkiye%E2%80%99de-gecici 
-koruma_409_558_1097.
8  See UNHCR legal considerations: http://
www.unhcr.org/56f3ec5a9.pdf.
9  For information on the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, see http://www.unhcr.org 
/3b66c2aa10. 
10  Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: 
“Definition of the term ‘refugee’ A. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, the 
term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person 
who: (1) Has been considered a refugee 
under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 
and 30 June 1928 or under the 
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 
September 1939 or the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization; 
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the 
International Refugee Organ iz ation during 
the period of its activities shall not 
prevent the status of refugee being 
accorded to persons who fulfil the 
conditions of paragraph 2 of this section.”
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Health Care 
All registered temporary protection beneficiaries, whether residing in the camps 
or outside the camps, are covered under Turkey’s general health insurance 
scheme and have the right to access health-care services provided by public 
health-care service providers free of charge. People who are eligible for tem-
porary protection, but have not yet completed their registration, have access 
only to emergency medical services and health services pertaining to com-
municable diseases as delivered by primary health-care institutions.
Temporary protection beneficiaries are only entitled to access health-care 
services in the province where they are registered. However, where appropriate 
treatment is not available in the province of registration or where deemed 
necessary for other medical reasons, the person concerned may be referred to 
another province. For emergency medical conditions, temporary protection 
beneficiaries can receive health-care services without any restrictions on loca-
tion. It is important to point out that Syrian nationals who reside in Turkey  
on the basis of a regular “residence permit” and therefore are not registered as 
temporary protection beneficiaries, cannot benefit from free health-care ser-
vices available to those under the temporary protection regime.13
Education
Under Turkish law, “basic education” for children consists of twelve years,  
divided into three levels of four years each. All children in the Turkish jurisdic-
tion, including foreign nationals, have the right to access basic education  
services delivered by public schools. All children registered under temporary 
protection have the right to be registered at public schools for the purpose  
of basic education. However, in practice there are continuing difficulties and 
shortcomings in the access of Syrian children to educational services. The 
children accommodated in the camps have unimpeded and virtually full access 
to basic education mainly at temporary education centers administered inside 
the camps, which are schools under the supervision of Turkish Ministry of  
Education, provide instruction in Arabic by Syrian teachers. On the other hand, 
“conditional refugee” status under LFIP;10 3. Persons who do not fulfill the eli-
gibility criteria for either refugee status or conditional refugee status under 
LFIP, who would however be subjected to death penalty or torture in country 
of origin if returned, qualify for “subsidiary protection” status under LFIP.  
The Turkish legal status of “subsidiary protection.”11
Differential Inclusion: Limited Rights attached  
to Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR)
Shelter 
The TPR does not provide a right to government-provided shelter for “tempo-
rary protection beneficiaries.” However, Article 37 TPR authorizes AFAD to 
build camps to accommodate temporary protection beneficiaries. These camps 
are officially referred to as “temporary accommodation centers” and Article 
24 TPR authorizes DGMM to allow temporary protection beneficiaries to reside 
outside the camp in provinces to be determined by the DGMM. It also com-
mits that out of temporary protection beneficiaries living outside the camps, 
those who are economically needy may be accommodated in other facilities 
identified by the government.
Freedom of Movement
When the TPR was published on October 22, 2014, this regulation left the deci-
sion to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of temporary protec-
tion beneficiaries if deemed necessary to the discretion of the government and 
DGMM. As per Article 10 TPR, in the temporary protection declaration deci-
sion, the Board of Ministers may choose to contain the implementation of tem-
porary protection measures to a specific region within Turkey as opposed to 
countrywide implementation. As per Article 15 TPR, the Board of Ministers has 
the authority to order “limitations” on temporary protection measures in 
place, or the “suspension” of existing measures for a specific period or indefi-
nitely “in the event of circumstances threatening national security, public  
order, public security and public health.” While the TPR of October 22, 2014, 
created the legal basis for imposition of residential requirements and controls 
on freedom of movement of temporary protection beneficiaries, it was not 
until August 2015 that Turkish government authorities introduced controls and 
limitations on the movement of Syrians within Turkey. 
On August 29, 2015, a DGMM written instruction signed by the Minister of Inte-
rior was circulated to the governorates across Turkey, specifically ordering 
the provincial authorities in the institutions to carry out a range of measures 
to control and prevent the movement of Syrians inside Turkey.12
11  See “Types of International Protection,” 
last modified May 25, 2015, http://www 
.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/types-of-international 
-protection_917_1063_5781_icerik.
12  DGMM written instruction, no.55327416-
000-22771, August 29, 2015, on “The 
Population Movements of Syrians within 
the Scope of Temporary Protection,” 
signed by Sebahattin Ozturk, Minister of 
Interior.
13  Derived from Article 27 TPR, December 18, 
2014, AFAD Circular, no. 2014/4 on 
“Administration of Services to Foreigners 
under the Temporary Protection Regime”; 
and November 4, 2015, Ministry of Health 
directive on “Healthcare Services to Be 
Provided to Temporary Protection 
Beneficiaries.”
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Details of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal
1)   All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands from 20 March 2016 will be 
returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law,  
thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance 
with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. 
It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human  
suffering and restore public order. Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered 
and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in 
accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. 
2)   For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled 
from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will  
be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, 
as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented from the same day 
the returns start. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried 
to enter the EU irregularly. On the EU side, resettlement under this mechanism will take 
place, in the first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by Member States in the 
conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within the 
Council on 20 July 2015, of which 18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any further need 
for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of 
an additional 54.000 persons. 
3)   Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration 
opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the 
EU to this effect.
4)   Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ended or at least have been sub-
stantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be acti-
vated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme.
5)   The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating 
Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest 
by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will 
take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow the Commission to 
make, following the required assessment of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate 
proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the European Parliament and the Council 
can make a final decision.
6)   The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the  
initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding 
of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from 
Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the 
field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs that can be swiftly 
financed from the Facility will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are 
children of school age outside the camps have the option of either attending  
a public school in the locality, which teach the Turkish school curriculum and 
instruct in Turkish, or one of the many private schools run by Syrian charities, 
which are classified as temporary education centers by the Ministry of Educa-
tion like the schools in the camps.14 
The EU-Turkey Refugee Deal
Turkey and the EU confirmed the joint plan on November 29, 2015. On March 7, 
2016, Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants  
not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece, and to 
take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the 
EU also agreed to continue “stepping up measures against migrant smugglers” 
and “welcomed the establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea.”  
At the same time, Turkey and the EU recognize that further swift and determined 
efforts are needed. This deal was the reaction against “irregular” migration  
of mostly Syrian refugees. According to IOM statistics, arrivals by sea and deaths 
in the Mediterranean from January 1 to December 21, 2015, are as follows. 
Arrivals by sea and deaths in the mediterranean: January 1–December 21, 201515
The refugee deal between the EU and Turkey determined how the EU decided 
to manage their “borders.” This deal was criticized by human- and refugee-
rights activists, because it left no place for “irregular” migrants to apply for 
international protection, which is against basic human rights. Although some 
people went to stations and borders to welcome refugees, hostility against 
them and the rise of racism emerged later in the summer of 2015.
14  Derived from Art 28 of TPR, December 18, 
2014, AFAD Circular, no. 2014/4, on 
“Administration of Services to Foreigners 
under the Temporary Protection Regime”; 
and the Turkish Ministry of Education 
Circular, no. 2014/21 on “Education 
Services for Foreign Nationals” of 
September 23, 2014.
15  See https://www.iom.int/news/irregular 
-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top 
-one-million-2015-iom.
16  “Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in 
Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM,” 
International Organization for Migration, 
December 22, 2015, https://www.iom.int 
/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals 
-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom.
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Country of Arrival Arrivals Deaths
Italy 150,317 (IOM est.) 2,889  
(Central Medit. route)
Malta 106
Greece 816,752 731  
(Eastern Medit. route)
Cyprus 269
Spain 3,845 72 
(Western Medit. and Western 
African routes)
Estimated Total 971,183 3,692*16
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government does not have to worry about the basic rights of re fugees because 
Turkish citizens do not have them. However, the government never recog-
nizes them as refugees, because recognizing them as refugees means that the 
Turkish state must become the protector of basic rights. When it becomes 
the protector of basic rights, it has to be democratic toward its own Kurdish, the 
Kurdish democratic movement, and other minorities. In other words, Turkey 
has its own democratic limitations for recognizing refugees with which most 
activists are struggling. 
“Turkish hospitality” is a phrase used by the Turkish government with regard 
to Syrians in Turkey who are always referred to as “guests” and “brothers.” 
Since Syrian refugees were backed by Turkish government protection in domes-
tic political discourse, nothing serious happened against them. This view of  
a “peaceful Turkey” for Syrian refugees is changing nowadays. It is not only the 
EU who is employing racist discourse against Syrians—see the rise of the right 
wing in many European countries—but racist discourse is also rising among 
Turkish people. In a field study by İstanbul Kemerburgaz University and Kent 
University, 224 Turkish people have been interviewed about Syrian refugees in 
Istanbul in the last few months of 2016.19
According to this study, 72 percent of participants are disturbed by Syrian 
refugees when they see them in the streets; 83 percent of participants believe 
that Syrians brought new diseases; 91 percent of participants believe that 
they are unemployed because of Syrian refugees; 94 percent of participants 
think that rents are getting higher because of Syrians; 86 percent of participants 
believe that Syrians are mostly criminals or beggars; 74 percent of partici-
pants believe that Syrian children reduce the quality of education. Overall, 76 
percent of participants do not like Syrians, 49 percent pity Syrians, 18 percent 
are afraid of Syrians, 14 percent are disgusted by Syrians, and 12 percent hate 
Syrians. Finally, 54 percent of participants want to organize anti-Syrian  
“go home” marches, and 55 percent of participants want Syrians to be sent to 
their countries before the war is over. 
As seen in the high percentage of hostile answers above, the EU is not alone 
in developing racist discourse against Syrians. The superficial picture of a 
about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will 
mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 
2018.
7)   The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.
8)   The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as 
set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of  
Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during 
the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a proposal 
to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at  
an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States’ positions in accordance with the 
existing rules.
9)   The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve human-
itarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which 
would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe. 17
New Era: What Is Next?
After the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, Turkey declared a state of emergency 
to “protect Turkish democracy,” however, the state of emergency targeted 
democratic opponents, especially the Kurdish democratic movement and pro-
gressives. Academics who were arrested signed a peace petition; the arrested 
writers and threatened progressive movements are clear signs of the un-
democratic moves of the state of emergency. These moves created tension 
between the EU and Turkey. The Turkish government threated the EU and  
demanded that they “open borders again to let Syrians cross EU borders.”18
This statement showed that Turkey had always used Syrians as “leverage” against 
the EU, while it already accepted to be a guardian of its borders by EU-Turkey 
refugee deal. This also showed that Turkey never aimed to promote human 
rights or to help refugees. In November 2016, the Turkish government started 
to accept some Syrians as Turkish citizens, especially teachers and doctors. 
Since the Turkish government suspended almost six hundred thousand people 
after the coup attempt, Syrians are expected to replace these suspended 
people by being moved to empty places. In other words, Turkey uses Syrian 
refugees not only against EU but also against host communities, against peo-
ple of the Turkish republic by, for example, changing the demography  
of Alevi and Kurdish areas especially. Although DGMM are calling some Syrians 
to apply for citizenship, this call has not been announced publicly because  
of potential reaction from Turkish citizens—especially by the Turkish middle 
class. However, granting citizenship to Syrians does not mean that they are also 
granting them basic rights, because under the state of emergency Turkish  
citizens have almost no democratic rights. Turkey has always tried to solve the 
“problem” of Syrian refugees either by creating temporary protection—which 
is one in its kind—or by accepting them as citizens, which means the Turkish 
17 “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016,” 
European Council, http://www.consilium 
.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016 
/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
18  See also “Erdoğan’dan AB’ye mülteci krizi 
tepkisi: Alnımızda enayi yazmıyor,” BBC, 
February 11, 2016, http://www.bbc.com 
/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_erdogan 
_omer_celik_multeciler_aciklama. 
19  See “İstanbulluların yüzde 91’i Suriyeliler 
nedeniyle iş bulamadığını söylüyor,” T24, 
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“peaceful Turkey for Syrians” drawn by the EU to make Turkey a safe third coun-
try that enables all “irregular Syrian migrants” to be sent to Turkey, is going  
to be disrupted soon. Not only because of a long state of emergency that 
brings undemocratic decrees for Turkish citizens, but also because of unhappy 
Turkish citizens who blame Syrian refugees for their unhappiness. Turkish  
citizens know that Syrians are supported by the Turkish state and that their pro-
tection is “state policy.” That is why they keep quiet about Syrians and those 
living in their country; however, as the above surveys show, the silence of 
Turkish citizens in their views toward Syrians is not free from hatred, disgust, 
or other unpleasant feelings. Like the United States and other countries in  
the EU, Turkish society is not immune to racism or hatred. For the moment,  
silence hides unpleasant feelings! 
It is not only Syrians but also minorities, including political opponents, who 
are not secure in Turkey. Turkey as a safe third country that provides protection 
is just a European dream that Europe invented for its own sake. 
To conclude, I have to draw attention to a new process for Syrians’ refugees 
in Turkey (it started in November 2016) that is called “exceptional citizenship.” 
This citizenship is exceptional because it is not asking Syrian refugees to have 
five-year residency permit to apply for citizenship—which is the regular pro-
cess to become a Turkish citizen for any foreigner. This exception is not widely 
known because the government is aware that their voters do not want Syrians 
to be Turkish citizens. It is not for every Syrian under temporary protection. 
According to DGMM, doctors, teachers, engineers (educated and qualified ones), 
and investors are invited to apply for citizenship via SMS. This is an obvious 
discriminative process directed toward Syrians refugees, since the other groups 
that live under temporary protection live with plenty of difficulties—this is  
another face of differential inclusion! The estimated number for citizenship is 
around twenty thousand. This process is not well known in Turkey either.  
The Turkish government does not inform its citizens about it, since Turkish citi-
zens might disturb and disrupt the process and this so-called peaceful co-
existence. Whatever the reactions might be, the Turkish government grants 
citizenship for educated and rich Syrians without offering much protection for 
the rest of Syrian population in Turkey in terms of rights and freedom. 
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Stream  
of Memory
Rubia Salgado, Gergana Mineva, and das Kollektiv Women*
We remember that 17 years ago, just after the black-blue government—a  
coalition between the conservative ÖVP and the far-right FPÖ—was formed, 
Pierre Bourdieu sent a video message to Austria.1 
We remember that 17 years ago the Lisbon Strategy was formulated.  
Its strategic aim was to make the EU a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-
based economic region. 
We remember that it wasn’t until 15 years ago that Europe’s last existing  
colonial empire, whose capital was Lisbon, formally came to an end with the 
independence of East Timor. 
We remember that 17 years ago the black-blue government could only gain 
access to the president’s offices through an underground passageway.  
We remember the Thursday demonstrations in Vienna. 
We remember that Bourdieu addressed progressive Austrians in his message. 
We remember we felt he was not addressing us; and yet he was. 
We remember that 27 years ago George W. Bush declared a new world order. 
We remember that 26 years ago Caetano Veloso wrote the song “Fora da  
ordem”: Something is out of order, out of the new world order. 
We remember that in his video message 17 years ago, Bourdieu talked about 
Tony Blair and his comment on Blair’s position at that time during the meeting to 
formulate the Lisbon Strategy was: “On European matters he is even more 
reactionary than a right-wing French president.” 
We remember neoliberalism being called a conservative revolution. 
We remember criticism of neoliberalism not necessarily being a criticism  
of capitalism. 
We remember an evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy seven years ago concluded 
that it had failed. We remember that the follow-up strategy Europe 2020 
aims, among other things, at improving the legal framework for employment 
and making this more flexible.
1 The style of this text was inspired by the 
book I Remember by Joe Brainard. It refers 
also to the poem “A Catedral de Colônia,” 
written by Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna. 
A first version of this text was written by 
Rubia Salgado in dialog with other maiz 
women* (maiz Frauen*), and published in 
the book Silent University: Towards a 
Transversal Pedagogy (Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2016). maiz is a self-organized inte-
gration center by and for migrant women 
established in Linz. This present version 
was reworked by Rubia Salgado and 
Gergana Mineva.
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We remember that part-time working is a widespread phenomenon. 
We remember that 17 years ago one quarter of working women in Austria 
were employed part-time. 
We remember that 7 years ago 32 percent of women in Austria were  
employed part-time. 
We remember that two years ago a record was set in Austria: the proportion 
of women working part-time was 48 percent. 
We remember that, compared with Austrian women, migrant women are 
twice as likely to be living in poverty.
We remember asylum policy.
We remember the term “de facto refugee.” Löschnak was Austrian interior 
minister at the time and it was 25 years ago. 
We remember a television report 12 years ago on the construction of high 
barbed-wire fences to seal off the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla 
in order to prevent refugees from Africa getting through to EU countries  
via this route. 
We remember that one of the men interviewed in this television report 
looked up into the camera and told the reporters and a whole lot of future 
viewers that much higher fences could be built and much deeper trenches 
could be dug. They would still find a way, they would still keep on trying and 
they would get through. 
We remember the images of men taken prisoner, sitting on the floor with 
their arms and legs tied together. 
We remember sitting in our apartment in front of the television set, unable to 
move our hands and feet for anger and shame. 
We remember that 12 years later, the Austrian government ordered the con-
struction of a border fence. 
We remember Bourdieu’s advice regarding the black-blue government  
17 years ago, not to dictate but to learn our own lessons. 
We remember the shift to the Right. 
We remember that 17 years after Bourdieu’s video message, the right-wing 
FPÖ became the second strongest party in the elections for the regional  
parliament in Vienna. 
We remember that 17 years after Bourdieu’s video message, the candidate  
of the right-wing FPÖ almost became elected for president of Austria.
We remember when it was noted in the evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy seven 
years ago that in order to present the EU as an attractive region for investment 
and jobs, the member states would need to make a contribution, which 
would include a policy of active competition and reducing benefit payments. 
We remember that in 2015, intellectuals argued that an explicit social policy 
was the only alternative for Europe. 
We remember the EU’s policy of austerity. 
We remember Greece. 
We remember Spain. 
We remember the multitude. 
We remember the chain of equivalence. 
We remember those who own no part of things.
We remember government from below. 
We remember somos malas y podemos ser peores. 
We remember social movements. 
We remember repeatedly asking ourselves which movements intellectuals 
meant by this. 
We remember Bourdieu thought then that intellectuals should ask themselves 
whether and how they had become collaborators with or accomplices to  
the developments in Austria. 
We remember that social struggles were and are bureaucratized and 
institutionalized. 
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We remember that 17 years ago Bourdieu spoke in favor of effective symbolic 
actions to be developed collectively along with artists by engaging with the 
causes and manifestations of conservative hegemony. 
We remember that I agreed with this then. 
We remember that after the black-blue government was formed, the links 
between anti-racism, art and activism in Austria became more evident. 
We remember wondering how the effect of symbolic actions against hegemony 
might be recognized. 
We remember that Gramsci founded a party. 
We remember that we had to try to create new structures of resistance and  
a new internationalism. 
We remember that a disabled man who was active in an organization for 
rights for the disabled angrily blamed us for only writing about migrants and 
refugees. 
We remember our discomfort. 
We remember we told him he was right. 
We remember the necessity of groups of political activists working together. 
We remember that democracy is in crisis. 
We remember carrying the word in the mouth. Cologne. Chewing.
We remember the poem “A Catedral de Colônia,” written by Affonso Romano 
de Sant’Anna 32 years ago.




As this cathedral is the living body of History
And the history of Me itself.2
We remember that it took six centuries to build the Cologne Cathedral.
We remember asking: Whose History?
We remember the cathedral of Cologne in 2015.
The the Cologne Cathedral interrupts itself
fractures itself.3 
We remember that there were no civil rights for Protestants in Cologne until 
the end of the eighteenth century.
We remember the deportation of the Jewish people from Cologne 592 years 
ago. 
We remember Hitler proclaiming the “end of the democratic mass rape” in 
Cologne 83 years ago.
We remember the eternal carillons within the bullets of Krupp’s cannons.























2 Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna, A Grande 
Fala do Índio Guarani e a Catedral de Colônia 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rocco, 1998), 135.
3 Ibid., 126. 
4 Ibid., 134f.
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We remember taking distance.
We remember chewing the borders between the perspectives of looking at 
Cologne and its cathedral: then and now.
We remember that since Bourdieu’s video message was sent, approx. 
30,000 people have died in the Mediterranean Sea.
We remember that having to write “approx.” because there are no exact figures 
available is an immeasurable scandal.
We remember that the EU’s policy of austerity is the cause of social 
deprivation. 
We remember that the struggles against inequality and discrimination were 
and are not always fought in a manner that respected gender equality. 
We remember that despite all the mantras of there being no alternative, 
knowledge does exist about how this predominant, violent, murderous order 
might possibly be changed. 
We remember that hardship is distributed very unevenly across the globe. 
We remember that most of the people who live in poverty can be found in 
countries that are former European colonies. 
We remember the economization of education. 
We remember voices expressing the belief that education should develop in 
alignment with the transformation of society. It should keep pace with the 
rapid changes of our times and offer an appropriate response to new 
demands. 
We remember globalization, knowledge society, employability, competitive-
ness, human capital, and other key concepts. 
We remember that the commercial interests of the economy have the highest 
priority, even when disguised as promoting social cohesion and protecting 
the environment, as is formulated in the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 or in its 
current new edition. 
We remember education being understood as a means of transforming social 
circumstances. 
We remember the question: How can education be conceived and realized 
as an instrument of resistance? 
We remember that Hanna Meißner defined agency as the capacity to respond 
to circumstances not only reproducing them. 
We remember that education can open up possibilities of democratic action, 
not conditions of action. 
We remember that acknowledging education’s inadequacy with regard to 
the aim of transforming society in the direction of a new hegemony does not 
mean that education cannot play any part in this process. 
We remember that emancipatory- and critical-education practice is not re-
duced to simply exposing reality. It leads to organizing a practice of change. 
We remember that critical-educational work also calls for structural change. 
We remember reciprocal pedagogy and pedagogy of migration. 
We remember that Stuart Hall mentioned 17 years ago that “the [white]  
English aren’t racist because they hate blacks but because without the 
blacks, they don’t know who they are.”
We remember the tireless effort to formulate questions which would interrupt 
and examine the processes of manufacture and reproduction of knowledge 
about the “others” and how they are different.
We remember during teacher training and development, repeatedly talking 
about the urgent need to examine and question knowledge about those who 
are learning with respect to how this functions in creating “others” and its 
discriminatory effects. 
We remember Frigga Haug and the need to ask questions in which one  
contradicts oneself. 
We remember asking ourselves: What counts as knowledge?  
When? Where? Why? 
We remember the production of knowledge challenging ruling structures. 
We remember the limits of our Western knowledge. 
We remember the denial of knowledge through violent processes. 
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We remember getting-to-know-you events and speeches about tolerance. 
We remember having heard it all before. 
We remember that 17 years ago, Bourdieu thought Austria had been woken 
from its sleep by the black-blue government and that it could shake the 
whole of Europe from its slumbers. 
We remember one subject for an exhibition at maiz 15 years after the black-
blue government: Does your dog sleep well? 
We remember that this question was suggested by refugees who were living 
in tents. 
We remember that 17 years later we often can’t sleep. 
We remember Gayatri C. Spivak writing 27 years ago about permitted  
ignorance—an ignorance which would reinforce one’s own position of power 
within the (post)colonial context.
We remember that three years ago maiz founded the University of the 
Ignorant. 
We remember that we wrote then that everyone is ignorant as long as re-
serves of knowledge are administered and knowledge continues to be pro-
duced without any critical consideration of the knowledge’s dimension  
of power and the violent processes of legitimizing or delegitimizing it and 
without applying the consequences resulting from this in practice. 
We remember that since 2005 (some) migrants in Germany have been legally 
obliged to complete German and orientation classes. 
We remember that Karin Jurschik made the film Zertifikat Deutsch eight 
years ago. 
We remember that the Integrationsvereinbarung (Integration agreement) has 
been in force in Austria since 2006. Many migrants are obliged to take inte-
gration courses and pass tests. 
We remember that in these integration courses, everyday topics with citizen-
ship elements and topics to inspire essential European and democratic  
values must also be taught in addition to a basic knowledge of the German 
language. 
We remember that maiz is the only organization in Austria that refuses to 
conduct integration courses and hold integration tests on behalf of the interior 
ministry, which caters to racist and repressive integration and migration 
policies. 
We remember that since 2016, those granted asylum and subsidiary protection 
in Austria are obliged to attend values and orientation courses “governing 
coexistence in Austria.” Anyone who does not fulfill these prescribed inte-
gration obligations can expect sanctions. 
We remember the cap imposed on the number of refugees. 
We remember bolt cutters. 
We remember the culture of welcome. 
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In this essay, I open with the question of how to account for necropolitics  
in Eastern Europe. The notion of necropolitics comes from the work of Marina 
Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić.1 Starting with their analysis and differentiation be-
tween biopolitics (Foucault)2 and necropolitics (Mbembe),3 and accepting the 
claim that the analysis of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has to start with 
necro- rather than biopolitics, my aim is to situate with their aid the dyad bio/
necro in CEE.4
Gržinić and Tatlić offer a notion of necropolitics: they literally expand the border 
of necropolitics. Consequently, necropolitics can retroactively serve analy-
tical purposes in thinking about CEE since the rise of neoliberalism and the 
application of the “shock doctrine” (Naomi Klein), where CEE is itself revealed 
as a necropolitics. What is more, Gržinić and Tatlić’s toolkit suggests that a 
retro active analysis of racialization can be unearthed. 
Necropolitics should not be privileged in the field of area studies and confined 
within that framework (as is the “Cold War” discipline for the study of non-
capitalist societies in the US). Therefore necropolitics can and should be applied 
to Latin America, too, as a laboratory of a “parallel regime of necropolitics.”5 
How realistic is it to claim that the influence of US imperialism on Latin America 
was indeed a necropolitics is open to debate, yet a retroactive reading of  
necropolitics as the analytical tool par excellence to topoi other than CEE holds 
a promising potential for various research programs (at least for those orbit-
ing around the decolonial option and/or dependency theory).
But is necropolitics not related to colonialism and race? And how to account for 
the analytic dismissal of race in CEE scholarship? A brief detour to “Balkanism” 




1  Marina Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić, Necro­
politics, Racialization, and Global 
Capitalism: Historicization of Biopolitics 
and Forensics of Politics, Art, and Life 
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2014). I mostly refer to Gržinić as the 
book’s first part, which I heavily use, is 
written by her.
2 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be 
Defended”: Lectures at the College de 
France, 1975–76, trans. David Macey  
(New York: Picador, 2003), 241.
3 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. 
Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, no. 1 
(2003): 11–40.
4 In Gržinić and Tatlić’s book, there are four 
interrelated processes: historicization, 
racialization, necropolitics, necropolitics 
and/as racialization. For an elaboration  
of these, see Stanimir Panayotov, “Neo-
necronomicon,” borderlands 13, no. 4 
(2014): 1–16. Also, in this text I make a 
compromise use of the descriptive “CEE”: 
while it is borrowed from the conceptual 
geography that the West continually 
imposes on the region, I avoid the recent 
post-2007 construction “Western Balkans,” 
which further disintegrates the geography 
described by CEE by pointing to the 
privilege of being a EU member state. 
5 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, 
Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 7.
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The Island
The most pretentious political project in European history that claims to secure—
and often militarize—the (moral) border of thought is “liberalism.” The pe-
culiar pretension of political liberalism is, more specifically, that the said border 
is maintained on the principles of universalized Enlightenment that have un-
dergone cathexis. There is hardly anything left of this unscrupulous claiming of 
the humanist patrolling of the border of thought when faced with the  
spatial pornography of Lesbos and Lampedusa. 
The securing of a peaceful European project extends to the vulgar management 
of the island today. Today the island can be conceptualized as both a site  
of social utopianism and political snuff. It is, I suggest, a paradigmatic space 
for deploying necropolitics in the East. The island becomes the dumping 
ground of Enlightenment: trapped between the island and the sea, migrants 
are transported between the state of emergency and the war state.11 An island 
is a duplicitous kind of “border.” Deleuze differentiated between two kinds  
of islands: continental islands, which are accidental, and oceanic ones, which 
are originary and essential. He states that “islands are either from before  
or for after humankind.”12 Neither kind of island is an authentic refuge for the 
human. In a state of emergency, the oceanic island in particular implies de-
population: “Those people who come to the island indeed occupy and populate 
it; but in reality, were they sufficiently separate, sufficiently creative, they 
would give the island only a dynamic image of itself, a consciousness of the 
movement which produced the island, such that through them the island would 
in the end become conscious of itself as deserted and unpeopled. The island 
would be only the dream of humans, and humans, the pure consciousness  
of the island.”13
Deleuze’s suggestion that humans could be, in reverse, “the pure consciousness 
of the island,” has become an unspeakably ugly satire: the humans using is-
lands as makeshift zones of salvation today are pushed back to the state of the 
through race but through ethnicities.6 In a recent discussion of Todorova’s 
ethnicity-privileging explanatory model (whereby race is a “misplaced racism”), 
Dušan Bjelić inadvertently opens space for the retroactive and regionalized 
use of necropolitics à la Gržinić:
In this internal European transaction between its West and its East, where-
by the West for its part had to incorporate the East’s marginal histories 
into its own historical legacy, should not then by extension the reverse 
be true? Should not the West’s history of colonialism be the histor ical  
legacy of Eastern Europe and the Balkans also? Or does it mean something 
altogether different: that the Balkans’ “lack of colonial predicament” 
would define the EU’s historic legacy? Should we not theorize the former 
East European, Marxist and non-colonial states’ refusal to accept EU  
refugee quotas for non-white Muslims as racially motivated? Yet how can 
we speak of race and apartheid in relation to countries with no colonial 
and racial relations?7
Gržinić’s notions of necropolitics and/as racialization speaks exactly to Bjelić’s 
concern. So does Fatima El-Tayeb’s discussion of European “racelessness.”8 
While Gržinić’s analysis extends to a post-1989 world, this can be offset by  
deploying El-Tayeb’s critique of European race blindness to Balkanism and the 
Ottoman and communist past as well: 
European theoretical framework […] constantly externalizes race, i.e. 
places it outside of the domain of what needs to be theorized. Accordingly, 
the con tinental European Left has produced no theory of racialization. 
Instead, class remains central—which is ironic since class is deeply racial-
ized in Europe. This ongoing racial amnesia, which is made possible 
through the erasure of the history of European racism and the history of 
Europeans of color, makes unspeakable the processes of internal racial-
ization and the ways in which they are inseparable from the aftereffects 
of European colonialism. In this way, neocolonial economic structures 
increasingly posit racialized communities as disposable populations. […] 
Europe, after all, is the only place that white people are native to; where 
they are not settler colonialists. This allows the con tinued claim that  
racist and colonialist oppression, while admittedly committed by (descen-
dants of) Europeans, has no impact on Europe itself.9
If Balkanism literature’s model disallows the conceptualization of racism because 
of the Balkans’ “lack of colonial predicament,”10 then Gržinić’s necropolitics 
and/as racialization allows it to include a post-1989 analysis of the (neo)colonial 
predicament, while El-Tayeb accommodates the possibility to demarcate  
the methodological nationalism of Balkanism’s racial blindness lying dormant 
in Todorova’s model. The moral reticence in terms such as “ethnic cleansing” 
or “ethnic warfare” is here outdone by necropolitics.
6  Maria Todorova, “The Trap of 
Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, 
and the Study of Eastern European 
Nationalism,” Slavic Review 64, no. 1 
(2005): 153. Urs Altermatt also claims this 
happens, by extension, through ethno-
natio nalism. See see Urs Altermatt, 
Nation, Ethnizität und Staat in Mitteleuropa 
(Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1996).
7  Dušan Bjelić, “Bulgaria’s Zionism, the 
Colonization of Palestine and the Question 
of Balkan Postcoloniality,” Interventions: 
International Journal of Postcolonial 
Studies (February 2016): 6. 
8 Fatima El-Tayeb, “Creolizing Europe,” 
Manifesta Journal, no. 17 (2015): 9–12.
9  Ibid., 9, 10. 
10  Todorova’s phrase, as used by Bjelić.
11 On the “war state,” see Gržinić and Tatlić, 
Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global 
Capitalism, 66. 
12 Gilles Deleuze, “Desert Islands,” in Desert 
Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974, trans. 
Michael Taromina, ed. David Lapoujade 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 9.
13 Ibid., 10. 
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the very category of life itself, because biopolitics has morphed into necro-
politics,16 then one gives over the power to the masters of the unthinkable. For 
Gržinić this bifurcation of life is a double form of death, always extracting  
surplus value from populations: “Death from real massive impoverishment, and 
a symbolical death from capital interventions.”17 Here is the moment when  
the points of comparison with Foucault’s biopolitics differ. While biopolitics can 
be formalized as “make live and let die,” Gržinić’s necropolitics takes the  
formulaic expression of “let live and make die.” It is the laissez-faire of dying. 
As Albahari concludes: “These two modalities of power, to make live and  
let die, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, undemocratic, illiberal, coercive, and 
lethal modalities of power […] are thought to be integral and necessary to 
liberal- democratic national and EU governance, at least in the current 
predicament.”18
Gržinić’s above-quoted formula empowers us to say that the research on CEE’s 
transition to capitalism has to start with necropolitics. Understanding this 
double formula entails the continued exposure of biopolitics as a Western epis-
temological arsenal. The lines drawn between the postcolonial world and 
Eastern Europe are obvious when we juxtapose the postcolonial world’s form of 
“private indirect government,”19 and its coterminous expansion in Eastern  
Europe as a mere economic determinism. And the logic of this determinism is 
driven by privatization: the exploited resource of the postcolonial world  
become exemplary in Eastern European policy. In both cases there is the  
phenomenon of the privatization of violence through the economy. These are 
the Others of Western biopolitics, but they are not its main addressees. 
Gržinić’s suggestion is that biopolitics always contains the war “at home”: it 
“capitalizes and governs the conscience in the First Capitalist World.”20 This is 
the meaning of welfarism in the West before the EU expansion. As soon as 
biopolitics cannot be contained in the conditions of Western liberal governance, 
the conditions of the contained need to change, which inevitably produces  
a backlash against the newcomers (i.e., the post-1989 EU-accession countries) 
of welfarism. In turn, as soon as the newcomers of welfarism have to accom-
island’s unconscious. The island is thus not a “zone” anymore, but a border:  
if the border gradually became the territory after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
pushback of migrants—today’s Europe’s others—signifies their stratified  
genderization and infantilization, whereby the border zones even of an island 
demonstrate that “the whole territory itself is the border now.”14 The milita-
rization of the island as the border par excellence, as the avatar of an unthink-
able type of utopian populace, is now in the hands of marine police: the  
unpeopled island is the island of the police. The moral liberal state offers itself 
as the guardian of a denuded dream of intransitivity. The island’s conscious-
ness remains depopulated at all costs.
As the paradigmatic topos of exercising necropolitics, the island offers a symp-
tomatology of self-colonizing, racialized enlightenment. Let’s not forget  
that the EU was a kind of self-contained biopolitical island of the West. While 
the European project was safely held as a Western European idea, the reasons 
to fret over its tenability were next to nil. As soon as it opened to the “semi-
periphery” after 1989 (with the notable former exception of Greece), there ap-
peared troubles in maintaining a correspondence theory of truth concerning  
its two terms: patrolling the border of humanist liberal thought and securing 
the border of allegedly humanist states. Opening up to the “semi-periphery” 
retarded the liberal epistemology of correspondence (modeled on the idea that 
any statement of truth corresponds to an actual state of affairs), and ques-
tioned the parallelism between those terms. 
The island and the sea became a two-tier protectorate of zoning the unthinkable: 
necropolitics as the repetition of death. Maurizio Albahari rehearses the  
necropolitical formula of Gržinić while describing the failure of such improvised 
correspondence theory between the border of liberal humanism and the  
one of the liberal state: “When it kills or let die, the state does so, explicitly or 
not, in the name and on behalf of a ‘population’ to be defended. Yet in doing 
so, it also reinforces its own legitimate and moral existence as sovereign, 
something else from society or ‘the nation,’ detached (but not extraneous or 
separate) and therefore a meta-pastor, or rather the meta-pastor—together  
with the church, at least in Italy. Symbolically and practically, borders become 
indispensable to nation and state, in mutually reinforcing relationship with 
this kind of sovereignty.”15
Eastern Death
Necropolitics thus relies on the repetition of death. The point of a theory  
of repetition (of death), offered by Gržinić and Tatlić, is not only to manifest its 
bloody counter part of the real but to offer a line of differentiation—literally a 
border. If one refuses to acknowledge that today there is a differentiation within 
14 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, 
Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 59. 
15 Maurizio Albahari, “Death and the Moral 
State: Making Borders and Sovereignty at 
the Southern Edges of Europe,” Working 
Paper, no. 136 (University of California, 
San Diego: The Center for Comparative 
Immigration Studies, 2006), 28. It is 
noteworthy that Albahari asks the reader 
to keep in mind that there are two regimes 
of maintaining rescue, the Anglo-Saxon 
and the continental. The first reveals a 
disinterest in the affairs of the individual 
(even if that means rescue from death), 
while the second legally stipulates rescue. 
Albahari, “Death and the Moral State,”  
11n20.
16  Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, 
Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 22. 
17 Ibid.
18  Albahari, “Death and the Moral State,” 29. 
19  Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001), 66–102.
20 Gržinić and Tatlić, Necropolitics, 
Racialization, and Global Capitalism, 37. 
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modate their own newcomers (the “refugees”), their own conditions as those 
containing the biopolitical (but really necropolitical) sovereignty need to 
change. This is because the newcomers of welfarism treat their polity as 
some form of compromised welfare state to be defended, and therefore this 
necessity of change is termed “necropolitics.” Albahari, in his case study, 
demonstrates that “death, in addition to normatively being a prerogative of 
sovereignty, is essentially part of the machinery by which liberal-democratic 
society is supposedly defended, and its life and common good fostered.”21
This indicates that the liberal state’s border of the unthinkable has been 
breached by nothing other than necropolitics. But how does the theory of 
necro politics in the East/CEE helps us understand its conflation in practice with 
unthinkability?22 After 1989, the limits of un/thinkability for the EU project 
were not only “expanded.” The post-communist EU expansion of once unthink-
able political others inevitably altered the limits of the unthinkable biopoliti-
cally, maintaining the elite club’s criteria of the thinkable (read: the admis sible). 
Today’s internal colonization of hatred and decomposed solidarity in the 
semi-periphery—and the ideal of solidarity is manageable to the East mostly 
when it comes to the mobility of its goods to the West—ideally warrants  
“the fact that the former Eastern European countries flatly refused the EU  
required quota for accepting Syrian refugees [which] suggests a trend of self -
ghettoization rather than de-ghettoization when it comes to the question  
of race.”23 To de-provincialize the Balkans requires much more than the  
mobility of capitals. 
One wonders whether there really is a “return of the repressed” when it comes 
to race. Rather, the work on Balkanism needs the return of “class” as racial-
ization to survey ethnicity-as-race as a continuity. Something of a merger be-
tween her own work and Gržinić’s necropolitics can be sensed in El-Tayeb’s 
proposal of “queering of ethnicity”: “A queering, or ‘creolizing’ of theory,  
if you will, that works on the intersections of concepts and disciplines, opens 
the potential of expressing exactly the positionality deemed impossible in 
dominant European discourses, namely that of Europeans of color.”24
By queering ethnicity in Europe—here “queering” stands for the re-racialization 
of class, parading as it does in its homeostasis of unmarked racelessness—
and more specifically queering ethnicity in the CEE/Balkans, one can recover 
class as a precious object of covert racial profiling that gives a special status 
of the “unspeakability” (as El-Tayeb’s describes it) of race. For it is this exact 
same unspeakability that licenses death as no longer “unthinkable” but as 
necro political condition of the liberal state. The contact zone between Gržinić 
and El-Tayeb that I identify is not an academic contest to mark CEE as colonial, 
but as racist colonial. For if the colonial analytic crumbles each time under  
silently racialized class and ethnicity, then what is the use of “de-provincializing 
Europe”?
21 Albahari, “Death and the Moral State,” 30. 
22 I do not discuss it here, but my elaboration 
and understanding of “unthinkability” is 
heavily inspired by Jelisaveta Blagojević, 
“Unthinkable: Ethico-Political Fiction in 
the Present,” Identities: Journal for Politics, 
Gender and Culture 8, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 
29–33.
23 Bjelić, “Bulgaria’s Zionism,” 6 n2.
24 El-Tayeb, “Creolizing Europe,” 11. 
25 Gržinić, Necropolitics, Racialization, and 
Global Capitalism, 76.
To sum up, while Todorova’s de-provincializing project is still a tenable move, 
it should be supplemented by a theory of necropolitics to account for the  
way in which the waning of Western biopolitics changes the meaning of CEE’s 
“liberal states” from the get-go of the transition. While El-Tayeb claims that 
so-called raceless Europe fundamental racism (in Gržinić’s terms this will be 
“racialization”) rests on its own (self-)silencing—a racial muteness that informs 
an immutable racism—Gržinić complements this tenet with the claim of a 
“parallel colonial regime.”25 Thus, as a starting point of surveying necropolitics 
in the East we can couple both suggestions, and then the picture we get  
results in a sort of racial-colonial silencing that is able to both maintain civic 
peace and suppress ethnic warfare (respectively in the capitalist West and  
in the Ottoman/socialist East). When both silences are broken, what follows is 
racialization and racial (not ethnic) warfare. And when ethnicity reveals itself 
as a race (Bjelić’s suggestion), class is deployed as racialized, and peace is  
illuminated as property qualification, then it is no longer possible to maintain 
that racism is not a useful analytic category for the Balkans. Thus race be-
comes central for the study of necropolitics in the East and opens the gates for 
its analytical and retroactive use.
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On December 19, 2016, the art world witnessed a remarkably dramatic event 
when the gunman Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş assassinated the Russian ambassador 
to Turkey, Andrey Karlov, during his speech at the opening of the photo ex-
hibition “Russia through Turk’s Eyes” at the Contemporary Art Center in Ankara.1 
Two Turkish photographers and a videographer, Yavuz Alatan, Hasim Kilic, 
and Burhan Ozbilici, captured the assassination in progress, before, during, 
and after the incident, making the assassination of Karlov the first ambassador 
to be shot on Ultra HD video.2
In the video of the assassination, Karlov can be seen collapsing to the floor  
after a third shot is fired by Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş, the policeman accused of kill-
ing the Russian ambassador. The camera then zooms out from close-up to  
a wide angle, framing the assassin and the assassinated in one picture, that 
also included a number of the artworks exhibited on the walls. Remarkably, no 
trace of blood could be seen in the video footage or in any of the photos of 
the crime scene. Nevertheless, the multiple-angle documentation immediately 
transformed the incident into a global media news sensation, and it became 
one of the most watched online videos of the year, competing with other similar 
videos of a similar brutal nature.
 
These types of dramatic video releases have become a new visual genre, and 
despite their graphic content they receive millions of clicks online and keep 
attracting the attention of the media as well as the general public. In the after-
math of the assassination, Alatan posted his photos on social media. A few 
days after he said, “I wish this hadn’t happened, and I hadn’t taken those pho-
tos.”3 Perhaps Alatan noted how his photos entered the mass culture category 
of visual violence and how he unconsciously risked promoting this brutal 
genre of visualization. 
Set City—
Post-snuff Film 




of the Protagonist 
at the Execution 
Film Set
Khaled Ramadan 
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film was strictly produced for political propaganda and for re cruitment. Filmed 
in Ultra HD, ISIS’s film—with the real death of the protagonist at the execution 
set—gave birth to a new notion of political propaganda production, which I 
call “reality cinematography.”
Nonetheless, the amount of acclaim and the professionalism accredited to the 
making of the ISIS film has been much higher than the film deserves. It is 
therefore inappropriate that some commentators and filmmakers have called it 
“stunning and shocking,”6 while others were overwhelmed by the tight sce-
nario and sequential scenes. Others were impressed by the long, medium, and 
short clips of the event from multiple angles and the combination of fast  
and slow scenes to highlight the ugliness of the burning process.
In this context, a few questions remain to be answered: Who benefits from 
embracing this type of violent production? By boosting this type of film, even 
in terms of technicalities, do we not risk sending a wrong signal to its pro-
ducers, telling them to publish more?
In response to the video of Al-Kasasbeh, political and media commentator 
Chauncey DeVega published a 2015 article in Daily Kos titled: “Yes, ISIS 
Burned a Man Alive: White Americans Did the Same Thing to Thousands of Black 
People.”7 In the article, DeVega argues that violence is a human trait and that 
we cannot overlook what he calls the “violence master classes” undertaken in 
the United States during slavery time. DeVega’s article draws parallels be-
tween ISIS’s video and the practice of the “unique violence ritual,” the lynching 
of African-Americans, and how images of black people who were burned to 
death was a form of mass culture in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America.8 
The violent past of lynching has continued to deepen the rift in American  
society between blacks and whites, resulting in one shared history with two dif-
ferent narratives. I shall return to DeVega’s argument later, but will first ana-
lyze ISIS’s video.
The Atmospheric Execution Film Set—Between Fiction, 
Documentary, Post-snuff Film, and Reality Cinema
One of the “masterpieces” of this category of visual violence entered the pub-
lic realm with the release of the gruesome execution video of the Royal  
Jordanian Air Force pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh,4 whose plane came down in Raqqa, 
Syria, during a mission against the Islamic State (ISIS) in December 2015. 
The captured pilot was placed in a metal cage and filmed being burned alive. 
Al-Kasasbeh’s horrific atmospheric execution set was described by many 
commentators as a highly sophisticated cinematic production, exhibiting high 
technical capabilities in terms of visual narrative, and signifying a de parture 
from the familiar videos made by jihadist organizations over the past ten years. 
Most published articles in both Arab and Western media about Al-Kasasbeh’s 
execution were descriptive and nonanalytic, politically contextualizing the act 
while rapidly acknowledging and embracing ISIS’s film making skills.
Since the “spectacular” film was released by ISIS, we have not seen a similar 
production by this or any other group. However, analyzing the technicality 
and conceptuality of the film, we can confidently say it was a low-budget film, 
made by ordinary contemporary videographers who—like many good film  
amateurs—know the rules of depth and angle, and the process of pursuing an 
expressive directorship ranging from attention to the visual detail to the  
montage of a persuasive narrative. 
However, despite the use of ordinary film principles, the film of Al-Kasasbeh did 
add a new classification to the motion-picture history as it maneuvered be-
tween fiction, snuff film, and documentary film. The film depicts the fictional 
practice that is implemented by a wide range of field professionals with one 
small difference—the conclusion results in a real homicide.
Execution footage and images of violent nature were made public from the on-
set of cinema, starting with Thomas Edison, the inventor of the motion- 
picture camera, who electrocuted/executed the elephant Topsy in 1903, as de-
scribed in the book Killing for Culture by David Kerekes and David Slater.5 
About a century later, depicting murderous executions at a film set is now real, 
like in the case of ISIS’s film, which was shot with 4K equipment, scripted, 
and efficiently edited to be made available online for political purposes. 
This does not mean that ISIS’s film brought about a new filming technique, but 
the film did expand the political propaganda film genre. It introduced a new 
era in the film arena—a contemporary category of violent visualization that 
challenges any given Hollywood production, mondo, snuff film, or “shockumen-
tary film aesthetics,” which are commonly produced for profit, while ISIS’s 
4  “Jordan Pilot Hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh 
‘burned alive,’” BBC News, February 3, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world 
-middle-east-31121160. 
5  David Kerekes and David Slater, Killing  
for Culture: An Illustrated History of Death 
Film from Mondo to Snuff (London: 
Creation Books, 1995). 
6 See the 2008 film Snuff: A Documentary 
about Killing on Camera, YouTube video, 
1:16:05, posted by “Alex Ivan,” February 8, 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=_N03hlFPptI. 
7  Chauncey DeVega, “Yes, ISIS Burned a 
Man Alive: White Americans Did the Same 
Thing to Thousands of Black People,” Daily 







“The Last Day” Documenting My Life, My Art, and My Plan
Another example of violent testimonial videos in our digital age is the video 
diary The Last Day by Ricardo López,11 who was a known stalker of the Icelandic 
singer Björk.12 Over a nine-month period, López, the twenty-one-year-old  
Uruguayan-American visual artist made a seventy-hour video diary at his Florida 
apartment, wherein he mused about Björk while experimenting with letter 
bombs intended to kill the singer on the very same day he would commit sui-
cide, so that their souls could meet in heaven. López decorated his apartment 
with a meticulous scenography, transforming it into a spooky film set (which 
looked like someone might be killed there). The scenery seemed to read like a 
visual statement, full of handwritings, banners, colors, and face makeup.
On September 12, 1996, López sent the package bomb to Björk’s house in 
London. He then returned home, delivered his final video testimony and filmed 
his own suicide. He shot himself in the mouth. Four days later, López’s body 
was discovered at his apartment, along with the seventy hours of video testi-
mony he recorded. His video diary was to document, in his words, “My life, 
my art, and my plan,” a statement written on one of the videotapes. His violent 
video was a comprehensive performance testimony, written, directed, and 
played by López himself. As predicted, his message did not go unnoticed. 
Danish filmmaker Sami Saif bought all the tapes from FBI to use in his film chron-
icling the last days of the life of Ricardo López.13
Although he was disconnected from reality, López was conscious about what 
to deliver to the public, and he knew exactly how to lure the media into his 
trap. Filming his own death on tape was enough to capture public attention—
López’s mission was accomplished from day one. Both López’s suicide film 
and ISIS’s execution film were produced with solid knowledge of the outcome—
their films would be seen and heard, in the same way previous productions of 
a similar nature were. López’s and ISIS’s films make up just a few of the many 
documentations of horrific events that mankind has witnessed.
Involuntarily Acting—Performance X
The well-researched twenty-two-minute propaganda film is in Arabic with Eng-
lish subtitles.9 Its execution set is carefully designed and well-studied as if  
every scene is done according to a script. It starts with a voice-over reading a 
propaganda statement with justified arguments. Accompanying it is a pho to-
montage and archival footage from different wars in the Middle East showing 
casualties and suffering. The subsequent sequence shows an interview with  
the captive pilot dressed in an orange outfit, similar to that worn by the prisoners 
at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.10 Toward the end, the sequence closes 
in the morning, showing the pilot in his orange jumpsuit alone, carefully and  
silently walking and wondering among the rubble of bombed houses, checking 
the site and carnage most likely caused by missile strikes carried out by the 
pilot himself, as indicated by the narrator. He faces the location for the first time, 
not from a bird’s-eye view but from ground level. The pilot involuntarily per-
forms his last march through the scenery toward the cage. The galvanized black 
metal cage is closed with no sign of a door. The relatively small cube-shaped 
cage is constructed in a way that will prevent the pilot from running freely  
inside it.
The sandy floor of the cage is soaked with gasoline and an X shape stretching 
from corner to corner is engraved in the sand. Most likely, the pilot was forced  
to stand in the middle of the X mark. Outside the cage, a long line is engraved 
in the sand. At the end of it there is a masked militant who is carrying a torch. 
Surrounding the scenery is a group of well-organized masked militants dressed 
and armed in identical costumes and military gear, signifying the authority  
of an army and not paramilitaries.
Accompanied by real sound, the last sequence is quietly played in slow motion. 
The pilot inside the cage covers his face with his hands. In a jump cut, he 
suddenly removes his hands and looks directly into the lens and sees that the 
line in the sand is on fire, ignited by the militant. The flame approaches the 
cage signifying the gripping climax of the film. Accompanied by melodic voices, 
the pilot is burned to death. After that, a bulldozer throws a large amount  
of rubble on the cage with the dead pilot inside, signifying what airstrikes do 
to people: burn them alive and bury them under the rubble. It is “an eye  
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” effect. The End. Black screen, logos, and 
abstract credits.
Regardless of the result and horrific methodology of the film, no one has pre-
sented a killing/execution film with such cinematographic style before. In 
terms of technicality perhaps it is the most well-made propaganda film known 
to the public.
9  The video used to be viewable online, but 
now this and similar videos are being 
removed. 
10  Jonah Bennett: “US Official Says ISIS  
Uses Orange Jumpsuits Because Of 
Guantanamo,” The Daily Caller, February 5, 
2015, http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/05 
/isis-orange-jumpsuits-gitmo.
11  Jay C, “The Video Diary of Ricardo López,” 
Documentary Blog, January 15, 2007, 
http://thedocumentaryblog.com/2007/01 
/15/the-video-diary-of-ricardo-lopez.  
See also “Inside the Mind of a Celebrity 
Stalker,” abc NEWS, December 11, 1996, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story 
?id=132422. 
12 See for instance, Björk, Björk (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2001).
13  This information was shared at a lecture 
held by Saif at Copenhagen Documentary 
Film School, in January 2006. The 
documentary film by Sami Saif, The Video 
Diary of Ricardo López, was produced in 
Denmark by NewCom Entertainment, and 
DR TV, Danish Broadcasting Corporation, 
Denmark (2000). 
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In recent years, individuals who work with human visual history and visuality, 
like myself, have often asked why such gruesome images do not play a signifi-
cant role in helping humanity reduce situations of violence, torture, or exe-
cution, regardless of the context they have been produced, used, archived, or 
exhibited in.21 How can we use or consume these visual representations for 
learning and for building awareness without falling into the political propagan-
dist trap of their producers? Some of us are determined to look at these visual 
representations from different and critical perspectives, trying to analyze and 
reconceptualize them concurrently with contemporary history, ethics, and 
aesthetics, concocting a more constructive discourse. In this regard, here comes 
some sort of a closure, though not a definite answer.
In June 2015, Australian composer Christopher de Groot and theatre-opera  
director Suzanne Chaundy received funding from Creative Victoria to develop 
a one-voice opera,22 which was based on the video diaries of Ricardo López.23 
The question is whether such a production will overcome the tendency to 
aestheticize videos of brutal nature as the attempt here is to generate an atti-
tude of mass-intervention and to change the notion of “the more you watch, 
the less you feel.”
This is certainly not The End.
The Lynching of African-Americans and  
the Mass Media of the Time
As stated in DeVega’s article, the gruesome reality of so-called spectacular 
lynchings are another example of executions that were also photo documented, 
as described in W. Fitzhugh Brundage’s book Lynching in the New South: 
Georgia and Virginia, 1880–1930.14 Based on photography and history, Brundage 
describes how people cheered and children played during the lynching of  
African-Americans.15 For example, when James Irwin was lynched on January 31, 
1930, after being accused of the murder of a white girl in the town of Ocilla, 
Georgia, he was taken into custody by a rampaging mob, his fingers and toes 
were cut off, his teeth pulled out by pliers and finally he was castrated. Irwin 
was then burned alive in front of hundreds of onlookers.16 
The lynching of African-Americans was documented for different purposes to 
aestheticize lynching for a variety of motives, including political reasons.  
The lynching events were photographed, exhibited, shared, printed, and distrib-
uted as postcards and posters.17 Although the horrific visual documentation 
will continue to haunt Americans and the rest of human society, as explained 
by DeVega, humanity has yet to learn how to deal with such visual 
experiences.
The Chronic Voyeuristic Relation and the  
Attitude of Anti-intervention
Leading American theoretician Susan Sontag wrote intensely on the conse-
quences on the human mind after seeing images of a brutal nature, which in-
cluded lynching. In her book Regarding the Pain of Others,18 Sontag con firms 
that human ity has not learned much since the spectacular lynching of African- 
 Americans, because the proliferation of horrific politicized photographic  
images has established within people a “chronic voyeuristic relation”: the 
more people are expo sed to violent visual imagery, the more it fosters in them 
an attitude of anti- inter vention. 
Unquestionably, there will always be a dispute as to whether such images should 
be removed from public display in museum collections due to their graphic 
nature. However, the risk that they may become a source of inspiration will  
always exist, like in the case of the photo documentation of lynching-like sit u-
ations involving captives imprisoned by American military forces at Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003/4.19 Some of the photos from Abu Ghraib physically 
and aesthetically depict, almost paraphrase, lynching situations of African- 
Americans in the United States,20 with one small difference: the Abu Ghraib 
images were not meant to be published.
14 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the 
New South: Georgia and Virginia,  
1880–1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1993).
15 Mark Gado, “Carnival of Death: Lynching 
in America,” Abibitumi Kasa, February 9, 
2015, http://www.abibitumikasa.com 
/forums/archive/index.php/t-131666.html. 
16 Brundage, Lynching in the New South, 143.
17 See, for instance, Arthur Franklin Raper, 
The Tragedy of Lynching (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1933); 
and Without Sanctuary: Lynching 
Photography in America, ed. James Allen, 
(Santa Fe, NM: Twin Palms Publishers, 
1999).
18 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others 
(New York: Picador, 2004).
19 Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” 
New Yorker, May 10, 2004, http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10 
/torture-at-abu-ghraib. 
20 Dora Apel, “Torture Culture: Lynching 
Photographs and the Images of Abu  
Ghraib,” Art Journal 64, no. 2 (Summer 
2005): 88–100. 
21 Awad Joumaa and Khaled Ramadan, 
Outsourcing Torture, an Al Jazeera English 
Investigation Documentary, produced in 
2015; see http://interactive.aljazeera.com 
/aje/2015/outsourcingtorture/index.html 
#VIEW%20FILM. 
22 Creative Victoria is a government body 
dedicated to supporting, championing, 
and growing the state’s creative 
industries, spanning arts, culture, screen, 
and design. See http://creative.vic.gov.au. 
23 See Heather Sutfin, “The Final Days of 
Ricardo López: The Opera,” Sword and 
Scale, May 10, 2016, http://swordandscale 
.com/the-final-days-of-ricardo-lopez 
-the-opera.
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RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION? is a video-installation project in progress that 
tries to formulate a link to older works of mine on asylum politics, tracing the 
connections and posing questions on a historical, political, and ideological 
level. It relates directly to the theme of the 15th Venice Biennale of Architecture, 
which took place in 2016.
RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION? tries to analyze, in several stages, how architecture, 
city planning, and art can be viewed in terms of migration and refugees.  
The main aspect of the project deals with the hegemony of the regime of the 
exterior gaze that makes objects out of refugees, asylum seekers, and mi-
grants. On the other side, the critical gaze can never be neutral because there 
are contradictory or parallel aspects to it. 
The words “criticism” and “crisis” have the same language roots with both lead-
ing to a kind of a change in which you can state: there is a crisis in post- 
democracy (where all the democratic institutions are in place, but nevertheless 
a small elite is taking advantage for its own interests), crisis in art, but there  
is also an interior crisis within criticism itself. The central topic of the Venice 
Biennale of Architecture carried the title “Reporting from the Front,” and it  
is remarkable how many of the pavilions did not have any discussion-based con-
tributions. On that occasion it was clear that architecture is only related  
to architecture and that it is only about a nation’s self-representation and self- 
 appraisal. 
The German and Austrian pavilions are taken as special examples in my work to 
decipher the hegemony of the regime of the exterior gaze. Both pavilions  
offered the same reproductions of those kinds of “best-practice examples” of 
architecture that in the end always produce a debate on positivism and thus 
become apolitical. Without acknowledging the reasons for migration or having 
critical reflections, several forms of participating projects offered solutions 
that couldn’t work in the long run. Such highly problematic solutions have been 
on view now for a couple of years, especially since the 2012 refugee demon-
strations took place, and when issues of migration became relevant also in the 
media—not only in Austria but in other European countries. In general, through 
the visual arts and in theater performances, refugees and migrants have be-
come more and more objectivized and homogenized. In art projects, refugees 
and migrants are simplified and reduced to statistics and maps, with an al-
most theatrical staging. 
Colonialism and coloniality, which are spreading internationally all around us 
in this time of global capitalism, have not been reflected on as part of the  
social or artistic agenda in post-democratic, neoliberal, and global capitalist 
countries.
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The overproduction of exhibitions and projects in Europe and elsewhere try 
to reach a common platform in order to come to an understanding of migrants 
and refugees, all of whom cannot be reached easily because of their non- 
status, invisibility, and class differences. The capitalist structures, which reduce 
people to numbers inside the legal-administrative system, are therefore not 
only repeated in Germany’s asylum politics, but also in the German Pavilion at 
the biennial.
Nevertheless the Austrian Pavilion “represented” Syrian topics!
Figs. 1–9 
Betül Seyma Küpeli and Esra Özmen, 
RESOURCE: IMMIGRATION?, 2016–ongoing
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In 2016, a critical perspective on borders required us to look beyond the phys-
ical manifestations of borders and into proposed data practices. This essay  
focuses on the unique European situation where the Europe Union’s external 
borders and the Schengen Agreement are being tested by the high numbers 
of people and goods moving in and out owing to the influx of refugees, as well 
as recent terrorist attacks.
As a response to this border crisis, the European Commission has proposed 
to expand the mandate of the different border policies currently in effect within 
Europe, and to introduce a new “Smart Border Package.” This will include 
measures to enable increased collaboration between different border and law-
enforcement agencies, the implementation of additional surveillance tech-
nology, and the creation of new databases. 
This essay will explore some of the limitations of, and challenges for, the new 
proposed system, which has the potential to create a radically new border  
environment: one where data moves more freely than people; where data col-
lection intrudes upon individual’s everyday lives; and where a border becomes 
a continuous space that extends beyond its physical location.
Calling for “Smart Borders”
In 2015, a New York Times article carried the headline: “Paris Attacks Force 
European Union to Act on Border Controls.”1 It described how EU interior and 
justice ministers had agreed to establish a new EU data system that would 
share the passport data of air travelers inside the Schengen Area. This decision 
was made shortly after it became evident that the Paris attackers were mostly 
European passport holders who had been able to slip in and out of Syria—and 
back into Europe—without being identified.2
This story is just one of the many that have contributed to the current discourse 
around migration, terrorism, and borders, in which borders are generally por-
trayed as vulnerable, under-resourced, inefficient, or not “smart” enough. The 
assumption is that the lack of data sharing between different countries within 
the Schengen Area has enabled terrorists to enter Europe, and has left European 
nation-states vulnerable; and that “smart” data-driven borders will be more 
reliable and efficient, safer, less prone to human error, and able to prevent 
Smarter Borders
Challenges  
and Limitations  
of Data-Driven 
Borders
Fieke Jansen, Tactical Technology Collective 
1  Steven Erlanger, “Paris Attacks Force 
European Union to Act on Border Controls,” 
New York Times, November 20, 2015.
2  On November 13, 2015, Paris was 
confronted with a series of coordinated 
terrorist attacks. Suicide bombers outside 
the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, and 
mass shootings and suicide bombings at 
the Bataclan theater killed 130 people. 
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bases are aimed at monitoring the movement of people and objects in and out 
of Europe. In addition, the European Commission is proposing a “Smart Border 
Package.”
Surveillance of Europe’s Waters and Borders
Eurosur was implemented in 2013 and is operated by Frontex. The “main pur-
pose is to improve the ‘situational awareness’ and reaction capability of the 
member states and FRONTEX is here to prevent irregular migration and cross- 
border crime at the EU’s external land and maritime borders.”8 Eurosur is a 
twenty-four-hour surveillance operation that covers the European sea and land 
borders using drones and satellite-tracking systems. The geographical scope 
of Eurosur does not stop at the European sea borders: its surveillance arm 
reaches far beyond the shores of Europe all the way to North Africa. The data 
collected through drones and satellites provides Frontex with real-time up-
dates on the border situ ation, which it can share—on a regular as well as on a 
case-by-case basis—with individual member states, Europol, and other EU 
law-enforcement agencies. In 2015, the European Commission proposed to 
strengthen Frontex’s mandate by increasing its financial and human resources.9 
terrorists from “slipping back in.”3 To understand how Europe’s border structures 
will change, what challenges smart borders pose, and what their limitations 
will be, I will first focus on the current governance structure of the European 
borders.
Borders and Travel in Europe
Borders are complex ecosystems that include both sea and land borders. These 
are governed by a range of policies, implemented by several agencies tasked 
with the responsibility to protect them. Europe’s borders are governed under the 
Schengen Agreement, which enables the abolishment of internal border 
checks between European nation-states and makes the Schengen Area func-
tion as one state for international travel.
Border ecosystems are impacted by, among other things, the geopolitical  
environment and the movement of both people and goods; in Europe, the cur-
rent volume of people moving in and out of the area has been increasing, 
with further increases expected. The EU border consists of a “territory delin-
eated by 7.400 km of land borders and 57.8000 km of coastline (‘maritime 
borders’). Some 300 million people—just under half of them non-EU citizens—
are estimated to enter and leave the EU every year.”4 These high numbers  
of travelers are noticeable in Europe’s main travel hubs, like Paris’s Charles de 
Gaulle airport, where in the month November 2016 over 4.8 million people 
passed through.5
In recent years, Europe has been confronted with tension around the border. 
This is most noticeable on the shores of Greece and Italy. Refugees and  
migrants fleeing the war in Syria and Iraq and instability in countries such as 
Afghanistan and Eritrea have increased. In 2015, asylum applications filed  
in different EU member states doubled the number filed in 2014, rising to 1.3 
million.7
How Are the European Borders Governed?
After signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the founding members created 
a joint database for the verification of both people and objects. Since then 
the database has been upgraded and expanded. The EU borders are managed 
under the following programs: the European External Surveillance System 
(Eurosur), the European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), the Schengen Information Sys-
tems I & II (SIS I & II), and the Visa Information System (VIS). Where Eurosur 
aims to increase situational awareness of sea and land borders, the other data-
3  Eticas, Big Data at the Border (Report for 
Ford Foundation and Open Society 
Foundations, MDF’s Quantified Society 
Program, 2015).
4  Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen, 
Borderline: The EU’s New Border 
Surveillance Initiatives; Assessing the 
Costs and Fundamental Rights Implications 
of EUROSUR and the “Smart Border” 
Proposals (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
2012), 11, http://www.statewatch.org/news 
/2012/jun/borderline.pdf.










7 Hayes and Vermeulen, Borderline, 18.
8  See Kristiina Milt, “Fact Sheets on the 
European Union: Management of the 
External Borders,” European Parliament at 
Your Service, September 2016, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU 
_4.2.4.pdf.
9  The Dublin Regulation, a European Law 
signed in 1990, decides on the EU member 
state who is responsible to process asylum- 
seeker applications. The regulation states 
that asylum seekers have to stay in the 
first European country they enter. 
Individuals seeking asylum in a different 
European country than the one they 
entered will be return to the first country 
of entry. The Eurodac database facilitates 
the implementation of the Dublin 
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equivalent of the American Esta Waiver, in which all third-country nationals 
can be pre-vetted prior to crossing a border, providing speedy entry and exit. 
RTP requires fingerprints, identity information, and travel information.13
Border Databases: What Are the Concerns?
There are many different concerns regarding Eurosur, Eurodac, SIS I&II, VIS, and 
the Smart Border initiative, ranging from questions around safeguards to  
human rights, lack of parliamentary oversight, the outsourcing of critical tech-
nological infrastructure, jurisdictional problems, and questions of who has 
access to these different databases.
Data, the Right to Privacy, and Marginalization
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights acknowledges the limita-
tions of individuals to understand the implication of data collection and its 
use at the borders. “The collection, use and storage of such data must be car-
ried out in accordance with data protection principles, including the right  
to private and family life. The use of several databases at different stages of the 
border check increases the risk of data protection violations. Passengers  
may not always be aware of the type of data processed, the purpose of this pro-
cessing or how to have their data corrected.”14 It is still unclear how Europe’s 
new Smart Border will inform people about the data-driven border.
Existing databases also raise privacy and data protection concerns. The Euro-
pean Commission stresses that Eurosur is not intended as a system to re-
gulate the collection, storage, or cross-border exchange of personal data.15 As 
it pertains to Eurosur, the right to privacy is seen as a marginal issue. How-
Managing Travel of People and Objects in Europe
EU border officials can make use of three large official databases for the regis-
tration, validation, and identification of travelers: Eurodac, SIS I & II, and VIS.  
In addition, the European Commission’s proposed Smart Borders Package will 
create two additional databases.
Eurodac is Europe’s fingerprint database for identifying refugees, used primarily 
to enforce the Dublin Regulation.10 The database is used to determine if refu-
gees have already applied for asylum in, or illegally traveled through, another 
EU member state. Any individual eighteen years or over who applies for asylum 
status needs to provide fingerprints, which are then registered in the Eurodac 
database. In 2013, the mandate of Eurodac was expanded to give law enforce-
ment access to its database. In 2016, the European Commission proposed to 
expand Eurodac to include facial-recognition data in a central database, and 
to lower the minimum age to six years and over.10
SIS I & II is a database containing information on criminal activity, immigration 
violations, and various objects and missing persons. It is the EU’s border  
information management system, where authorities put in alerts on wanted  
or missing people and objects, and individuals with entry bans. Upon entering 
the EU, individuals are cross-referenced against this database. SIS II can  
be accessed by different authorities, including police officers, border-patrol 
officers, and law-enforcement officials.11 
The VIS database contains information, including biometrics, on visa applica-
tions, and aims to improve and centralize visa policies and application  
processes for the EU. To ensure that a non-EU national entering Europe is the 
legitimate visa holder, fingerprints are cross-referenced against the biometric 
data on the visa application and across the entire VIS database.12
The “Smart Borders” Package
To make European borders safer and more efficient, the European Commission 
has proposed increased collaboration between the different agencies and  
European nation-states; the implementation of new surveillance technology; 
and the creation of new databases. Part of this proposal is the new Smart  
Borders Package, which will introduce two new databases: the Entry/Exit System 
(EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). The EES will primarily  
be used to monitor people who overstay. The system will collect and store data 
(identities and fingerprints) about third-country nationals and the date and 
place they enter and exit. This database will be shared with law enforcement 
and authorities in all EU member states, and with Europol. The RTP is the 
10  Paula Kift and Mark Latonero, “On Digital 
Passageways and Borders,” Data & Society, 
May 12, 2016, https://datasociety.net 
/events/databite-no-80-mark-latonero 
-paula-kift/.
11 Eticas, Big Data at the Border.
12 See EU Issue Tracker, EU Smart Borders: 
Registered Traveller Programme (EU  
Issue Tracker, November 29, 2016); and 
European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, DIGNITY: Fundamental Rights  
at Airports: Border Checks at Five 
International Airports in the European 
Union (Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2014), doi:10.2811 
/68358.
13 European Commission, “Stronger and 
Smarter Border for the European Union: 
The Entry-Exit System,” in European 





14 European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, DIGNITY, 11.
15 Hayes and Vermeulen, Borderline, 36.
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In 2013, the European Organization for Security (ESO), representing major  
security companies, published its objective on how the industry could best as-
sist Europe in implementing Eurosur and assist Frontex. This entailed a vision 
on how the security industry could best invest in the development and produc-
tion phase of the components needed for the implementation of Eurosur, and  
to better provide technical assistance to support the Commission and Frontex.22
This collaboration and subcontracting of technical functionalities, also known 
as “outsourcing,” is not unique to the defense industry: there is a growing 
governmental trend to outsource key tasks to commercial entities in many dif-
ferent areas. However, outsourcing raises troubling questions around over-
sight. “Latour states that the more science and technology succeed, the more 
opaque and obscure they become.”23 The investment in the research, creation 
and implementation of technology for Eurosur and Frontex by industry has 
meant that knowledge on the technical part of Europe’s border systems is nested 
within industry, paid for by the EU. This has made “smart” border systems dif-
ficult to govern, as government and governmental bodies lack the necessary 
knowledge and skills to have proper oversight on these systems.
Moving into the Future
Even with these different databases in effect, the European Union feels the need 
to increase data collection around individuals entering and exiting the border, 
increase its technical border surveillance capabilities, and invest in the creation 
of centralized databases—all of which imply that the future of Europe’s borders 
lies in “predictive borders.”
Critics of the European Commission’s border plan have so far focused predom-
inantly on the collection of data, the legal frameworks under which this is 
done, and how this could impact individuals’ rights to human dignity and privacy. 
This, however, misses the dimensions of the consequences of collecting and 
ever, not only could boats, and by proxy people, be identified by analyzing high 
resolution satellite and drone images, Frontex national coordination centers 
are allowed to process personal data, which could be combined with the drone 
and satellite surveillance data. This would leave refugees exposed to tracking 
from the point of departure to the point of asylum request, without being aware 
that this data was being collected, combined, and used.16
Expanding the mandate of Eurosur and Eurodac and providing EU law enforce-
ment agencies access to the data collected, as per The European Commis-
sion’s proposal, would further stigmatize refugees. “Providing access is based 
on the assumption that refugees will be more likely to commit crimes than 
other travelers or European citizens.”17 Studies around predictive policing show 
that including specific demographic datasets perpetuates prejudices. For  
example, if additional police forces are send to patrol what is considered a 
“high crime area,” they will likely encounter crime, reinforcing the assumption 
that this is a “high crime area.” However, if police deployed the same amount  
of officers in a “low crime area,” the crime rates they report would also increase. 
Providing law-enforcement access to refugee registration databases could  
result in similar negative feedback loops.18 
Technocracy and Oversight
The European Commission’s proposal to expand the mandate of the different 
border management systems is part of a larger political issue, where changes 
are presented in isolation and as a technical addition to existing policies.  
In 2012, Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen argued that “these technical solu-
tions are often presented as mere technical measures as if somehow separate 
from the EU’s border migration and border control policies (and thus less  
deserving of scrutiny or discussion) when they have moved ever closer to its 
core.”19 In 2013, the European Parliament raised concerns about the lack of 
parliamentary oversight over Frontex, and about how the Smart Borders Pack-
age would build up vast technical infrastructures for the mass processing  
of personal data.20
The European Parliament did not, however, address the collaboration with and 
subcontracting of commercial entities for certain functionalities needed  
for the creation and maintenance of border databases. In 2010, Didier Bigo and 
Julien Jeandesboz raised concerns about the relationship between the Euro-
pean Commission and defense contractors in the field of security. They stated 
that this relationship has passed well beyond mere dialogue: “Major defence 
and security companies have played a key role in the definition of the orienta-
tion and priorities of the EU’s research and development policy for security- 
related technical systems—and also turn out to be the major beneficiaries of 
this policy.”21
16 Kift and Latonero, “On Digital Passageways 
and Borders.” 
17 Ibid.
18 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: 
How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy (New York: Penguin, 
2016); and Kristian Lum, “Predictive 
Policing,” Data & Society, November 17, 
2016, https://datasociety.net/events 
/databite-no-90-kristian-lum/#.
19 Hayes and Vermeulen, Borderline, 12.
20 See Milt, “Fact Sheets on the European 
Union.”
21 Didier Bigo and Julien Jeandesboz, “The 
EU and the European Security Industry 
Questioning the ‘Public-Private Dialogue,’” 
INEX Policy Brief, no. 5 (February 2010): 2, 
https://www.prio.org/PageFiles/1522 
/INEX%20Policy%20brief%20No%205.pdf.
22 ESO, “Border Surveillance,” July 2013, 
http://www.eos-eu.com/Middle.aspx?page 
=border%20surveillance%20wg.
23 Eticas, Big Data at the Border, 20.
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is an easily measurable variable that is used in place of a variable that cannot 
be measured or is difficult to measure.”27 Proxy data at borders could be travel 
patterns, ports of departure, or meal preferences. The problem with proxy 
variables is that it is assumed they are closely linked to the complex phenom-
ena a smart system aims to score, but in fact they are by default something 
different.28
The Input Determines the Output
The output of an algorithm—in this case a risk score—is determined by what 
is put into the system. If the input, the database, is inaccurate or biased,  
the results will also be inaccurate or biased. To assess algorithmic systems 
you first need to examine the database, investigate what is collected at Euro-
pean borders, and examine what the limitations are in capturing human  
behavior in data, and what the risks are of excluding or over-representing cer-
tain groups in data sets.
In a 2016 interview for the Jim Bakkers Show, an Austrian policeman on the 
Austria-Slovenia border explained how after a day’s work collecting the finger-
prints of refugees who crossed the border, the fingerprints are deleted almost 
instantly. “We are not allowed to save the fingerprints, we do what we’re asked 
to do.”29 The act of deleting fingerprints creates biases in the Eurodac data-
base. Refugees end up getting registered in a different European country other 
then the first country of entry. Humans looking at the Eurodac database will 
know from experience that these sorts of things happen. An algorithm will ana-
lyze it as if the input was correct. “Machines learning algorithms are very good  
at repeating and finding patterns, and predicting the repetition. They do not ask 
the question, ‘Why?’ When you apply machine learning algorithms you are  
automating past practices.”30
storing large quantities of data and merging existing databases. To interpret 
large quantities of data, data needs to be modeled. Categorizing and scoring 
individuals is a way to model data in order to predict whether an individual  
is a legitimate traveler or should be subject to further investigation. The use of 
this kind of algorithmic “risk scoring” at borders, however, has inherent limi-
tations and brings up some important concerns.24
Risk scoring combines intelligence, behavioral modeling, and data analytics. 
Behavioral modeling looks at the past to predict the future. In the case of bor-
ders, the border authority would need to define a low-risk traveler versus a 
high-risk traveler. To do this, historical data would be gathered on past travelers 
who meet these definitions. This data could include historical records of  
border crossings from the Eurodac, SIS I & II, or VIS systems, but also other intel-
ligence sources on the traveler. This data would then be analyzed by an  
algorithm to find patterns, which would then be used to create behavior models 
for low-risk travelers versus high-risk ones.25
In the future when an individual applies for a visa or the RTP, it is most likely 
that in addition to their name being cross-referenced against no-fly lists  
and SIS II, they will also be given a risk score. Data such as passport number, 
name, age, sex, frequency of travel, when and how the ticket was bought, 
and their airplane seat number and meal preference, will be analyzed against 
behavior models.
Can Data Predict Reality?
One reason often given for the need for smart borders is that the terrorist, the 
person who overstays, and the migrant can be more easily found among the  
millions of travelers entering and exiting Europe. However there are a number  
of limitations in assuming that data-driven systems will find terrorists. As secu-
rity expert Bruce Schneier explains,“The complexity of the problem highlights 
the limits of data mining and data surveillance as a deterrent for terrorist activ-
ity. According to [Bruce] Schneier, these limits can be summed up in three 
points: firstly, all detection systems have inherent error rates. [...] Secondly, the 
very nature of terrorist attacks make it difficult to establish patterns which 
can be useful to identify potential threats. [...] Thirdly, individuals who engage 
in terrorist activities are very wary when providing personal data and are con-
stantly trying to avoid detection.”26
Schneier argues that it is difficult to identify terrorists or terrorist patterns, as 
every ill-intentioned traveler aims not to be identified and avoids creating  
recognizable patterns. And since terrorist behavior cannot easily be quantified 
in data points, a data system will then look for proxy data. “A proxy variable  
24 See O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction.
25 Paula Salerno, “The Past Predicts the 
Future: Leveraging Behavorial Data to 




26 Eticas, Big Data at the Border, 43.
27 Jim Frost, “Proxy Variables: The Good Twin 
of Confounding Variables,” The MiniTab 




28 See O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction. 
29 Cited in Shadia Nasralla and Gabriela 
Baczynska, “On the Border, Austria Takes 
Migrant Fingerprints, Then Discards 
Them,” Reuters, February 22, 2016,  
http://in.reuters.com/article/europe 
-migrants-fingerprints-idINKCN0VV1IE.
30 Cathy O’Neil, “Weapons of Math 
Destruction,” Data & Society, October 26, 
2016, https://datasociety.net/events 
/databite-no-88-cathy-oneil/.
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Conclusion
The discourse in Europe around its border crisis has forced the EU to respond 
with a new plan to increase the security of its borders. The European Com-
mission proposes to expand the mandate of existing policies and create a Smart 
Border Package. However in the desire to increase border authorities’ capa-
bilities, it is crucial to be critical of the scope and implementation of these 
policies.
These “smart” systems will create borders that are continuous, and that interact 
with travelers prior, during, and post-border crossings, but they will operate 
outside of most travelers’ awareness. The European Commission’s border pro-
posals should be questioned not only on their legitimacy, necessity, and pro-
portionality, but also on how they came about, the involvement of parliamentary 
oversight, and the scope for public debate. Policies should be examined on 
their safeguards to political and civil rights, and measures to prevent system-
atic discriminatory practices.
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The global-media sphere is experiencing new developments. First, these devel-
opments are the expansion of Western, Eastern, Middle Eastern, and Latin 
American media organizations into Africa. This expansion also includes the ex-
pansion of African media organizations themselves within the African con-
tinent. Second, there is a quantitative increase in content about Africa. Third, 
there is qualitative increase in positive reporting about Africa. 
Africa-to-Africa expansion is symbolized by, for example, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (SABC) (re)launch of its twenty-four-hour news chan-
nel, SABC NEWS, on August 1, 2013. This relaunch, conceptualized within  
the African renaissance philosophy and decolonization of the African informa-
tional spheres, aimed at counteracting Western media “imperialism” and  
negative framing of the continent. Competing with SABC is another South  
African twenty-four-hour news channel E News Channel Africa (ENCA), which 
was launched in August 2012. ENCA’s signature magazine program Africa 
360’s slogan, “Africa 360: See Africa like you have never seen it before,” de-
scribes what Africa-to-Africa channels are trying to achieve. Nigeria, for exam-
ple, recently launched TVC news in July 2013, a pan-African news channel. 
 
But Western media continues to grow in Africa: Africanews, an extension of 
Euronews, was launched on April 20, 2016. Bloomberg TV Africa was launched 
in October 2013. The African edition of Forbes magazine on September 29, 
2011. CNBC Africa on June 1, 2007. CNBC Africa now has offices in strategic 
locations, in Africa’s bigger cities in terms of the continent’s political economy: 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, Lagos, and Abuja. 
All the new channels are being launched into spaces still being dominated  
by CNN and BBC. Competition has forced CNN and BBC to fight in protection 
of their territory by increasing Africa-focused programming, such as CNN’s 
Marketplace Africa, Inside Africa, and African Voices, and, in June 2012, BBC’s 
Focus on Africa.
Chinese media institutions, too, are equally making significant inroads in the 
African continent. The English version of China Daily was launched in Kenya  
in December 2012. More visible of the Chinese media in the continent is CCTV 
News, a twenty-four-hour English news channel, carrying the programs Africa 
Live (Biz Africa), Talk Africa, and Faces of Africa.
Justifying Expansion into Africa
Justifications for expanding into the African media sphere are coalescing into 
a particular language or discourse of their own. Collectively, they critique  
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Decolonization 
The foregoing justifications form part of the decolonization process. Decoloniz-
ing African media and cultural territories consists of the reconsideration of 
the Western cultural industries’ role in preserving colonial influences and legacy 
in the former African colonies. Although in the past, postcolonial states’  
media were depending on Western-controlled news and entertainment organi-
zations, this disadvantage is being corrected today, in attempts to control  
the nar rative about Africa. These are other forms of having territorial control and 
sovereignty in the African informational and cultural spheres. In the past, the 
disquiet was principally articulated in two ways: quantitative and qualitative.
The quantitative dimension criticized the massive flow of news and entertain-
ment products from Western countries to Africa. This flow was considered 
uni-directional. This was because news and entertainment products emanated 
from the Western “core” to the rest of the South. News and entertainment  
material coming from the South to the West was absent or scarce. 
There was/is also a qualitative aspect in the critique of way that Africa was/is 
reported on in the West. The qualitative aspect critically questioned Western 
perspectives on reporting and content as well. Central to the critique was that 
Western news organizations mainly adopted a negative framework when  
telling stories about Africa. There were hardly any positive stories about the 
continent. Most of them were about military dictatorships, corruption, natural 
disasters, and other social ills.
These are the boundaries and borders that I referred to above. Both qualitative 
and quantitative aspects within the discourse of decolonization led to a 
strong call for the establishment of New World Information and Communication 
Order (NWICO). NWICO put emphasis on the critical role communication 
plays in economic and social development. 
the view that global media’s negative framing of Africa has, all along, been 
creating borders that made it impossible for people to fully understand Africa. 
These new media outlets are removing these borders to create a better under-
standing about Africa. 
If, for example, the old ways of discoursing about Africa were as characterized 
by cultural insensitivity and riddled with negativities, the new scramble for 
African media sphere tries to be culturally sensitive, diplomatic, and introspec-
tive as shall be seen in the language that is used in the following quotation.  
If the old discourse constructed Africa as a “dark continent” of despair, primitive-
ness, and in need of civilization, the new discourse crafts Africa as a place  
of hope, progress, and transformation: 
Bloomberg is watching Africa bloom. This is the time for Africa. Three 
things have happened. You find Africa from the power of potential to the 
power of promise; now talking about the power of progression. Now 
these three things have happened in the ten years. This is the time that 
Africa is blooming.1
After decades of turmoil and uncertainty, a new Africa is emerging […]. 
The old stereotypes are being challenged and a new, compelling narrative 
is being written. I am incredibly excited to be part of a new BBC pro-
gramme that will provide solid coverage and analysis of Africa’s challenges 
and prospects.2
The above quotations admit that old stereotypes existed, that particular fram-
ing and negative images of Africa was the norm, and that global twenty-four-
hour news channels are now reexamining their role in the discourse about Africa. 
It is, however, not only the old dominant twenty-four-hour news channels of 
the West that are using the same language associated with ethical reporting, 
fairness, and positive framing Africa, it is also the new channels of the south. 
Tine Ustad Figenschou points to six core values that define Al Jazeera’s strategy. 
One of them is the following: “The Southern Perspective: A much higher pro-
portion of stories from the developing world; consider the impact of any story 
on the developing world; avoid conventional ‘western’ political and cultural  
attitudes and assumptions; adopt an indigenous perspective.”3
China’s CCTV is very explicit in its justification for expanding into African media 
space and the reasoning fits snugly into discourse regarding Africa -oriented 
expansion. It says: “CCTV News intends to strengthen news coverage in Africa. 
In so doing, CTV News wishes to promote communication and cooperation 
between China and African countries on politics, economy, trade and culture.”4
1  Rebecca Hawkes, “Bloomberg TV Africa 
Readies For Launch,” Rapid TV News, 
October 9, 2013, http://www.rapidtvnews 
.com/2013100930200/bloomberg-tv-africa 
-readies-for-launch.html#axzz4ROwMS8yk.
2  See statements made by Komla Dumor  
in “BBC to Launch Focus on Africa TV 
Programme,” BBC News, June 8, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world 
-18375291.
3  Tine Ustad Figenschou, “The South Is 
Talking Back: With a White Face and a 
British accent—Editorial Dilemmas in Al 
Jazeera English,” Journalism 13, no. 3 
(2011): 354–70.





The language of decolonization, cultural sensitivity, and other justifications  
for expansion mask neoliberal market-oriented logic in the African-oriented ex-
pansion. All media companies expanding into Africa media space are not  
humanitarian ventures. Southern-based media (that are regional), as well as 
media of the Global North, are strategic and calculated capturing of African 
media markets for commercial ends. Africa-to-Africa media expansions threaten 
the growth of local media, as much as Western media. It is equally plausible 
that external regional media, employing similar liberal market-oriented tactics, 
could threaten the growth of local media of receiving countries. Old and  
new media are using their respective financial muscles to expand in the African 
media market. 
First, there is the critical aspect of the competition that has forced old news 
players to adopt news business strategies. Africa-focused expansions are 
happening in the midst of, metaphorically, southward expansions in the interna-
tional communication and global news. Southward expansion can be divided 
into two. It is first symbolized by continuity, reform, and reinforcement of the 
historically dominant international news channels of developed countries 
such as CNN International and BBC. In terms of continuity, reform and reinforce-
ment, the historically dominant CNN International, for example, has trans-
formed its business strategy by relying less on news agencies about Africa. News 
and magazine shows such as CNN’s Marketplace Africa, Inside Africa, and  
African Voices suggest that the network now reports on various aspects of  
Africa other than just hard news. CNN’s focus on Africa, against CNN worldwide 
declining ratings, has paid off commercially and in terms of audience share.  
It is now the most-watched international news channel in Africa. 
Equally, BBC has ensured its continuity, reform, and reinforcement by keeping 
its spot as the second most-watched international news channel in the conti-
nent. BBC has gone on to establish exclusively Africa-focused program called 
Focus on Africa. BBC, too, has had to adjust or would be moved out of the  
African market by new global news players in the competition for the growing 
African middle-class audiences. The realization of Africa as a global-news 
market creates another dimension in the southward expansion. This dimension 
is epitomized by global-news channels of developed countries in the north 
that follow on the footsteps of CNN International and BBC. Some of these 
channels have a clear-cut Africa- focused agenda—with CNBC Africa being the 
prime example.
Second, Africa-focused expansions are happening in the midst of, metaphori-
cally, southward and northward expansions in the international communi-
cation and global news flow scene. South-south and northward expansions are 
exemplified by the regionalization and broader globalization of media conglom-
erates of the Global South. Al Jazeera’s horizontal expansion or regionalization  
in the Middle East, its strong and determined presence in the African continent, 
and its northward expansion into rest of the world is an example here. The 
same can be said of CCTV’s expansion in the Asia-Pacific and then to the rest 
of the world. The increased growth of South Africa’s e.tv in the African conti-
nent first and then expansion throughout the world is another example. 
Third, Africa-focused expansions are happening in the midst of transnational 
commercialization and commoditization of cultural identities and languages  
of the South in the international communication and global news flow scene. 
The commercialization and commoditization of identities and languages  
occur as a counterbalance and, at the same time, reinforcement of the hege-
mony of European colonial languages in other regions, particularly the English 
language. Commercialization and commoditization of identity and language 
are manifest in exploitation of particular sets of cultural and linguistic identities 
that are in specific geopolitical regions and/or diasporic communities for  
media-related commercial purposes. For example, France 24 has French, English, 
and Arabic channels; CNN has CNN Mexico, CNN en Español, CNN Arabic, 
and so on; and Aljazeera has Al Jazeera Balkans, Al Jazeera Türk, Al Jazeera 
America, and so forth. Interestingly, if not concerning, global-news broadcasters 
in the African media use English, French, or Portuguese—“colonial languages”— 
rather than indi genous or regional languages. Furthermore, the commercial-
ization of identity through reinforcement of hegemony of the English language 
can been seen, for example, in the global growth of the Indian twenty-four-
hour news channel NDTV 24x7 and its targeting of the Indian community in the 
diaspora. 
It is rather disingenuous for media institutions in the north to simply say they re-
writing the narrative about Africa. There are strong factors that, in part, force 
them to look for greener pastures in Africa. Some of these factors are restrained 
growth in their respective countries because of the crisis resulting from the 
economic meltdown; long-standing and strong competition in the already sat-
urated national media market; radically declining levels of news media con-
sumption by audiences, particularly young adults. For the majority of audiences 
of the Global North, “the media landscape now has all the characteristics of 
post-modernity: it is characterized by fragmentation, almost unlim ited choice, 
and a diminishing sense of national conversation or shared political destiny.”5
On the other hand, for many Africans the media landscape is characteristically 
modern, dominated more by traditional broadcast radio and television and 
Borderless Global Public Sphere? Musawenkosi Ndlovu
5  Ian Glenn and Robert Mattes, “Political 
Communication in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa,” Working Paper, no. 299 (2011): 2.
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parts in developed capitalistic economies are employing these media capabili-
ties for production of cultural programs for national, regional, worldwide, and 
diaspora consumption. In the African region, for example, it is largely South  
Africa and Nigeria, two of Africa’s economically powerful countries, that export 
their cultural products in the rest of the region.
The other important point is that as much as dominant southern countries can 
be exporting their own media products, they can also be a conduit for Western 
media and cultural imperialism. For example, South African media content,  
especially popular- and high-culture media products, is hardly “South African.” 
While we might cautiously speak of typically India’s Bollywood or Nigeria’s 
Nollywood movies and Latin America’s telenovelas in their respective regions 
and in the diaspora, it is difficult to speak of any enduring media product 
forms and formats that are idiosyncratically South African. Also, unlike in Latin 
America, Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, Africa-based regional media  
expansion scarcely foster any new forms of cultural and linguistic cooperation 
among developing African countries such as program exchange. 
African-oriented expansion does not create space for the development of  
indigenous languages; it enhances the hegemony of colonial languages such 
as English, French, and Portuguese. Regionalization is biased in favor of  
powerful countries of the South and inimical to the spirit of NWICO through 
which southern countries collectively campaign for equal flow of international 
information. Although there are disadvantages, there are also advantages. 
The first advantage is that if one of the main concerns in international commu-
nication is that the representation of Africa in the global news media is bi ased 
and is always negative, the growth of southern-based global news channels and 
programs is forcing Western global channels to question their represen tation  
and framing of Africa. This is in terms of: cultural sensitivity, hiring local personnel, 
and in terms of expanding so-called magazine TV programs that could cover 
a wide scope of Africa and Africans, not just within realm of conventional 
mainstream news that is normally oriented toward negative happenings.7 
Mag azine programs on CNN’s African Voices and Marketplace Africa are now 
feature programs that speak of African urgency, success, innovation, and  
future prosperity. 
Lastly, the sheer presence of business channels and programs such as Forbes 
Africa, Bloomberg TV Africa, CNBC Africa, and CNN’s Marketplace Africa tells  
less by newspapers and online media. The environment allows for growth of 
television. “While radio remains popular in Africa, TV is growing.”6 There is  
increase in television expansion—with improved electrification, satellite tech-
nology, and cheaper TV sets as well as battery-operated ones. In most coun-
tries, the TV signal (especially new players) is distributed to the major cities 
only—satellite is used to cover wider coverage. The launch of various satellites 
has opened many opportunities across Africa. Dishes are smaller and cheaper, 
for instance, and satellite technology (Worldspace) allows for more stations 
as well as more variety. 
There are other factors as well that make global news media expand into African 
media space to explore African media space for growth. These have to do 
with audience size. Media conglomerates are entering Africa, which they now 
view as a region rather than a desperate conglomeration of countries. In 
terms of population size, African countries offer a huge market. The size of the 
cities and buying power cannot be underestimated—Lagos, Harare, and  
Abidjan combined have thirty-six million people as opposed to ten million peo-
ple in cities like Paris, Rome, and Zurich. 
As much as there are comparable patterns in the nature of global news (and en-
tertainment) channel’s transnational expansions, the Africa-oriented expan-
sions are intriguing because for a very long time Africa had not been seen as 
primary investment region. For this article, there are oppositional factors that 
cause global news media to expand into African media and cultural spaces. 
Conclusion 
The expansion of southern-based media conglomerates into African media 
and cultural space could be seen as both the reversal of cultural imperialism and 
internationalization of the local cultures they carry. On the one hand, this  
can be true—although exaggerated in terms of scale and scope of cultural con-
tent being “reversed.” On the other hand, perceptions of reversal of cultural 
imperialism could be misleading. Some regional media have, arguably, potential 
to establish various new forms of media, cultural imperialism, or synchroni-
zation among the nations of the South, which can be masqueraded in the notions 
of counterbalancing the influence of Western media, reversing cultural im-
perialism, South-South cooperation, geo-linguistic commonalities (usually cre-
ated by common colonial languages), and globalization of local cultures or 
even the African renaissance. Southern countries were never homogenous or 
similarly marginalized in the global political economy. Those southern-based 
countries with relatively stronger economies and stronger political influences 
are expanding in their respective regions and to the world at large. Economies 
with better-developed media industries—and similar to their Western counter-
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Borderless Global Public Sphere? 
Literaturea big story about new perceptions of Africa as an investment destination rather 
than a place of disaster. Stereotypical images of starving Africans now in-
creasingly coexist alongside robust reports on African financial markets, African 
CEO interviews, and so on. The parochial reporting and negative imaging  
that used to characterize Western news channels is slowly changing. But these 
changes should not be overemphasized.
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We speak today about a crisis in contemporary social movements. This 
crisis has been produced in part by our failure to develop a meaningful 
and collective historical consciousness. Such a consciousness would 
entail recognition that our victories attained by freedom movements are 
never etched in stone. What we often perceive under one set of histor-
ical conditions as glorious triumphs of mass struggle can later ricochet 
against us if we do not continually reconfigure the terms and transform 
the terrain of our struggle. The struggle must go on. Transformed circum-
stances require new theories and practices.
—Angela Davis, The Meaning of Freedom, and Other Difficult Dialogues1
The impossibility to change neoliberal systems that shape and oppress every-
day life on all social levels, as well as the simultaneous and paradoxical act  
of reproducing and resisting dominant social structures (a side effect of con-
temporary emancipatory politics), put us in the position to rethink what the 
politics of liberation or its revolutionary practices of today are. The attribute 
“revolutionary,” means that those practices are politically engaged and socially 
transformative in a very concrete context. The fact is that all social revolu-
tions have emerged outside of dominant ideological, economical, and political 
structures in order to cope with the unbearable conditions of common life  
in certain times. Each of them generated a new social order grounded in the 
radical imagination of everyday life. In other words, social revolutions always 
fought for freedom, social justice, and new liberating legality through “illegal” 
means. But what happens when all those facts become romanticized versions 
of possible futures and when the freedom is (ab)used as a key concept of 
neoliberal society? 
Dealing with this question, my intention is to underline the false dichotomy 
between the meaning of legality and illegality when it comes to difficult ques-
tions on the contemporary total war on terror(ism) (WOT) that shapes the  
actual state of global crisis, and at the same time escapes the real political ques-
tions that we should face. Freedom appears at this point as a fundamental and  
arbitrary notion of neoliberal society, a notion that justifies the state of war (con-
sisting of all recent and actual political, economical, social crises) and de-
velops through it further “liberal” interests and inequalities. The actual means 
of democratic defense of humanity, such as: military interventions, austerity 
measures, refugee policies, humanitarian aid, migration laws, human rights, 
and so on, are discursively and ideologically based on the meaning of freedom. 
Those means (co)produce the neoliberal mechanisms of global governmen-
tality, as well as the permanent state of crisis, conflict, and terror. Such inverted 
horizons of freedom exclude any critical way of thinking, educating, organiz-
ing, re sisting, and living outside the neoliberal concept of legality today. The 
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Following historical events, we can say that global or total war officially started 
in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, when the Bush adminis-
tration initiated an international military campaign known as the war on terror 
(or the war on terrorism). Led by the United States and the United Kingdom 
with NATO support, the war on terror was waged initially against al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist organizations but soon expanded to include Saddam Hussein, 
Iraq, and so forth. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
were transformed into occasions to abuse and manipulate collective grief, to 
reduce it to a national desire for vengeance for which freedom and democracy 
became exportable commodities: “commodities that can be sold or imposed 
upon entire populations whose resistances are aggressively suppressed by the 
military […]. Bloodshed and belligerence in the name of freedom and democ-
racy!”7 Appropriating the idea of freedom and democracy while making use of 
the permanent financial crises and fear of terror, the neoliberal means of  
war production prevent(ed) any radical possibility of political subjectivization 
against the war on terror or the possibility of confronting its permanency. 
Catherine Hass points out that contemporary war is necessarily a permanent 
one, because there is no intrinsic political, subjective goal that would deter-
mine its end, THE PEACE. The question that appears in the title of her PhD 
thesis “Qu’appelle-t-on une guerre? Enquête sur le nom de guerre aujourd’hui” 
(What does the term “war” stand for today?) testifies to this current state of 
war, its permanence and necessity, the purpose of which, as emphasized by 
Catharine Hass, is not the achievement of peace,8 because the differentiation 
between war and peace doesn’t exist anymore. Such contemporary global 
struggle for freedom opens up questions on the limits of political, theoretical, 
and artistic practices as well the question of resisting responsibility and  
revolutionary subjectivity. Following the red thread of recent theoretical and 
art-theory works, this text looks for the meaning of freedom, which is anta gon-
istically contextualized by neoliberal and revolutionary understandings of 
contemporary permanent war today. The war that made people’s lives illegal.
The State of Permanent War
The prevailing apparatus of the neoliberal state, constructed through the 
model of arbitrary freedom and its manipulative liberal values, does not produce 
only class, race, gender, and many other social/economic/political/cultural  
diversifications through the oppressive politics of identity and its economy of 
brutal exploitation, but rather “human waste” (human-as-waste) through ad-
ministrative and managing mechanisms of contemporary war: permanent and 
global. There are at least three theoretical cross-referential understand ing of 
the meaning of “human waste”: symbolic, bio-political, and political-economic. 
The first two approaches re/produce social order that is achieved through  
inscription of pollution, danger, redundancy, and contamination into the Other 
by violent means of so-called social purification and protection (intervention).2 
The difference is in the individual or collective constitution of humans-as-
waste as a threat at the level of the population. The Marxist critique is based on 
a third political-economic approach that examines humans- as-waste as a  
byproduct of the capitalist mode of production.3
Marina Gržinić’s definition of the war state shaped by force, violence, and fear 
is the most precise definition of the neoliberal state, a definition that goes  
beyond the historical meaning of the fascist state in order to underline “what 
the major logic of dominance in the world today is, and this logic is the logic  
of war.”4 According to Gržinić, the war state has elements of historical fascism, 
such as “a sovereign leader, people, death as the management of life,” but 
also has elements of present neoliberalism, such as individual freedom and 
autonomy as a crucial right. Referring to Santiago López Petit, she explains the 
notion of postmodern fascism as a form of self-governmentality based on  
the self-management of a proper autonomy of differences for which the cohe-
sive element is war. Such a war state twists the meaning of the capitalist  
nation-state in order to “sterilize the Other, evacuate the conflict from public 
space and neutralize the political”5 constantly demanding “a proliferation  
of unbelievable ‘freedom’ of particularities”6 for which the best example is the 
reconciling agenda of human rights that keeps strong borders of power be-
tween central and peripheral identities. 
1 Angela Y. Davis, The Meaning of Freedom, 
and Other Difficult Dialogues (San 
Francisco: City Light Books, 2012), 19.
2 Symbolic approaches to humans-as-waste 
mostly engage the work of Mary Douglas, 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of 
Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge, 1966); and Julia Kristeva 
Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), relating to the meaning of abject 
and abjection as a process of being 
expelled, thrown down, debased, and 
humiliated. Biopolitical approaches are 
generally based by Michel Foucault’s 
writings on biopolitics and state racism 
(Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be 
Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1975–1976 [New York: Picador, 
2003]); Giorgio Agamben’s writings 
on homo sacer and “bare life” (Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life [Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998]); and Achille 
Mbembe’s essay on necropolitics (Achille 
Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 
15, no. 1 [2003]: 11–40). 
3 Marx argues that capitalism perpetually 
generates human accumulation in the 
form of a “surplus population” of workers 
(Capital, Volume 1, New York: Penguin 
Books, 1976), and, moreover, “squanders 
human beings, living labor,” resulting  
in a “waste of the workers’ life and health.” 
See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3  
(New York: Penguin Books, 1981). 
4 Marina Gržinić, “From Biopolitics to 
Necropolitics and the Institution  




7 Davis, Meaning of Freedom, 89–90.
8 See Catherina Hass, “Qu’appelle-t-on une 
guerre? Enquête sur le nom de guerre 
aujourd’hui” (PhD diss., Université Paris 8, 
Paris, 2001).
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of becoming. In other words, it is a process “of being able to see and understand 
difference within unity, and resisting the tendency to reproduce the hierar-
chies embedded in the world we want to change.”11
According to Robin D. G. Kelley’s introduction to Davis’s book, the idea that  
an across-the-board community of complexity and differences will be founded 
on justice and equality, as well the provision of education, health care, and 
housing and the abolition of the police and capitalist state is totally opposite to 
the idea of the neoliberal society.12 It is important to highlight that such an 
idea of neoliberal society, which appropriated the meaning of freedom, is not 
the recent one. Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and  
others proposed it as a capitalist mode of ultimate freedom after the Second 
World War. The Mont Pelerin Society (named after the hotel near Montreux, 
Switzerland, where the first meeting was convened by Hayek) was established 
in 1947 by famous economists, philosophers, and intellectuals, as well as eight 
winners of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (including von Mises, Hayek, 
Friedman) that proclaimed freedom as a ground value of the liberal state. 
Freedom of expression, free market economic policies, and the political values 
of an open society became markers of classic liberalism through this interna-
tional organization. Marginalized during the Fordist era and the Keynesian wel-
fare state, the Mont Pelerin Society subsequently became more and more  
influential, until after the 1970s when it became one of the most influential ideo-
logical and theoretical grounds of global regulatory reformation, which enabled 
the rise of neoliberalism under US hegemony.13 Referring to Lidija Radojević, 
such a process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring of social production 
changed the meaning and the role of the state in accordance with locally 
specific geographical and historical conditions. The neoliberal state was born 
with an aim to establish a proper institutional environment for structuring  
the behavior of its citizens and (re)producing simultaneously the state power  
as well the eternal border between legal and illegal—in order to make impossible 
any resistance to it.14
war, as a war without limits, is managed by other political conditions, such as: 
legal military intervention, arms-trade agreements in the name of freedom, 
and the defense of democracy and human rights.
The definition of “war state” as well as contemporary war today leads us to 
the conclusion that neoliberality of global capitalism is the formative ideology 
of the total war that produces a permanent state of economic, political and 
social crisis, as well “human waste.” Today, with the imperative of democratic 
citizenship, the self-righteous first world politics serves to justify and pacify  
repressive forms of the new final solution. By introducing a new binary opposi-
tion: illegal/legal, while claiming human rights as a tool of neoliberal system-
atic restructuration, this final solution offers false, but also the ultimate choice 
between the permanent war for global security (in other words, WOT) and  
any radical form of resistance to the neoliberal fist world society (preemptively 
signified as a terrorist or illegal one). Instead of such choice, we should point 
out the following questions: Who are all those illegal, undocumented, disal-
lowed, non-belonging, non-xyz “bastards” who resist or just stay outside those 
legalized neoliberal oppressive structures? What if only “being illegal” can 
break through the repressive neoliberal system of the global inequality that we 
live in? Or simply: How can we (re)build an idea of social revolution, or make  
a radical collective change today beyond all those appropriated/abused notions 
of freedom, as well beyond recycled/emptied vocabulary that is coming from 
the history of previous revolutionary struggles and resistances?
What Is the Meaning of Freedom?
Is the question that Angela Davis posed in her writings after so many years of 
fighting, thinking, and resisting the repressive mechanisms in power struc-
tures of our contemporary world.9 Due to the most idealistic vain, such freedom 
is a permanent struggle—that refers to the term of permanent revolution 
which is a base for society emancipation and freedom gained through struggle/
resistance/revolution etc.)—a radically different future, a fundamental social 
precondition for an emancipatory collective transformation beyond slavery,  
colonialism, racism, patriarchy, capitalism, fascism, and so forth. But at the 
same time, through substantial historical events and material (post)ideological 
transformations of state, freedom became the most expensive word of the 
globalized neoliberal society.10 Today, the meaning of freedom is (ab)used as 
a fetishizing synonym for the law of those who have permanently established 
themselves within the neoliberal system of political and economic power. Envi-
sioning revolutionary freedom through the larger collective claim for a new 
society (unity), requiring the radical emancipatory conception of complex 
community beyond existing power structures of the neoliberal state and its 
regulative and oppressive apparatus, Davis remands that freedom is a process 
9 Davis’s book, The Meaning of Freedom, 
consists of collections of public speeches, 
interviews, texts, and so on. 
10 Freedom: The Most Expensive Capitalist 
Word is the title of the theater play based 
on the authors’ research trip to the world’s 
most isolated country—North Korea. The 
two authors, Maja Pelević and Olga 
Dimitrijević, question the idea of freedom 
in the era of ever-intensifying global 
surveillance, and face the existing 
propaganda and dominant stereotypes of 
the North Korean totalitarian regime and 
Western neoliberal democracies. See 
http://festival.bitef.rs/event/freedom 
-expensive-capitalist-word/.
11 Robin D. G. Kelley, foreword to Davis, 
Meaning of Freedom, 14.
12 Ibid.
13 Lidija Radojević, “The Illegality of 
Freedom” (lecture, Academy of Fine Arts, 
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Freedom as Radically Different Future
What does today’s art offer to understand and radicalize the meaning of freedom 
beyond the existing society, or more precisely, beyond the neoliberal state? 
Art definitely produces a glitch that calls for social imagination of a radically 
different future, and for an emancipatory reconceptualization of the community, 
as well for political (re)articulation of the most emergent issues of today. In 
other words, today’s art produces the politics of error that interrupts our social 
reality with a counter-historical urgency to face the present, shifting in- 
between the unspoken history and utopian/dystopian future. The politics of 
error is introduced here as a new concept, dealing with an impossibility to break 
through artistic or cultural institutional structures and ossified academic 
worlds, with rare exceptions. Such error, as a symptom of living contempora-
neity, indicates: dislocation and new location, visibility and presence of the 
invisible, possibility and freedom of experimentation, and many other transfor-
mative promises.
There are artworks or art projects that actualize, conceptualize, and imagine 
the politics of freedom beyond existing neoliberal, patriarchal, colonial modes 
of society. The red thread of singular meaning of these radically different  
futures could be traced through some of the following paradigmatic examples.
Naked Freedom (2010) is a film/video work by artist-theoretician Marina Gržinić 
and Aina Šmid. They are a duo who create artistic situations for being, co-
thinking and co-creating with others. The video starts with an Achille Mbembe 
quote: “What connects terror, death, and freedom is an ecstatic notion of 
temporality and politics.”17 The film focuses on deregulation of social life within 
globalized capitalism through an attempt to be socially engaged, politically 
creative, and radically free. Authors experimentally approach the mode of recon-
ceptualization of the community. With reference to Soviet filmmakers Vertov 
and Eisenstein and their mode of political montage, Gržinić and Šmid put  
in question the usual means of art production (which is today socially twisted  
It brings us to the conclusion that all dimensions of everyday life within the neo-
liberal system today are reduced to market rationality, by means of indivi-
dualized social relations that are formed through profitability, normativity, and 
competition. In other words, the neoliberal system (state) manages the notion 
of civic/civil subject and transforms the citizens and their knowledge and 
abilities into human capital—its initial investments. It also includes one’s ability 
to strategically plan and organize one’s own life—one’s individual choice to 
estimate what is profitable, useful, and successful, as well as individual respon -
sibility and self-care. Social differences and political paradigms created  
binary oppositions such as minority/majority, center/periphery, private/public, 
and universal/particular that have also an important place in civil/civic sub-
jectivization. Culturalized systemic differences (established on traditional cat-
egories of ethnicity, gender, and class) produced a multicultural society in 
which those economic and political differences were fragmented and neutral-
ized through the politics of diversity and the ideology of reconciliation and 
tolerance (human rights). The common signifier of those diverse communities 
of individuals—consisting of such civil subjects, is actually homo oeconomicus: 
an entrepreneur of him- or herself.15
Owing to the fact that we are all fixed by this globalized neoliberal mode of 
social (re)production, which abused the idea of freedom against ourselves, we 
can say that past drives for freedom and historical means of emancipatory 
movements and revolutionary struggle do not function anymore. In such 
material -neoliberal conditions, freedom lost its historical, revolutionary mean-
ing of collective struggle, because it was distributed to individuals as a com-
modity of identity (self)production. On the 51st anniversary of the establishment 
of the Black Panthers (1966), we can see how the embeddedness of revolu-
tionary freedom in the globalizing, democratizing world functions as a global 
“cultural heritage,” consumption norm, aesthetic value, fashion, or very pale 
repetition of revolutionary rhetoric that doesn’t make much sense in the material 
conditions that we live in. It appears rather as a lethargic feeling of mislead-
ing nostalgia. A few years ago, addressing the Occupy movement, Angela Davis 
said that what we need instead of such deceiving repetition of old revolution-
ary folklore, are new ideas and strategies for a revolutionary social change, 
for a radical future that will bring us out of this unbearable neoliberal lives: “More 
than once I have heard people say, ‘If only a new Black Panther Party could  
be organized, then we could seriously deal with The Man, you know?’ But sup-
pose we were to say: ‘There is no Man anymore.’ There is suffering. There is 
oppression. There is terrifying racism. But this racism does not come from the 
mythical ‘Man.’ Moreover, it is laced with sexism and homophobia and unpre-
cedented class exploitation associated with a dangerously globalized capitalism. 
We need new ideas and new strategies that will take us into the twenty-first 
century.”16
15 From Michel Foucault: “Homo economicus 
is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of 
himself.” Michel Foucault, The Birth  
of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1978–79 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 226. From Wendy 
Brown: “Citizen-subject as neoliberal 
entrepreneur in every aspect of the life in 
neoliberal society.” Wendy Brown, 
“Neoliberalism and End of Liberal 
Democracy,” in Edgework: Critical Essay 
on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 42–44. 
From Jason Read: “Neoliberalism through 
the prism of particular production of 
subjectivity as well as through the ways  
in which individuals are constructed as 
subjects of human capital.” Jason Read,  
“A Genealogy of Homo Economicus: 
Neoliberalism and the Production of 
Subjectivity,” in “The Birth of Biopolitics,” 
special issue, Foucault Studies, no. 6 
(February 2009): 25–36.
16 Davis, Meaning of Freedom, 18.
17 Marina Gržinić and Aina Šmid, “Čista 
sloboda (Naked Freedom) 2010,”  
February 13, 2013, http://grzinic-smid 
.si/?p=413.
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made a science-fiction-inflected protest “training film” called Deep State, 
which starts from different moments of political resistance and struggle, partic-
ularly those that took place in Egypt in 2011 (so-called revolutionary struggles 
to achieve “democracy and freedom”). The deep state is not possible to prove; 
it has special interests and generates relationships of real power, and it makes 
fundamental decisions that “often run counter to the outward of impression of 
democracy.”23 This film, through popular protests and legislated acts of vio-
lence and containment, traces the fluid and invisible influences that impact the 
state. Through a vivid montage of newly filmed and archival footage, which 
put into continuum past, present, and future, the film follows the clashes  
between the rioter (running for freedom) and the deep state (unregulated by  
democracy). The process of disappointment, loss and limitation of utopian  
visions within existing contemporary democratic society is at the same time the 
process of liberation from the deep state (the state of dictatorship). This film 
not only puts existing narrations of protesting and resistance into question, 
but also the notions of democracy and freedom within the neoliberal capitalist 
state that stands against deep state (loosely synonymous with the shadow 
government) as the only possible option of the postmodern world where history 
has ended.
The politics of glitch or the aesthetics of error is present in many artworks 
dealing with the meaning of freedom. Looking into the bare images of Margareta 
Kern’s animation work To Whom Does the World Belong?,24 we face the politi-
cal montage that uses stop/slow motion animation, drawings, voice, poetry 
recordings, video documentation, sounds, and silences, and this produces an 
inner voice that directs us, occupies our thoughts, and reorients our actions, 
while simultaneously creating the syncretic experience (aesthesis) of affect pro-
duction. A voice can be heard signaling the end of trading at a stock exchange, 
lines of poetry are drawing the contours of a woman’s body, a body that is  
being dragged along a street in Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011. Society 
defeated, a woman beaten-up by the police on one side, the neoliberal state 
and contemporary patriarchy on the other all feature in an image that has 
traveled the world. The war to end dictatorship soon turns into the war on terror. 
It becomes a permanent, necessary, and constituent agent of the survival of 
and politically predictable). They problematize the issue of (neo)liberal  
(neo)colo nialism through the discussion between Kwame Nimako and Gržinić, 
filmed at a workshop on education, development, and freedom held at  
Duke University, in February 2010.18 The discussion reveals the relocation of global 
borders and peripheries today and lost moments of possible radical com-
munities, as well the instabilities and restrictions that have been already incor-
porated in new global narratives and impossible movements. Referring to  
the Nimako’s claim: “We are here (in the EU), because you were there (in Africa),” 
Gržinić said: “We are here (in the EU), because you want to go there (to  
Eastern Europe).” This opens up the question of complicity of understanding 
the whole set of (post)colonial relations within the common struggle (for 
“complex unity”) against the systematic violence and neoliberal legitimatizing 
of oppression of global capitalism. 
New World Summit (NWS) initiated by Jonas Staal uses the field of art to reimag-
ine a space for a fundamental practice of democracy today. NWS was estab-
lished as an artistic and political organization in 2012.19 Since then, it is dedicated 
to providing “alternative parliaments” that host organizations that currently 
are, or consider themselves, excluded from democracy. As it is stated by the 
project, NWS opposes the misuse of the concept of democracy for expan-
sionist, military, and colonial gains to which the orga nization refers as “democ-
ratism” such as WOT. This concept rejects the model of the nation-state and 
accepts of an ideology of self-governance at all levels of society through the 
discipline of performing the stateless democracy. So, relating to the art practice 
or more precisely to the form or to the morphology of art, this project (re)in-
troduces the notion of revolutionary realism as “the kind of reality that becomes 
possible through a revolutionary practice, but [is] not yet present.” According 
to Staal, revolutionary realism rejects the script “that define[s] what is realistic 
and what is utopian, what proper citizenship is and what the terrorist act is. 
Revolutionary realism focuses on shaping new possible realities once we have 
rejected the forms that structure our current per formance, in this case specif-
ically controlled within the stage of nation-state.”20
The materiality, form, and morphology of such an ideology is in a process  
of permanent transformation of both art and politics through the practice of 
stateless democracy.21
Another form of state appears within the art-theory field, as well within the 
global politics of power relations and that is “state within state” or better known 
as deep state (coming from the Turkish term Derin Devlet). Karen Mirza and 
Brad Butler, through their artistic practice, particularly their project titled The 
Museum of (Non)Participation,22 which represents the process of investigation 
of the terms and conditions of images, objects, collaboration, dialogue, and the 
social. In 2012, with China Miéville and the art-activist group Mosireen, they 
18 Marina Gržinić, “Images of Struggle, 
Politics and Decoloniality,” interview by 
Tjaša Kancler, kronotop.org, 2015, http://
www.kronotop.org/ftexts/interview-with 
-marina-grzinic/.
19 See “About” section, New World Summit, 
http://newworldsummit.org. 
20 Jonas Staal, “IDEOLOGY=FORM,” e­flux 








24 See Margareta Kern’s website,  
http://www.margaretakern.com/. 
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Center Belgrade, 2015), 12.
26 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2000), 32.
neoliberalism, which lurks in the background of this image. (Non)framing po-
litical acts by the media, such as a failed revolution and a permanent war, 
thus coproduce a social actuality by placing the actual (visible) in place of the 
real (invisible). Using the political montage of the affect—the necessary glitch 
in the process of image animation—Kern does not just draw us in, but rather 
drags us into the world to which we belong. This political spectacle of a 
scratched frame, of an animation suspended in the moment of aesthetic glitch, 
is at the same time the red thread of this work—the thread that unravels the 
body of the state, economics, and art. Documentary records chronicling global 
social circumstances in the era of neoliberalism overlap with the animation, 
which performs a forensic deconstruction of those images, fragmenting them 
to frame the real, invisible, and empty places of a necessary political subjectiv-
ization. Contemporary society’s revolt against the state are glimpsed in the 
animated documentary records of the protests: against tuition fees (England, 
2010), against budget cuts on healthcare (Spain, 2012), against dictatorship 
(Egypt, 2011), and so forth. The revolt, which demands freedom, social rights 
(labor, healthcare, and education rights), and human dignity (equality) is here 
condensed into frames that do not show, but (re)produce the status quo of 
everyday politics. The voice of each individual political subject within the col-
lective body of revolt, the interrupted, cut-up voice of animation questions  
if it is at all possible to produce effective images of revolt, protest, and revolu-
tion in the world of today.25
Beyond theoretical thinking about limits and promises of a social utopia, as well 
as beyond aesthetic questions about unpresentable universality of great 
events and its images, there are creative processes and practices that involves 
excess/resistance, freedom, and yet non-existing political as well as art(istic) 
singularity. Jean-Luc Nancy points out that the term “singular” in Latin—singuli— 
already announces its plurality: “The singular is primarily each one and,  
therefore, also with and among all the others. The singular is a plural.”26 Despite 
this paradox, the notions of singularity and plurality are not opposite; they co- 
determine each other: each singularity is always another in a plurality of  
“being-with” others. The key point is that being can only relate to being-with-
one -another, in terms of being-in-common, to create a radically different com-
munity. In that sense, artistic practices that appear today as singular insights 
into the world of the neoliberalism (as an ultimate form of oppression today) or 
as singular ruptures that politicize the space and time (by not accepting the 
neoliberal meanings of freedom, as well as the neoliberal dichotomy of (il)legal-
ity, particularly when it comes to the resistance), co-create another singularity 
through being-with others that calls for radical change. They co-create another 
singularity that has potential to break through societal and political as well 
post-ideological social orders of the present and the past; this singularity shows 
the future beyond multiplied classes and identities of today’s neoliberal,  
patriarchal, and colonial reality.
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Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better 
Life!, 2016. The poster reads: “You will get NO Asylum in Austria if you are 
discriminated and prosecuted in your country. Asylum concluded.”
Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life! (2016) con-
sists of five posters that respond to the asylum and refugee policies in Austria 
and comment on the refugee guide issued by the Austrian Federal Ministry  
of Interior (www.refugee-guide.at).
The refugee guide, which is supposed to provide information about the rules 
and values in Austria, uses statements that harbor clichéd resentments.  
Instead of mirroring prejudice and intolerance, the brochure should serve as 
an aid to those who seek refuge. The only thing this ridiculous rule-of-conduct 
picture-book guide conveys is that we are a prejudiced people and that,  
despite globalization, we’ll never manage to grow beyond Eurocentric thought 
processes. The politics of misanthropy now privileges the cultural and social  
aspects over the biological. Culturalization is consequently the present form of 
racialization. To develop a politics of humanity and dignity, it is imperative  
to insist that the right to asylum is not a question of hospitality; it is a fundamental 
human right and knows no quantifiable limit!
Fig. 12 
Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!, 2016. 
The poster reads: “Truth, Freedom, Patriotism. Modern migration is a hostile conquest!”
Fig. 11 
Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better 
Life!, 2016. The poster reads: “Austria: Information Values”
Fig. 13 
Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!, 2016. The 
poster reads: “The doctor is not treating ANY asylum seekers! The lawyer is not defending ANY 
foreigners! The bar is free of asylum seekers!”
Fig. 14 
Marika Schmiedt, Human Dignity Is Violable: No Fundamental Right to a Better Life!, 2016. 
The poster reads: “Situation FLEXIBLE. 37,500. Approximate value!”
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Racialized dysphoria (colonial detachment) describes the disconnection to my 
own blackness due to racism and colorism. Dysphoria describes a state of  
unease, and also a feeling of not being comfortable in one’s body, a term often 
used in transgender contexts. I use the term to describe how racism affects 
the way I felt in my own body. 
Sommerkindergarten (summer nursery for children of 
employees, working-class parents), Linz, summer, 1999 
I must have been about four years old. I remember being an outspoken child; 
I liked playing outside, I liked the sun, I made friends easily, and always got 
along very well with every child in the various nurseries I came to be in. I didn’t 
know what race or ethnicity was, which I believe is normal for a four-year-old. 
Luisa (which is not her real name) was the only black girl besides me in this 
summer nursery. Maybe I felt so comfortable around Luisa back then, because 
I could recognize a bit of myself in her. I believe representation, and recog-
nizing yourself in terms of people that look similar to you, is always something 
that secures a certain feeling of belonging. I believe nonwhite children need 
that even more than white children in Europe, since representation of race or  
ethnicity in European countries like Austria privileges white children anyway. 
As Luisa and I played outside, three little girls asked me if I wanted to join 
them in playing hide and seek. “Ja klar!” (“Of course!”), I said. One of the girls 
looked at me, and a certain dominance took over her little blue eyes and she 
said, “Du darfst nur mit uns spielen, wenn du aufhörst mit dieser Schwarzen 
zu spielen.” Three girls, not older than five, told me I could only play with them 
if I stop playing with the black girl. They of course did not refer to her as 
black; they used the n-word. I cannot remember what happened after that, but 
I remember feeling sad about them using a word I did not fully understand 
but was clearly derogatory to refer to another child because of her skin color. 
I was something between white and black, therefore I had more value to them, 
and because of the light shade of my skin they wanted to play with me but 
not with Luisa. On that day I learned that some skin colors and ethnicities were 
perceived as better than others. I instantly knew that wasn’t fair. 
Europaschule (elementary school), Linz, September, 2001 
So elementary school was about to start for the first time ever and I was really 
excited. I looked so cute: my hair was a bit longer so it got bigger and puffier;  
I had a little afro that I really liked. I wore a little fake fur jacket and a backpack 
that my mothers bought me from Brazil. It was a blue school backpack with 








Only one year after I got my first straightening iron, I decided that I no longer 
wanted to have milchkaffee- (caffe latte–) shaded skin. White peers always  
referred to it as being the perfect brown shade, but this was not a compliment 
to me. I felt like going pale because I connected fairness with class and “be- 
 ing classy.” Again, I did not connect my skin color to blackness since I already 
had detached myself from it mentally. I connected it instead to something  
undesirable for me, something “cheap,” and that was the last thing I wanted to 
be. There is this extreme regime of racialized sexism, classism, and double 
standards in Western society. Everything that is constructed to be the “other” 
or the “exotic” tends to often be sexualized (ergo: desired), and everything 
sex ualized tends to often be demonized (tempting, something “forbidden,” 
something that is actually not supposed to be). This shows how little desire is 
ac tually linked to love, and fetishism has nothing to do with love at all. Sexual 
desire has nothing to do with respect or appreciation; desire in this case is 
lust, and lust is not love. Being deemed sexual also means being deemed 
“cheap” in a sexist and classist society, which results in objectification and de-
humanization of, in my case, a young black/Latina female body. So being  
perceived as exotic and sexual did not resonate with what felt safe to me as a 
sixteen-year-old. I began using sunblock with an SPF of 50+; not even my 
mothers, who had fairer skin than I, used this type of sunblock. People started 
noticing and asking me why I used it, and I told them that I didn’t want to tan.  
I even lied to friends, telling them I had a sun allergy. In my head, I was about 
to become what I subliminally always desired to be: white. 
Episode 3
Bleach and Sweet 16
Linz, December 2011
 
The age of sixteen meant a lot to me. Influenced by popular US media, I dreamed 
of being a young woman, sophisticated, strong, and beautiful by the age of 
sweet sixteen. My idols were the Olsen Twins, Hilary Duff, and I fancied just 
about everything that had to do with rich, white girls with blonde hair. I made 
the decision to not just always straighten my hair, but also to bleach it plati-
num blonde. It was a one-year process. I did it by myself and lost half the 
length of my hair. When it was wet, it wouldn’t even bounce back to its natural 
curly texture, from the amount of damage I did to it.
At that time, I reached a very low point in my life because of depression and an 
eating disorder (which I will analyze later) that led to a mental breakdown 
Everybody started asking me where this backpack was from and why it looked 
so weird. I always answered that it’s not weird, and it is from Brazil. I told 
them that it’s a country and that I’m from it. Then they said my backpack was 
ugly. I asked my mom to buy me a new backpack; she said that I asked with  
so much angst in my eyes that she couldn’t deny buying a new “regular” one 
for me. In this very young age the construct of me being the “other,” the strange 
one, the Ausländer (a negative term for foreigners) was getting clearer and 
clearer to me. I was six, and I already felt like I didn’t belong. They started mak-
ing fun of my curly hair and then eventually started calling me the n-word. 
The day I came home after school, when my classmates called me the n-word 
for the first time, both my mothers got really upset. The situation did not really 
change, even after my mothers talked to the teachers. I can’t remember  





I had already spent a lot of time having a big problem with my naturally curly 
hair. I came to build up a deep hatred toward it and always wore it up, some-
times I pulled on it, trying to get the curls away, but my hair always bounced 
back to its natural texture. I was fifteen when my mom finally let me buy a straight-
ening iron. I remember being very excited about it, after years of trying to 
work out ways to make my hair appear less curly, by blow drying it with a round 
brush, for example. I remember feeling an enormous relief when running the 
iron through my curly hair, and it coming out as straight as my peers’ hair. I felt 
pretty for the first time since starting school. I gained new confidence in my-
self, simply because my hair was now straight and I appeared less “foreign.” When 
one does not fit the criteria of what is perceived to look like “the norm,” those 
who are different from the majority of people around them tend to strive to as-
similate to the majority. People who try to assimilate in a new place feel less 
alienated. The process of assimilation leaves the one who undergoes it feeling 
constantly dissatisfied in that “to become white,” for example, is impossible.
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secrecy to it. You were not allowed to talk about pro-ana or pro-mia (the bulimic 
version of pro-ana) in public or to your friends and family. There even was  
advice given to delete your internet history after browsing pro-ana/mia websites.
So, during summer break I had enough time to stabilize my anorexic eating be-
havior, until one time I binge ate. I hadn’t eaten in a day and in the middle  
of the night I woke up, walked downstairs to the kitchen, and ate every sweet 
thing I could find. My jaw was hurting from chewing so compulsively and I 
couldn’t stop eating until I felt sick. I knew exactly what I had to do, so I went 
to the bathroom and “purged” what I had devoured. A deep feeling of shame 
and failure took over and I cried myself to sleep again. These binges started 
to happen more and more frequently and I started losing interest in everything 
I once liked. 
Back to school after summer break, my weight loss was topic number one  
in class. Everyone admired my slimmed-down body; the girls started asking me 
how I became so thin. I felt successful even though I was ashamed of what  
I was doing. I didn’t tell anyone my bathroom secrets; I answered that I only ate 
fruits and vegetables every day. Everyone believed me. I felt recognized for 
the first time. By being thinner, my breasts, which had naturally grown bigger for 
me than for my peers, and my hips, which were wider than the other girls’ 
hips, began to shrink. I appeared younger and the boys stopped making fun 
of me. I became more quiet; my goal was to disappear, to blend in completely. 
Analyzing Reconnection and Self-Recognition
The Power of the Words  
“You Are a Beautiful Black Girl” 
Linz, Summer 2012 
I was seventeen years old and I had decided that there had to be more to me 
than my eating disorder. I had lived with it since I was twelve, always relapsing, 
and I felt like I had to decide whether to start living normally again, or keep 
on relapsing and feeling suicidal. 
It really was like this: I just got up on one morning, binged and purged as usual 
and while I was flushing the toilet I thought, “Mir reicht’s!” (“That’s it!”). I have 
been unhappy for the longest time I could remember, and I felt like there had to 
be another way, that there had to be some purpose to life. 
and hospitalization. The reason I’m pointing this out is that it was at this exact 
time that I looked as white as I ever could. My skin still bothered me and I 
even considered ordering bleaching kits off the internet. Skin-bleaching prod-
ucts are officially forbidden and not openly sold in Europe.
I somehow didn’t order it and never got to do it and I must admit it is a scary 
thought, even back then, but even scarier are the facts that back then, I didn’t 
once question why I wanted to alter my skin tone, and that I actually didn’t 
care about the medical consequences that it would have brought me. I was in 
a state of complete detachment from my body. I did not see my body as my 
own; I saw it as something I had to modify, as a battlefield, as something that 
belonged to those looking at it, as something to be judged and defined by 
others, the predominately white gaze. 
Analyzing Racialized Trauma and Puberty as a Trigger  
for Eating Disorders
Bulimia Nervosa and Anorexia Nervosa  
and Being a Black/Latina Girl in Europe 
Linz, Summer 2007
I decided to start my first diet when I was eleven years old. I had read enough 
“women’s magazines” about dieting and working out, so I made my first meal 
plan: two apples for breakfast, one slice of bread with cheese for lunch, and 
clear soup for dinner. No sweets, nothing fried, two hundred calories a day maxi-
mum. I knew it was extreme, and my mom didn’t like it, but I actually didn’t 
care. I had put my mind to lose as much weight as possible. I discovered so-
called pro-ana websites, where predominately anonymous online users would 
keep a diary of their eating patterns and workout regimens, along with selfies 
showing the progress of their weight loss. Self-loathing was a demand: “1. You 
shall hate every gram of fat on your body, 2. you shall hate food, 3. don’t quit 
working out even if you pass out, 4. the goal is to be thinner than everyone 
around you, 5. bones are beautiful and to be shown, 6. your body is your 
battlefield.”1
This seemed like the perfect setup for an already ostracized feeling black/Latina 
girl hitting puberty. It didn’t seem wrong to me; I firmly believed that thinness 
was the gateway to happiness and recognition. Anorexia nervosa looked like a 
lifestyle that I desperately wanted to achieve, something that connected my 
body to discipline and hard work. “Thinspiration” or “thinspo” are videos and 
pictures of emaciated models and girls, predominantly white and upper class. 
Being thin seemed like a step toward success. Of course, there was a certain 
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/anas-letter.html. (Site discontinued.)
134 135
I cut my hair short, after deciding I no longer wanted to bleach and damage it. 
I had also dyed it black again and stopped compulsively using sunblock.  
I decided to go to the Afro shop nearby and get my hair braided. When I told 
my then-boyfriend about my hair plans, he started laughing at me. But since  
I was slowly feeling more secure about myself and shifting my energy away from 
losing weight, I didn’t care. He wasn’t a good boyfriend to me anyway. 
When I first entered the Afro shop, I saw all the different hairpieces hanging off 
the walls; it was colorful, loud, and messy, and I really liked it. I scheduled  
an appointment and went home excited. The day finally came, and I sat for four 
hours while Beatrice (fictional name) the shop owner, and her sister braided  
my hair. It was unusual, it hurt a bit, but I still enjoyed it. I felt like I was doing 
something good to myself. I wasn’t even aware of the Afro-cultural aspect of the 
hairstyle, since my idea of blackness was so limited, but somehow sitting 
there getting my hair done in that exact fashion felt right to me. Maybe I felt 
the connection subliminally?
I went home after they were finished and I loved how fresh my scalp was feel-
ing and how long the braids were. I truly felt beautiful and I was enjoying  
myself. It was starting to get dark outside when I reached home and a nice sum-
mer breeze was in the air. Marcela (fictional name) was sitting outside on a 
bench. Marcela is a very close friend of my mothers and she used to take care 
of me when I was a child—I got to know her when I was seven. She has been 
and still is to this day the only African-Brazilian person I grew up around. Marcela 
was talking on the phone as she saw me walking by. When she saw me wear-
ing my braids, smiling, waving at her, she ended her call and hugged me very 
tight. She looked at me, her eyes full of joy and slightly teary, and she said, 
“Voce esta linda, nega.” She called me a beautiful black girl (nega can be  
endearing and is used a lot in Brazil). It all started making sense to me: “Eu 
sou negra tambem?” (Am I black too?), she nodded and said, “Sim. Como eu 
tambem. Nos somos negras tambem e somos lindas. Estas tranças combinam 
perfeitamente com voce porque trançando-o, nos cuidamos do nosso cabelo.” 
(Yes, like me as well. We are black too and we are beautiful. These braids fit 
you so perfectly because braiding it is how we take care of our hair.) My light 
skin didn’t mean I could not be black, since being black is an identity based  
on heritage of culture and genetic makeup.
 
By reconnecting oneself with blackness, one is dismantling a history of erasure 
and whitewashing. By auto-affirming that I was black, I felt like I finally in-
habited my body. I remember running to my mom, showing her the braids, and 
proudly saying, “Mom, I am black. I am black!” It was the start of a journey of 
diaspora reconnection. Nobody had ever called me black before in this matter, so 
directly, without a “mid-term” or anything fetishizing, just referring to me  
as black. It felt extremely empowering. 
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Detaching mixed black people from their blackness is a very powerful colonial 
tool. To whitewash mixed people fuels the idea of the “other” (that is, other 
than white) as being something bad and undesirable, thus upholding colonial 
structures through a seemingly superficial matter; the outer appearance of  
a human being. This happens especially in a black context, and it goes back to 
the history of slavery. Enslaved black women, who worked on plantations, 
were often raped by their white masters. Children who emerged from these 
atrocities were usually lighter skinned, and because of that they had to be kept 
inside the master’s house as “house slaves.” This created a clear hierarchy  
between skin tones that lasts until this day. What takes place nowadays is that 
lighter-skinned black people try to sever themselves from their blackness in 
order to conform to what is deemed good in Western society. It is still perfectly 
normal to deny one’s blackness. 
To call myself black when it is part of my heritage is both an identity and a  
political statement. To be able to identify myself as Afro-Latina woman in a place 
like Austria is crucial for my mental well-being, because it sets an end to the 
fight I was having against the truth of my own ancestry.2
2 My main reference for this contribution is 
Grada Kilomba, Plantation Memories: 




The runaway hit Prison Break (directed by Paul T. Scheuring) ran for four seasons 
(2005–9) on US and UK television and the much-anticipated season 5 has been 
aired from April to May of 2017. Using an escape plan tattooed onto his body, the 
lead character, Michael Scofield (Wentworth Miller), saves his innocent brother, 
Lincoln Burrows (Dominic Purcell), from the electric chair by breaking out of 
Fox River State Penitentiary with other inmates, aided by his love interest, Sara 
Tancredi (Sarah Wayne Callies), the prison doctor. Michael is the mastermind 
throughout as they take down “The Company” in their bid for freedom. This 
essay speculates on Miller, the lead protagonist who is of black/white “mixed 
race” ancestry, who is being passed as white and what this might mean for 
border bodies within “post-race” scopic regimes. This is important because 
“civil society represents itself to itself as being infinitely inclusive, and its 
technologies of hegemony (including cinema) are mobilized to manufacture 
this assertion not to dissent from it […]. Films can be thought of as one of an 
ensemble of discursive practices mobilized by civil society to invite, or inter-
pellate, blacks to the same variety of social identities that other races are  
able to embody without contradiction.”1
The US’s “tragic mulatto” stereotype means that cinematic and televisual strat-
egies represent the ontological status of black/white mixed-race people in  
relation to alienation, dishonor, violence, and non-whiteness. Miller’s whitening 
is significant as his body is only readable through blackness because the only 
grammar through which mixing has been known is deficit, psychic dysfunction, 
and societal malfunction. As a tragic mulatto his body exists within a “libidinal 
economy” related to the political economy, (hetero)sexuality, and the 
unconscious.2
UK-born Miller’s father is of African-American and Jamaican descent, which 
are already mixed categories because of enslavement histories, and his mother 
is a white US American. He claims British and American citizenship, can claim 
Jamaican citizenship, and at the time of his birth in Chipping Norton in 1972 he 
would have been the nation’s “half-caste.” At birth his black/white “mixed-
race” body provided a psychic and surface border to whiteness connected to 
centuries of anti-African descent racism, and now it connects to twenty-first-
century neoliberal post-race racialization within continuing negro-phobia. Such 
body bordering should make it impossible for him to be read as white on-
screen but does not. His being passed as white emphasizes that whiteness is 
more than skin color, but skin’s recognition as white dictates who can transform 






1 Frank Wilderson, Red, White and Black: 
Cinema and the Structure of US  
Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 24.
2 Ibid., 7.
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The 2000 United States census was the first time people could self-identify 
with more than one race, and in the 2010 census the multiracial group had 
grown by 32 percent to nine million. Since 2000 multiracial groups have  
increased by 50 percent, whereas the US population overall increased by 9.7 
percent. In the 2010 census four groups were over one million: white and 
black (1.8 million); white and “some other race” (1.7 million); white and Asian 
(1.6 million); white and American Indian and Alaska Native (1.4 million). Since the 
2000 census, the black and white pop ulation grew by 134 percent (1 million) 
and white and Asian by 87 percent (750,000). Black/white mixedness continues 
to be problematized even though it is fast increasing.
There is a view in the United Kingdom that mixed-race people are the new 
faces of a multicultural nation; for example, Jessica Ennis-Hill’s global iconicity 
as citizen body in London’s 2012 Olympic Games.7 In terms of aesthetics, 
there is a preference for lighter skin and straighter hair among white people in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. For example, in Glamour magazine’s 
November 2011 readers’ choices of the top fifty most attractive men, the only 
two black men chosen were Ashton Merrygold and Marvin Humes from the boy 
band JLS. Their darker-skinned band mates, JB and Oritsé Williams, were  
conspicuously absent. The twenty-first-century skin politics is one in which the 
acceptable face of blackness is a black/white mixed-race one. This new  
“mulatticity” illustrates its link to colonialism and enslavement’s “chromatocracy,”8 
thus it is a fantasy that black/white mixed-race aesthetic value indicates  
the end of racism in the United Kingdom/United States and racial equality.
In the “multiracial/tolerant” UK and the post-Obama US, the body politics of 
the Racial Contract’s libidinal economy dictate that “globally and within partic-
ular nations […] white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue  
to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, 
political states differentially favouring their interests, an economy structured 
around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just  
in whites sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously and unconsciously 
toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitle-
ment as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further.”9
Kingdom. To develop this argument, I will first turn to mixing as US/UK pro blem 
and opportunity, before looking at passing and what recognition of him as a 
black/white mixed-race man being passed as white does in that moment. Last, 
I will focus on whiteness and black/white mixed-race dispossession in twenty-
first-century “post-race” states where everyone is (not) white. 
Libidinal Economies of Mixing as Problem and Opportunity 
in the United States and the United Kingdom
For Frank Wilderson, libidinal economy is not only linked to “forms of attraction, 
affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence  
of lethal consumption [...]. It is the whole structure of psychic and emotional 
life [...] inclusive of [...] a structure of feeling [...] it is a dispensation of energies, 
concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and 
phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.”3
Seen from the libidinal economy of suffering the “mulatto” body is patholo-
gized and used as a tool of “racial” hygiene, a warning against physical mixing. 
Through the grammar of suffering (s)he becomes antihuman if the human  
is read as unmixed. (S)he is a product of modernity as (s)he appears as a new 
ontology, a “new race” with marginality and the tragedy of unbelonging  
being his/her ontological condition. Irrespective of white kinship within societies 
structured by racial dominance, there is no guarantee of being part of the  
national body occupied by those designated white. In the United States, accord-
ing to Naomi Zack, the “proscriptive white kinship schema reinforces and  
perpetuates ordinary ideas about physical races as natural entities” rather than 
seeing that the “white breeding schema of family identity is a form of social 
technology.”4
Since the landmark 1967 Loving v. Virginia court case, which ruled that inter-
racial marriage was legal in all of the United States, transracial intimacy appears 
to have been normalized. However, the multiracial movement exists within a 
twenty-first-century liberal humanist discursive terrain of “meritocracy,” “multi-
culturalism,” and “diversity” alongside continuing antiblack racism, as seen 
with #BlackLivesMatter and Jada Pinkett-Smith’s 2016 stand against the lack of 
racial diver sity in the Oscars. Racism and diversity coexist within “the strange 
enigma of race in contemporary America.”5 In the US’s “color-blind racism,” 
blacks and dark-skinned minorities lag behind whites in all spheres of social life. 
Here, color-coded inequality relates social injustice to individual or cultural 
limitations. Transracial marriage continues to be problematized because of the 
children, location, or extra burden on couples, and the racial order of mono-
racial intimacy is maintained while whites now claim to be victims of “reverse 
racism.”6
3 Ibid.
4 Naomi Zack, Race and Mixed Race 
(Philadelphia: Temple University, 1993), 
39–40.
5 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without 
Racists: Color­Blind Racism and the 
Persistence of Racial Inequality in America 
(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010). 
6 Ibid., 1–4.
7 See my essay, “A Tale of Two Olympians,” 
in Body Aesthetics, ed. Sherri Irvin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
94–109.
8 Robert Carr, Black Nationalism in the New 
World: Reading the African­American and 
West Indian Experience (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2002).
9  Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 40.
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Black/white mixed-race problematization continues to be transported through 
antiblack racism’s affects—disgust, contempt, hate, anxiety, fear, shame—
within the national tolerance of “mixing.” “The tolerated” are “perceived to be 
harmless or relatively unthreatening” as recognized mechanisms for dissent 
and change,20 while racism has segued into the actions of a few rogue white 
individuals at the fringes of politics. However, as we see from the Brexit vote and 
Donald Trump’s election campaign in 2016, racism is at the very heart of UK/
US politics. 
If national tolerance focuses on the politically “ineffectual,” the twenty-first-
century racial nomos draws on 1960s and ’70s integration where disgust and 
contempt are implicated in governance of internal racial colonies.21 Skin’s  
The contract constructs a white world through an epistemology of ignorance, 
“a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are 
psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that 
whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have 
made.”10 Here, ignorance denotes a will to silence knowledge of white privilege, 
antiblack racism and “color-blind” ideology.11 This produces “unknowledges” 
that “sometimes [...] are consciously generated, while at other times they are 
unconsciously generated and supported [… but] they work to support white 
privilege and supremacy.”12 Unknowledges undergird governance of border 
bodies through state and societal processes, structures and affects even while 
black/white mixed-race bodies have “post-race” iconicity.
Black and white mixing has also long been considered a problem in the United 
Kingdom. Mark Christian’s analysis of “The Fletcher Report” (1930) shows  
British problematization of transracial intimacy.13 This eugenicist report  
constructed black/white half-caste children as “genetically abnormal” and their 
transracial families as poverty ridden and immoral.14 Media moral panic and 
stereotyping of the black/white mixed-race population were the report’s legacy. 
World War II prompted more moral panic because of the interaction of mobi-
lized white British women and black colonial mobilized men because of the fear 
of “half-caste children.”15 In 1942 the British Colonial Office was anxious about 
the future UK population because of the sexual invasion of black soldiers.16  
By 1947 black/white mixed-race orphans were the nation’s “lonely picaninny.”17 
In the 1950s, the wartime extra-legal anti-miscegenation regime evolved into ban 
of black people in public spaces, which was aimed at minimizing hetero-
sexual transracial intimacy.
In 2006, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, desired  
a future Britain of more racial equality, less racial discrimination, and real  
integration of its diverse people.18 Problematizing mixed-race Britons, he erased 
mixed-race multiplicity creating one minority group based on being “not 
quite white.” He outlined the negatives as more than average mixed-race familial 
and individual dysfunction: lone parenthood, family breakdown, drug treat-
ment, and identity stripping because they are “marooned between communities.” 
For Philips, black and white kinship means identification as black in order to 
not be “identity stripped.” Paradoxically, white kinship marked on border bod ies 
is advantageous within “chromatocratic” UK/US societies even though the 
tragic mulatto speaks of anxiety and trauma, as we see in Fletcher, Phillips, and 
in the film The Human Stain (2003), starring Miller.19 In this movie, Miller plays 
the young Coleman Silk, a black mixed-race man passing as white, who be-
comes a renowned professor but has to quit his job because he is accused of 
antiblack racism. His history is only revealed once he dies and his sister 
appears.
10 Ibid., 18.
11 Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 2–4.
12 Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, 
introduction to Race and Epistemologies 
of Ignorance, ed. Shannon Sullivan and 
Nancy Tuana (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2007), 1–2. 
13 Mark Christian, “The Fletcher Report 
1930: A Historical Case Study of Contested 
Black Mixed Heritage Britishness,” Journal 
of Historical Sociology 21, nos. 2/3 (June/
September 2008): 213–41. This report was 
researched and written by Muriel Fletcher 
between 1928 and 1930, supported by  
the Association for the Welfare of Half-
Caste Children and the University of 
Liverpool. The Fletcher Report cemented 
the derogatory term “half-caste” into the 
social perception of Liverpool that had  
a well-established black community by 
the end of World War I. 
14 Ibid., 234.
15 In the first wave there were 125,000 
volunteers, mostly Jamaican, who joined 
the RAF (Royal Air force), worked in 
munitions factories and in forestry in 
Scotland. By 1942 there were 3 million 
American troops 130,000 of whom were 
African-American. The British government 
responded with measures to curb the flow 
of nonwhite soldiers. From these policies 
we can see the emergence of Britain as a 
modern racialized state. See Hazel Carby, 
“Postcolonial Translations,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): 213–34.
16 Ibid., 213–34.
17 For Robert Carr, the picaninny “is always 
distinguishable from the term ‘child’ 
reserved here primarily for white, therefore, 
human and therefore developed, people 
of the master(’s) race.” Carr, Black 
Nationalism in the New World, 80.
18 For the first time, more than half of all 
ethnic minority Britons are British born, 
but even more significant is the 
astonishing rise in the numbers of mixed-
race Britons. In 2001 they numbered 
674,000. New projections based on the 
census suggest that this number will grow 
to 950,000 in 2010, and 1.24 m in 2020. 
By the end of that decade, they are almost 
certain to overtake those of Indian origin 
to become the single largest minority 
group in the country. I welcome this, but 
as with all the changes we face it is not an 
uncomplicated prospect. The mixed-race 
Britons are young, and they show the 
highest employment rate of any minority 
group. But they also exhibit the highest 
rates of lone parenthood and family 
breakdown, in some cases three times the 
average. They suffer the highest rates of 
drug treatment. We don’t yet know why 
this is so, though many people talk now of 
identity stripping children who grow up 
marooned between communities.
19 Directed by Robert Benton, it grossed  
US $24.86 million.
20 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 341.
21 A legal, governmental, and spatial order in 
which “race” does not necessarily mean 
physical variations coded on the body but 
an impersonal discursive ordering that is 
reviving the old imperial system. See Paul 
Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or 
Convivial Culture? (London: Routledge, 
2004).
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colonial politics, which generates the racial epidermal schema,22 means that 
black/white mixed-race people experience racism’s negative affects because of 
the mixing that paradoxically illustrates tolerance. As in colonialism, libid inal 
economies within extra-legal anti-miscegenation regimes speak of “proper” 
white sexuality and family life as a requirement of citizenship.23 Black/white 
mixed-race dysfunction, the tragic mulatto, and the lonely picaninny are discur-
sive constructs of white racial hygiene. Black/white mixed-race border bodies 
are placed outside of the nation as family because of antiblack racism and  
national intolerance.24
These border bodies “can only provide the terrain upon which the ‘host’ nation 
can make its claim to tolerance, civilization and indeed modernity itself.”25 
Kinship ties do not bind border bodies to whiteness because of the “white 
breeding schema of family identity.”26 If there is transracial intimacy, children 
experience a repression of love that is “pathological and may be suffered  
by both designated blacks and designated whites in order to maintain the white 
breeding schema.”27
As a result of hypodescent, “the one drop rule,” black ancestry makes one black.28 
This mark of race still continues in the idea that identification must be with 
“one’s Black side of the family” even though post-structuralist, postcolonial 
thinking has shown us that identity is shifting, never fixed in a once-and-for-all 
way,29 race is a social construct,30 culture is hybrid,31 and racialized identifi-
cations are performative.32 Locating black/white mixed race as a minority group 
through ethnic monitoring statistics and affectively as border bodies trans-
ports enslavement’s blood quantum into the twenty-first century. Thus, black/
white mixed-race families and subjects cannot signify core national values  
as the “heteronormative family and its gendered practices is already ‘raced,’  
already scripted as ‘white,’ and Christian and it is this that establishes the stan-
dards to which the nation’s ‘others’ should aspire.”33 Thus, libidinal economy 
keeps the nation white and makes clear that transracial intimacy has never been 
just about affect but about power, maintaining white racial dominance, disci-
plining bodies, and managing life. Antiblack racism was enshrined within hetero-
sexual intimacy because “the inferior other becomes a fundamental project  
for the establishment of the superior self whose superiority is a function of what  
it is.”34 What recognition does Miller being passed as white instantiate?
Being Passed as White and Recognition of Mixedness
Frantz Fanon inserts into Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s deracinated reflections on  
corporeal schema a decolonizing analysis of the coloniality of power, being and 
knowledge through discussing racism’s colonial hold on black and white 
psyches.35 The historico-racial schema shows that white colonial discourses on 
22 See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
(London: Pluto, 1967).
23 See Anne Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge 
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate 
in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002); and Race and the 
Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of 
Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).
24 Michelle Elam, The Souls of Mixed Folks: 
Race, Politics and Aesthetics in the  
New Millennium (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011).
25 Gail Lewis, “Welcome to the Margins: 
Diversity, Tolerance, and Politics of 
Exclusion,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, 
no. 3 (2005): 546–47.
26 Naomi Zack, Race and Mixed Race (Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 
39–40.
27 Ibid., 40.
28 See Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe, Scattered 
Belongings: Cultural Paradoxes of “Race,” 
Nation and Gender (London: Routledge, 
1999); Jill Olumide, Raiding the Gene Pool: 
The Social Construction of Mixed Race 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002); Suki Ali, 
Mixed­Race, Post­race: Gender, New Ethnic­
ities and Cultural Practices (Oxford: Berg, 
2003); and Zack, Race and Mixed Race, 40. 
29 Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs 
‘Identity’?,” in Questions of Cultural Identity, 
ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: 
Sage, 1996), 1–17; and Stuart Hall, “New 
Ethnicities,” in Stuart Hall: Critical 
Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. David 
Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 441-49.
30 Ifekwunigwe, Scattered Belongings, 20.
31 Homi K. Bhabha, “The Third Space: 
Interview with Homi Bhabha,” in Identity, 
Community, Culture, Difference, ed. 
Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1990), 207–21.
32 See my book, Black Skins, Black Masks: 
Hybridity, Dialogism, Performativity 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
33 Lewis, “Welcome to the Margins,” 52.
34 Lewis Ricardo Gordon, Her Majesty’s Other 
Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neo­
colonial Age (Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1997), 70.
35 Tate, Black Skins, Black Masks.
36 George Yancy, Look a White! Philosophical 
Essays on Whiteness (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2012), 152.
37 Ibid., 153.
38 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Empire of Love: 
Towards a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy 
and Carnality (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 16.
racial difference and their accompanying structuration and institutionalization 
of white racial dominance, cultural consciousness, social practices, and knowl-
edge production, created “the black (wo)man” as inferior other and “the white 
(wo)man” as superior. We become ourselves in the eyes of others as they  
recognize us through a racialized process. Black essential difference was the 
foundation for the racial epidermal schema, which ensures that the black (wo)
man was known as deviant, hypersexual, incapable of intellectual thought, 
and dangerous, without complexity, subjectivity, and personhood. The “white 
gaze renders the black body ontologically truncated, fixed like an essence,”36  
it operates as “a form of bodily fragmentation, ‘visual mutilation’ and reduction.”37 
Transracial intimacy does not escape this racialized recognition because  
“the autological subject, the genealogical society, their modes of intimacy and 
their material anchors emerged from European Empire as a mode and ma-
neuver of domination and exploitation and continue to operate as such. [ … Thus] 
the intimate couple is a key transfer point between, on the one hand, liberal 
imaginaries of contractual economies, politics and sociality and on the other 
liberal forms of power in the contemporary world […]. If the intimate couple  
is a key transfer point within liberalism this couple is already conditioned by lib-
eralism’s emergence and dispersion in empire.”38
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white momentarily destabilizes white superiority as new subjects emerge. 
However, empathetic identification is part of the process where “blackness pro-
vided the occasion for [white] self-reflection as well as for an exploration of 
terror, desire, fear, loathing and longing […] the role of feelings in securing dom-
ination [is important in the] obliteration of the other through the slipping on  
of blackness.”49
Being passed as works because the nation gets something back. Miller is caught 
within the national “post-race” libidinal economy,50 in which his body bridges 
black and white consumers because of the social, economic, and cultural capi-
tals of skin color, class, and celebrity. There is an extension from his black/
white mixed-race body to white bodies through recognition so that post-racial 
white guilt and shame because of racism is transformed to white pleasure at 
white tolerance.51 Miller’s body stands in for all black/white mixed-race people, 
his body is the fungible material through which white domination is main-
tained because mixedness proves UK/US tolerance.52 His border body is caught 
in this “post-race” libidinal economy,53 and his dispossession is complete even  
as a celebrity. 
The term “celebrity” derives from the nineteenth century and is capitalism’s 
product because of the evolution of public visibility through the mass media.54 
While democratized, fame is racially ordered. Adulation, identification, and 
emulation with/of the famous are key elements in celebrity culture.55 Fame gives 
Miller’s border body material, social, cultural, affective, and psychic value  
because we desire fame, stars, and “celebrification,” so as fans we celebrate the 
Thus, “love, intimacy and sexuality are not about desire, pleasure or sex per se, 
but about things like geography, history, culpability, and obligation; the ex-
traction of wealth and the distribution of life and death; hope and despair; and 
the seemingly self-evident fact and value of freedom.”39 Miller has been passed  
as white and his body comes to speak for and to all whites. Passed as is differ-
ent from passing for as it implies a different scopic regime, a dissection that 
looks over while overlooking racial difference, an envisaging that wilfully refuses 
otherness.40
Everyone passes as “the subject is never what they image themselves to be 
nor are they simply self-evidently there.”41 As Miller shows, passing is not inher-
ently transgressive but “must be understood in relationship to forms of social  
antagonism.” Thus we can ask more meaningful questions: “How are differences 
that threaten the system recuperated? How do ambiguous or hybrid bodies 
get read in a way which further supports the enunciative power of those who 
are telling the differences? In what ways is passing implicated in the very  
discourse around tellable differences?”42 Passing as white or as black does mat-
ter politically. For example, Rachel Dolezal43 passing as black illustrated passing 
“can function as a technique of knowledge which assumes ‘blackness’ to be 
imageable and hence beable. However, for black subjects to refuse to pass as 
white—that is, for black subjects to pass as black-can make visible the violent 
histories concealed by the invisibility of the mark of passing.”44 This is the case 
for Miller in his real life as a gay, black/white mixed-race man who speaks 
about the overt racism he experiences irrespective of his celebrity, while as an 
actor we see his body being passed as white. This passing as resists the racial-
ized scopic regime of essential difference and the disturbance border bodies 
cause to white knowledge/power/being. There is a shoring up of whiteness 
with each disturbance by border bodies as differences and ambiguities are rein-
corporated. In the realm of fiction, being passed as white can momentarily  
alter the systematization of racial difference. However, there is the overwhelm-
ing desire to call border bodies to account racially through the accumulation  
of knowledge on/of racial ambiguity so misrecognition ceases to occur. White-
ness pauses on Miller’s racial ambiguity, on his border body, and imagines  
itself as unmarked norm. Thus, “acts of passing become mechanisms for the 
recreation of [white] nation space.”45
Whiteness and Black/White Mixed-Race Dispossession  
in Twenty-First-Century “Post-race” States
Miller as white establishes a “third space,”46 or “critical thirding,”47 that moves 
past racial binaries while being imbricated by them. This produces the tension 
between Miller’s performance of whiteness and the normative performativity  
of bi-racialization.48 The empathetic identification of the audience with Miller as 
39 Ibid., 10.
40 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 
trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 
2005).
41 Sara Ahmed, “‘She’ll Wake Up One of These 
Days and Find She’s Turned into a Nigger’: 
Passing through Hybridity,” Theory 
Culture and Society 16, no. 2 (1999): 87.
42 Ibid.
43 A white woman who passed herself off for 
almost a decade as a black woman, rose 
to be the head of the Spokane NAACP, 
before being “outed” during a TV 
interview by KXLY reporter Jeff Humphrey 
as white—later confirmed by her white 
parents—in June 2015. See “Raw interview 
with Rachel Dolezal,” YouTube video, 8:51,  
posted by “KXLY,” June 11, 2013, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKRj 
_h7vmMM.
44 Ahmed, “‘She’ll Wake Up One of These 
Days,” 87.
45 Ibid., 93.
46 Bhabha, Third Space, 207–11.
47 Edward Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to  
Los Angeles and Other Real­and­Imagined 
Places (Oxford: Wiley, 1996).
48 Ifekwunigwe, Scattered Belongings.
49 Sadiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: 
Terror, Slavery and Self­Making in 
Nineteenth­Century America (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 7.
50 Wilderson, Red, White and Black.
51 See my book, Black Women’s Bodies and 
the Nation: Race, Gender and Culture 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
52 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 7–21.
53 Wilderson, Red, White and Black, 67–73.
54 Su Holmes and Sean Redmond, 
“Introduction: Understanding Celebrity 
Culture,” in Framing Celebrity: New 
Directions in Celebrity Culture, ed. Su 
Holmes and Sean Redmond (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 1–16.
55 Ibid.
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famous and co-create celebrities’ fame through fandom.56 We reach out for 
Miller in order to engage in a healing process directed by the self, based on de-
veloping “intimacy” with him. Thus, we can see how Miller’s border body  
becomes a site of pleasure. His celebrity body produces cannibalistic affective 
attachment as fans pass through it to remake themselves. Such attachment 
to black/white mixed-race corporeality illustrates the social, political, cultural, 
affective, and psychic value of his border body for white identification and 
passing as “post-race.” His border body has been made to stand in for the white 
norm while being racially branded as black because of hypodescent. His 
body produces a different matrix of corporeality, power, gender, race, class, 
sexuality, and celebrity in which the body does not speak him but speaks back 
to our very imaginings of him as white. Pleasure in his whitened body is deeply 
melancholic as it replays corporeality as the basis for the consumption, produc-
tion, and representation of the black/white mixed-race celebrity body in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
This brings to mind catachresis,57 the act of reversing, displacing, grasping, 
and transforming the value-coding apparatus, thus, pointing to the Derridean 
idea that originary incompleteness is part of all meaning systems. Miller’s 
body is always subject to slippage as there are no “true” examples of black/white 
mixedness and he is allowed into the circle of representation only as subal-
tern.58 As subaltern, being passed as white speaks the constituting of racial dif-
ference by the white world and black/white mixed-race border bodies as  
unified object. Miller’s being passed as white onscreen does not transform the 
value coding apparatus of race but shows whose body can extend to white-
ness. His passing has a positive outcome for the white self and nation as it  
enables catharsis. The emotional discharge of white racist shame produced  
by the empathetic identification with the body of the black/white mixed-race 
man as those racialized as white pass through it. This is a peculiar race per-
formativity of “the opposite” as whiteness looks at Miller and envisages him as 
nonthreatening as he is consumed as racialized object.59 
56 Ibid.
57 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?,” in Colonial Discourse and Post­
colonial Theory: A Reader, ed. Patrick 
Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 66–111.
58 Ibid.
59 Derrida, Politics of Friendship. 
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If we recall the initial narrative of the crisis in 2008, the general level of costs for 
reproduction of the system grew because of the rise of petroleum price and 
raw materials, while the war on terror increased the public debt and the banks 
could not cover the whole set of credits. Then the fall of Lehman Brothers in 
the United States created a domino effect on the financial markets, and all these 
had a direct impact on our lives. But we can also say that this was actually  
the moment in which the very concept of crisis entered into crisis. 
If reaching the limit, according to the Marxist analysis, was a potential to over-
come capitalism, we see that the idea of crisis as a “passage toward” today 
has a different meaning. We are witnessing a phenomenon in which capital is 
beyond its limit: the valorization of capital is operating nowadays indepen-
dently of real production, which creates “bubbles” because it produces an  
immense accumulation of fictitious capital through financial mechanisms, with -
out the necessity of real production. Santiago López Petit says that this means 
we cannot talk anymore about real economy and financial economy. The bub-
bles are no more than an aberration, but they are a permanent character of the 
financial accumulation regime.1 In this context, the relation capital/work as  
opposing political force is today equivalent to the relation capital/debt, as Marina 
Vishmidt argues, acquiring an unprecedented role by almost eclipsing the 
theory of work- value.2 According to Achille Mbembe, the nation-states are  
becoming agencies for collection of debt in the name of global oligarchy invest-
ments and international financial industry, which is politically inexpungable.3 
By extending the debt over the whole societies, this became a mechanism  
of subjection and control of our lives by capitalist governance. Through indi-
vidual debt, public deficit, and public debt, lives of entire populations are 
mortgaged and expropriated. 
The extortion of public debt interests, depredation, expropriation of goods, and 
common wealth operate today through the process of accumulation by dis-
possession and simultaneous negation and violation of human rights. The accu-
mulation is now possible neither with real inversions nor with the creation  
of new productive capacities, and while it works simultaneously, as Mbembe  
describes it, through and across different scales of race, the principal conse-







1 See Santiago López Petit, La movilización 
global: Breve tratado para atacar la 
realidad [Global mobilization: A brief 
treatise for attacking reality] (Madrid: 
Traficantes de sueños, 2009). 
2 See Marina Vishmidt, “Human Capital or 
Toxic Asset: After the Wage,” Mute, from 
Reartikulacija, nos. 10–13 (2010), http://
www.metamute.org/community/your-posts 
/human-capital-or-toxic-asset-after-wage. 
3 See Achille Mbembe, “Theory From the 
Antipodes: Notes on Jean & John 
Comaroffs’ TFS,” The Johannesburg Salon 5 
(2012), http://jwtc.org.za/salon_volume 
_5/achille_mbembe.htm. 
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who migrated to Western Europe before Slovenia joined the European Union 
(first to Italy and then to Spain), not quite white10 and not quite trans*,11 who still 
inhabits this symbolic East because of a reiterated reproduction of racializa-
tion processes, I think it is necessary to search for decolonial ruptures, modula-
tions, and interferences that continuously morph the grid, its point system, 
coordinates, and preestablished channels and threads, moving in new directions. 
This means that the way we perceive borders changes and with this change 
we have to conceptualize Europe differently as well.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Aníbal Quijano, one of the founding 
members of the research group Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality, introduced 
a new concept called “coloniality” as being the indispensable underside of 
modernity from the sixteenth century onward. Quijano has defined the term as 
Butler puts it, our dispensability.4 These recent transformations, following Paul B. 
Preciado, as well point to the articulation of a set of new micro-prosthetic  
devices for the control of subjectivity with new molecular biological techniques 
and media networks.5 As he writes, we are facing a new kind of capitalism 
that is hot, psychotropic, and punk—but we have to add by referring to Frantz 
Fanon—in the zones of being, while also being cold, bureaucratic, necrotoxic, 
and heavy metal in the zones of non-being.6 Thus, the crisis no longer describes 
an exceptional period, something temporal or episodic, but it has rather became 
the norm—the fabric of social life—of our existence. This new necro political 
mode of life, as Marina Gržinić argues, means pure abandonment. The surplus 
value of capital today is based and generated from (the worlds of) death.7
In the last number of years, the arrival of refugees and migrants, mostly from 
countries in war and military conflict zones (Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, 
Eritrea, Somalia, Kurdistan, Ukraine, etc.), to the EU through African, Mediter-
ranean, and Balkan routes has increased. Thousands of people are dying as they 
cross the militarized borders of Fortress Europe, which continue to build  
new walls in France (Calais), between Hungary and Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey, 
Slovenia and Croatia, Austria and Slovenia, while Germany is negotiating  
with Turkey the blockade of the routes toward the EU and deportations in ex-
change for liberalization of visas for Turkish citizens. Similar to EU-Turkey agree-
ment are the current negotiations with African countries (Ethiopia, Niger,  
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali) to intensify the control of the EU’s external borders and 
cut the possibility of crossing the Mediterranean Sea. The system of asylum  
is paralyzed and inefficient, and refugees and migrants are trapped on their way, 
detained in different internment camps, prisons, and border centers, experi-
encing the situation of systematic abandonment, intensified processes of racial 
discrimination, and death. In this situation, migration as well is defined in 
terms of crisis to be managed. Calling the current reality a “refugee crisis” or 
“migrant crisis” rather than the crisis of European politics of systems of produc-
tion of truth, human rights, citizenship, nation-states, and colonial episte-
mology of sex-gender binaries, points to the depoliticization that occurs today.8 
Instead of a Europe without borders, as Tatjana Greif has stressed, we have  
a Europe of “concentration camps,” racist raids, de portations, sealed and mili-
tarized borders, walls and barbwire, and an increasingly sophisticated system  
of control.9 
To rethink the silenced colonial/imperial history of European migration politics 
and reconfiguration of internal and external borders through the West-East 
relation of repetition, together with coloniality of gender, the control of subjec-
tivity, and knowledge, or the most extreme forms of exclusion and politics  
of death today, I suggest to point toward a number of multiple, heterogeneous, 
entangled, and complex processes within one single colonial capitalist his-
torical reality. As a former Eastern European, from former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), 
4 See Judith Butler, “Fiscal Crisis or the Neo-
liberal Assault on Democracy?,” Critical 
Legal Thinking (2011), http://criticallegal 
thinking.com/2011/11/14/fiscal-crisis-or-the 
-neo-liberal-assault-on-democracy/.
5 See Paul B. Preciado, “Pharmaco- 
pornographic Capitalism: Postporn Politics 
and the Decolonization of Sexual 
Representations,” in Utopia of Alliances, 
Conditions of Impossibilities and the 
Vocabulary of Decoloniality, trans. Marina 
Gržinić, ed. Editorial Group for Writing 
Insurgent Genealogies (Vienna: Löcker, 
2013).
6 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2015).
7 See Marina Gržinić, “Subjectivation, 
Biopolitics and Necropolitics: Where Do 
We Stand?,” Reartikulacija, no. 6 (2009), 
http://grzinic-smid.si/?p=893. 
8 See Marina Gržinić, “100 Years of Now,” 
German Pavilion—La Biennale di Venezia 
(2015), http://archiv.deutscher-pavillon.
org/2015/en/; and Paul B. Preciado, 
“Ciudadanía en transición” [Citizenship in 
transition], in El Estado Mental [The mental 
state] (2016), https://elestadomental.com 
/especiales/cambiar-de-voz/ciudadania 
-en-transicion.
9 See Tatjana Greif, “Deportiranci” 
[Deported], Reartikulacija, no. 2 (2007), 
http://grzinic-smid.si/?p=861. 
10 To quote Gržinić: “In relation to ‘former’ 
Western Europe, its hegemony (supremacy) 
and construction of deficient ‘other,’ 
someone coming from former Eastern 
Europe is always part of process of 
discrimination; because there is always 
implemented the so-called principle of 
the ‘deficiency” of a certain geographical 
region called former Eastern Europe, 
where it is seen as such by its Western 
counterpart. […] But when the color  
of the skin is a border, then within the 
discrimination processes, we have  
to recontextualize ourselves, so to speak, 
every moment, both while entering the 
public as well in the private context, 
because it is not the same—we can still 
hide ourselves within a system of 
mimicry.” From “The System of Racism/
White Supremacy,” a conversation 
between Jude Sentongo Kafeero and Sheri 
Avraham, Marina Gržinić, Marissa Lôbo, 
and Ivana Marjanović, in Utopia of 
Alliances, Conditions of Impossibilities 
and the Vocabulary of Decoloniality, 117.
11 The term “trans*” with an asterisk is being 
used recently as an umbrella concept to 
include many different gender 
expressions and identities, such as trans, 
transsexual, transgender, gender queer, 
etc. The asterisk emphasizes the 
heterogeneity of bodies, identities, and 
experiences that goes beyond the 
imposed gender-binary social norms. 
Trans* is a concept introduced by its 
protagonists out of rejection of the terms 
coming from the pathologizing medical 
discourse. The asterisk as well points out 
that while our struggle is common, we 
recognize that there is not just one 
interpretation of what does it mean to be 
trans, transsexual, or transgender. Both 
terms, queer and trans*, have to be 
rethought from the decolonial positionality.
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(refugees and migrants, who are violently discriminated against on a global 
scale). These brutal processes of selection of migrants, in terms of racial, 
class, gender, sexual, and religious categories construct us as differentiated 
subhuman(s) through different processes of dehumanization.16 
Pointing to the geo- and body-political aspects of the organization of European 
space, Kwame Nimako and Gržinić expose the following thesis in a conversation 
during the workshop “Education, Development, Freedom” at Duke University, 
Durham, organized by the Centre for Global Studies in February 2010, and 
filmed for the video Naked Freedom:
Kwame Nimako: “We are here (in EU) because you were there (in Africa!)”
Marina Gržinić: “We are here (in EU) because you want to go there (in 
Eastern Europe!)”17
This is developed further around two important questions that need to be taken 
into consid eration. As Nimako emphasizes, after the fall of the Berlin Wall,  
former Eastern Europe was subjected to the process of political reorganization, 
integration, and subordination to the Western model of society and servitude; 
this consisted in reimplementing directives and legislation already active in 
the EU. Such relation we can name, following Gržinić, the relation of repetition. 
It is a repetition of Western Europe’s political and economic model, of its 
structures of government and governmentality, its modes of life and modes of 
death, the institutional and migration control, its system of knowledge (theory) 
and aesthetic regimes (art), activism, and so on.18 This specific process of colo-
niality through repetition also functions through a suppression of “local” his-
tories, knowledge, and practices of resistance. Likewise, while Western Europe 
is also naming itself “former,” it seems that it does not have to be responsible 
a matrix of power that operates through four interrelated domains: the control 
of economy, the control of authority, the control of gender and sexuality,  
and the control of subjectivity and knowledge.12 If the critique of capitalism from 
the Eurocentric point of view privileges some economic relations over others, 
without negat ing the incessant accumulation of capital on global scale, Quijano 
has conceptualized the intersectionality of multiple, heterogeneous, global 
hierarchies, and forms of domination and exploitation: racial, sexual, political, 
economic, spiritual, and linguistic. Emphasizing its structural, constitutive, 
and not derivative relations, by claiming intersectionality, these are analytical 
methods introduced previously by black feminists (Combahee River Collective, 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Audre Lorde, and Patricia Hill Collins, among others)  
and developed further by and with feminists of color (Chela Sandoval, Chandra 
Mohanty, Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherríe Moraga, etc.) to point to their historical, 
theoretical, and practical exclusions.
According to Madina Tlostanova, through such analysis we can understand how 
the West determines one single norm of humanity, and in relation to it legiti-
mate a single knowledge of economic and social system, spatial, and temporal 
models, values, and cultural norms. The coloniality, which operates as an  
active process, reconfirms differences between societies, subjects, and know-
ledge(s), while destroying lives to save modernity and capitalism.13
If post-socialism in such a framework of analysis is not at all postcolonial, this 
means that we have to modify the basis of our analysis and its paradigms, 
conceptualizing the entanglement of modernity, colonialism, and capitalism in 
order to understand the East under conditions of coloniality in relation to the 
West. As Neda Atanasoski argues, “What is crucial here is that if postsocialism is 
relegated to periodizing a particular moment of regional transition that at 
once affirms the death of socialism and consigns it to an ideological formation 
inferior to Western modernity and universality, it particularizes what is actually 
a global condition in which the West situates the universal claims of human 
rights, freedom, democracy, that underwrite its global violence.”14 This implies 
as well taking into account the imitation of Western modernity by the East, 
with racism in its core. 
It is within these processes, where the colonial history of European color-
blindness is inscribed, though the concept of race has its geographic and intel-
lectual origin in Europe. While racism is silenced or presented as a marginal 
problem (as well by the social movements, like it happened with 15M or the 
Slovenian uprising), we have to emphasize that racialization is the main logic 
of global capitalism, which regulates and differentiates the social, political, 
and economic space.15 This is today a process of colonial capitalist differentia-
tion, as Gržinić argues, between the first- and second-class citizens (racial-
ized citizens, LGBTQI, sex workers, disabled people, etc.); and noncitizens  
12 See Género y descolonialidad [Gender and 
decoloniality], ed. Walter Mignolo et al. 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Signo, 2008).
13 See Madina Tlostanova, “Post-Soviet 
Imaginary and Global Coloniality:  





14 Neda Atanasoski, Humanitarian Violence: 
The U. S. Deployment of Diversity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013), 26.
15 See David T. Goldberg, The Threat of Race: 
Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism 
(Singapore: Utopia Press, 2009); Fatima 
El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering 
Ethnicity in Postnational Europe 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2011); and Marina Gržinić and Šefik 
Tatlić, “Global Capitalism’s Racializations,” 
Deartikulacija, part 2 (2012), https:// 
www.academia.edu/2096960/Global 
_Capitalisms_Racialization_s.
16 See Gržinić, “100 Years of Now.”
17 See the video Naked Freedom by Marina 
Gržinić and Aina Šmid, http://grzinic-smid 
.si/?p=413.
18 See Marina Gržinić, “Capital Repetition,” 
Reartikulacija, no. 8 (2009), http://grzinic 
-smid.si/?p=907.
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When we say migrants or refugees we have to ask ourselves how these catego-
ries are being formed by hegemonic politics through the processes of pro-
duction of “Other(s),” reducing the complexity by situating us in the ahis toric 
context, outside of geographic and political frames.20 At the same time, the 
EU migratory control apparatus regulates the selection of bodies in relation to 
belonging to determined ethno/national, racial, or religious group, as well  
as gender and sexuality by reproducing oppressive sexual norms that are gen-
dered, racialized, and classist. 
To challenge the colonial formulation of gender classification, Maria Lugones’s 
work is crucial here. On the one hand, because she developed a critique of 
Quijano’s understanding of sex as biological, of his failure to see that within the 
concept of gender the idea of sexual or biological dimorphism (man-woman 
dichotomy), heteronormativity and the patriarchal distribution of power are in-
scribed.21 On the other, her analysis of gender within coloniality reveals that 
eurocentrism and racism are embedded in the universal notions of the gender -
binary system. Along these lines she exposes how gender and sexual diversity 
are filtered through a colonizing binary gaze and presented as naturalized ideas 
of “sex” and “gender,” both operating as Eurocentric categories.22 The Euro-
pean colonial expansion, which started with conquest of America and by pro-
gressively introducing the first regulations and punishment laws, prohibition  
of homosexuality, and multiplicity of gender expressions, disclose gender and 
sexuality as technologies for categorizing colonized subjects and organizing 
their subsequent removal, reeducation, or genocide. What we are witnessing 
in the current context of old-new forms of European migration politics and 
the relaunching of Western hegemony (supremacy) is also, referring to Jin 
Haritaworn, how “the sign of diversity moves from the racialized body (who be-
comes the ‘migrant homophobe’) to the sexualized one (who becomes the  
‘injured homosexual’ in need of protection from the ‘migrant homophobe’).”23 
While the former Western Europe, its politics of racialization and discrimination, 
now integrate within its borders those “Other(s)” who were discriminated in 
the past (e.g., women, LGBTQI, etc.), and who in many contexts continue living 
for or conscious of its historic and contemporary colonial and fascist regimes 
of power. Moreover, by claiming the division West/East “obsolete” after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the repetition and multiplication of Occident/Orient divi-
sion is escalating. As Gayatri Spivak explains, “Terror in this guise is not a  
monopoly of some Muslim fundamentalists. It is the preserve of whatever entity— 
including our democracies—convinced that its enemy is by definition the enemy 
of “humanity,” “civilization,” and even “God” himself—a theological enemy.”19 
The second issue Nimako points out is the process of zonification. We can say 
that European politics of segregation transformed former Eastern Europe into  
a border-zone in the way that the territory of former socialist countries functions 
as a buffer zone to control and block migrations from Africa and Asia, while 
migrants from former Eastern European countries are at the same time subjected 
to control, discrimination (employment), and processes of depor tation from 
the “former” Western Europe. 
The countries of the former Eastern Europe, which became subsidiary states, 
periferialized in their servile relation to the EU politics, show, on the one 
hand, contempt toward “those below them” in processes of constant hierar-
chization, and, on the other, intensified servitude toward European colonial/ 
imperial centers. Ethno-nationalism and differentiation with labor division  
on a global scale are today presented as “liberation” from what was suppressed 
during decades of communism and socialism. To ethno-national construc-
tions, European abstract universalism as a form of cosmopolitanism is being 
counterposed. Correspondingly, the West needs the East to project itself  
as a free space, as a space of hospitality culture and respect for human rights, 
while it points to former Eastern Europe as a pathologic space, still not quite 
European, where racism, fascism, and homo-transphobia prevail as essential 
characteristics of the region. This dominant imaginary is today being ques-
tioned through the protests organized by refugees and migrants as well as other 
leftist activist groups. 
The EU insists on following the Dublin Regulation that imposes the periferialized 
countries of Europe to embrace the criminal procedures of Western Europe 
over migrants. These procedures consist not in the protection but in the selec-
tion of migrants for the interest of the labor market in northern Europe. While  
in Greece, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and so on, the police, 
military, and paramilitary groups brutally attack refugees and migrants, in  
the north of Europe they talk about “human” capital for capitalist accumulation, 
covering up their own brutal attacks on migrants and their technocratic orga-
nization of necropolitics. Today, the two poles of European politics, ethno- 
nationalist, and technocratic operate at the same time, sub jugating migrants and 
refugees to paternalist assimilation, extreme conditions of exploitation, racist 
identi fication, violation, torture, deportation, and death. 
19 Gayatri C. Spivak, “Religion, Politics, 
Theology: A Conversation with Achille 
Mbembe,” boundary 2 34, no. 2 (Summer 
2007): 169.
20 See Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 
“Deconstruir la frontera o dibujar nuevos 
paisajes: Sobre la materialidad de  
la frontera” [Deconstructing the border  
or drawing new landscapes: On the 
materiality of the border], Política  
y sociedad, no. 36 (2001): 85–95.
21 See Tejiendo de otro modo: Feminismo, 
epistemología y apuestas descoloniales  
en Abya Yala [Weaving from another world: 
Feminism, epistemology, and decolonial 
stakes in Abya Yala], ed. Yuderkys 
Espinosa Miñoso, Diana Gomez Correal, 
and Karina Ochoa Muñoz (Popayán: 
Universidad del Cauca, 2014).
22 See María Lugones, “Colonialidad y 
género: Hacia un feminismo descolonial” 
[Coloniality and gender: Toward  
a decolonial feminism], in Mignolo et al., 
Género y descolonialidad.
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Thus, a decolonial turn with its ongoing attempt to push for a conceptual de-
naturalization, aims at undermining the fundamental logic of modernity and its 
disciplines, in need for assertion of rights (also epistemic) of the “wretched.”29 
To undo the discourse imposed by the state and capital on refugees and mi-
grants, on our bodies, and the criminalization of resistance, we have to change 
the terms of conversation and search for new ways to fight the current necro-
political regime. Changing the terms of conversation means to think about the 
movement of refugees and migrants—which makes visible the extreme bru-
tality and crimes of the European border and migratory regime, as well as the 
European integration politics based on hierarchic inclusion/exclusion—as  
a movement of liberation that is opening a space for all of us. It is a call to radi-
cally transform, rather than to seek change within the existing social struc-
tures. Those who want to transform the system are the ones who lost all, but 
don’t have anything else to lose. These are people against whom Europe is 
building walls, barbed-wire borders, concentration camps, and the contempo-
rary logics of crisis. Against the depoliticization and humanitarian discourse, 
refugees and migrants in their pluriversality are opening up a political space for 
a real emancipation, by creating a critical exteriority and by config uring the 
space for production of practices and relations that make possible a decolonial 
line of flight through which subjectivity and desire flow. The question is how 
can we from the fractured locus (dwelling in the border), which is our common 
experience, continue to build alliances in order to dismantle the colonial  
logics of power, and to strengthen our networks of resistance and solidarity in 
Europe, the Global South, and East.
without the full recognition of their rights—as Gržinić argues, it produces at 
the same time its nonwhite population, migrants, re fugees, and LGBTQI of color, 
as Other(s).24
A recently developed critique, put forward by various authors from the former 
Yugoslavia, interrogates a linkage between “Europeanisation” and “gay eman-
cipation,” showing how certain forms of gay activist engagement are elevated 
to a measure of democracy, progress, and modernity while relegating homo-
transphobic attacks to the status of non-European “Other(s),” who are inevitably 
positioned as appertaining to the patriarchal past that should be left behind. 
As Piro Rexhepi writes in his text “From Orientalism to Homonationalism: Queer 
Politics, Islamophobia and Europeanisation in Kosovo,” this separation serves 
the purpose of creating and strengthening a local liberal European -oriented elite, 
which then acts as local interlocutors that, in advocating Europeanization as 
the solution to violence directed toward queer communities, become vehicles 
of EU expansionism.25 
Taking into the analysis the body-political aspects of migratory control, we see 
that coloniality, as Tlostanova states, has as its central element the idea of 
classifying humankind and the ontological marginalization of non-Western and 
not quite Western people. In all cases, modernity justifies violence and the 
negation of the human rights of those who are labeled as not quite human (i.e., 
not quite European, not quite Soviet, not quite Christian, not quite white, not 
quite women, not quite heterosexual, not quite queer, not quite trans).26 In this 
sense, the extent to which the body as a culturally intelligible construct, and 
the modern/colonial techniques in and through which bodies are positioned and 
transformed, are in fact inextricably entangled. 
By shifting the geography of reason and the Western progressive narrative we 
see that, as Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso points out, “the future already was.”27 
This situation points to the fact that knowledge that is socially ignored, silenced, 
and/or not recognized as knowledge is related to the position of enunciation,  
as Grada Kilomba questions, ”Who can speak? Who is acknowledged to have the 
knowledge?”28 and to the ways of understanding how class divisions, racial-
ization, ableism, sex-gender binary, and heteronormativity are constructed 
historically and operate through the existing colonial capitalist institutions today. 
This helps to change the critical failure to recognize the body not as one  
already constituted object of knowledge among others, but rather as the con-
tingent ground of our knowledge and knowing. Directing the critical attention  
toward the questions of embodiment, positionality, and the visual, means taking 
into the analysis a much more complex system of colonial power relations that 
also point to the need of breaking down the body politics in a molar sense  
(a whole, integrated body with one identity) in the name of multiplicity and sen-
sibility, its resistant and transformative political potentials.
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‘Migrant Homophobia’ in Germany,” in 
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disciplinary approaches, ed. Encarnacion 
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Sérgio Costa (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 138.
24 See Gabriele Dietze, “Analysis of Gender,” 
Deartikulacija, part 2 (2012), http://www 
.damne.net/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/De 
-Artikulacija2.pdf. 
25 See Piro Rexhepi, “From Orientalism to 
Homonationalism: Queer Politics, 
Islamophobia and Europeanization in 
Kosovo,” in LGBT Activism and 
Europeanisation in Post­Yugoslav space, 
ed. Bojan Bilić (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016).
26 See Tlostanova, “Post-Soviet Imaginary.” 
27 Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, “El futuro ya 
fue: Una crítica a la idea del progreso en 
las narrativas de liberación sexo genéricas 
y queer identitarias en Abya Yala” [The 
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Signo, 2015), 13.
28 Grada Kilomba, Plantation Memories: 
Episodes of Everyday Racism (Münster: 
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29 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963).
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In this essay,1 I attempt to advance, from a decolonial point of view, a construc-
tion of a genealogy of the relationship between feminist politics and black 
and indigenous antiracist struggles in Abya Yala.2 I explore the late emergence 
of antiracist, decolonial, and ethno-racial movements and struggles in Latin 
America, understanding mestizaje (the process of racial mixing) ideology and 
the processes of broad Westernization as obstacles to overcome and face  
the racist imperial reason, even by feminism, in its attempt to decolonize such 
a reason. Finally, I analyze the toll that feminism in Latin America has paid by  
insisting on the country’s fragmented view and in its treatment of oppression 
centered on gender. 
In the introduction to the 2014 book Tejiendo de Otro Modo: Feminismo, epis-
temología y apuestas descoloniales en Abya Yala,3 which I edited with Diana 
Gomez Correal and Karina Ochoa Muñoz, we consider the complicated relation-
ship between feminism and the struggles of indigenous people and African 
descendants in the place known by its colonial name as Latin America. Through 
a memory-building exercise we remember how, since the end of the 1980s 
onward, indigenous and African descendants’ struggles began to take shape, 
increasingly challenging the nation-state with their demands for autonomy (polit-
ical, cultural organizational, and epistemological) and with their critique of  
Eurocentric discourse of institutions, the international agenda of rights, the 
world of development, and the politics of local and international urban social 
movements that insist on the nation-state’s universalist views and ideals of 
“good” centered on individual agency and consumerism.
Over the course of our work, we remembered the continent-wide campaign 
centered on the five hundredth anniversary of indigenous, black, and popular 
resistance juxtaposed against the official celebration the Eurocentric dis-
course has called “the discovery of America.” We recall the 1990s as a decade 
marked by the Zapatista insurrection in Mexico, and the processes initiated  
in a good part of the region—Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Venezuela—that happened thanks to the great mobilization and countrywide 
awakening of indigenous and African descendents’ landless peasant movements 
of peoples, and as well popular and urban movements. Finally, we recognize  
a part of feminism being present and accompanying these processes.
Toward a 
Construction  
of the History of  
a (Dis)encounter
The Feminist 





1 My thanks go to Dulce Reyes Bonilla and 
Daniella Avila for their assistance with the 
content editing of the first English version 
of this text. 
2 Abya Yala, which in the Kuna language 
means “land in its full maturity” or “land 
of vital blood,” is the name used by the 
Kuna people, an ancient Native American 
nation who used to inhabit the land known 
today as northwest Colombia and southeast 
Panama, to refer to the American continent 
before the arrival of Columbus.—Trans. 
3 Tejiendo de otro modo: Feminismo, 
epistemología y apuestas descoloniales en 
Abya Yala [Weaving from another world: 
Feminism, epistemology, and decolonial 
stakes in Abya Yala], ed. Yuderkys 
Espinosa Miñoso, Diana Gomez Correal, 
and Karina Ochoa Muñoz. Popayán: 
Editorial de la Universidad del Cauca, 2014.
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of word and representation within Eurocentric feminist activism, has scarred 
many of us, and has propelled us to search for explanations that have allowed 
us to understand and account for our lived experiences. This was an experi-
ence of oppression that was systematically denied to us by feminism in its tradi-
tional form, one that did not allow us to see and analyze oppression in its 
right dimension.
And it is from there that several of us in Abya Yala have denounced and theo-
rized these problems within feminists’ organizations and in the wider move-
ment. The first indictments based on class differences were formulated since 
the mid-1980s by the Latin American popular feminism that was committed  
to Marxism and left-wing politics against the privileges and prerogatives enjoyed 
by some women and reflected in the organization itself in terms of defining 
central issues, strategies, alliances, and forms of representation. Later, during 
the 1990s, these differences were formulated by the autonomous feminism 
movement in terms of the relationship with the state and the processes of insti-
tutionalization and bureaucratization of the feminist agenda. Parallel to this 
history, in the 1980s, the power of a black movement in Brazil emerged in the 
public scene from where the first voices of black women were ready to fight  
for their place within the mixed antiracist movement and within the feminist 
movement. The African-Brazilian movement will be paradigmatic in this history, 
ushering race consciousness and a broad struggle against institutional racism. 
African-Brazilian feminism became a pioneering force in the region in open-
ing up thinking about the relationship between gender, race, and class.6
In Brazil, a country of African descent, the self-identified black women’s 
movement was nurtured by the black feminists‘ intellectual production in the 
United States. Their dialogue, since the 1980s, has allowed them to grow some 
theoretical-methodological tools to better think of their own reality.7
However, to keep from idealizing those processes, we acknowledge the difficul-
ties and obstacles that have plagued these attempts of articulation between 
feminism and indigenous, black, and popular struggles. While we recognize the 
attempts toward the mutual recognition between feminists and women from 
indigenous and African movements, we also notice that the problems and 
dangers of trying to construct an agenda of common interests have become 
more evident. History shows the impossibility of a more equitable and horizontal 
listening to each other and the impossibility of feminism to abandon its pre-
tense to produce a universal truth about gender-based oppression and the ways 
to reverse it.
Thus, articulations, complicity and alliances between women of indigenous, 
Afro-descendants, and popular movements’ origin with feminists were 
not always easy. This was due, among other things, to the feminists’ class 
and racial backgrounds, and although a ranking inside the feminist 
movement have shown that there were women descendants of native and 
African peoples, coming from the working class, the fact is that the great 
majority of feminists have been white-mestiza, urban, university educated, 
coming from the middle and upper classes. As it has been denounced 
and analyzed by black feminists and women of color in the United States 
(hooks, 2004; Lorde, 2003), these origins have conditioned their inter-
pretations of women’s oppression as well as the basic postulates of a 
program of liberation and development, that is, the strategies that could 
end this oppression bringing it toward the type of society to which we 
aspire. Saying this, the differences between feminists and organized 
women of subaltern groups are palpable. The latter therefore have not 
been attracted to or summoned by the feminist struggle, a struggle that 
they have seen quite far from their reality.4 
Although more and more voices of indigenous and African-descended “women”5 
are capable of recognizing, observing, and making visible the sexism that  
operates in their communities and in their political organizations, there contin-
ues to be a border and a complicated relationship between feminism and 
“women” from organizations and/or communities and indigenous and African 
movements. To me, this has to do with some other reasons I would like to  
return to later in this essay.
The fact is that with the expansion of feminism into wider spaces of society, 
and the incorporation of racialized subjects and marginal communities, these 
problems were no longer expressed only in the relationship between move-
ments but within the feminist’s ranking or classification system. Disagreements 
arose about the unequal relationships “between women.” Experiencing sym-
bolic and epistemic violence, racism, meritocracy, and other forms of manage-
ment and passing over of sites of prestige and power, as well as the management 
4 Tejiendo de otro modo, 22. The two 
references that appear in the middle of 
this quotation refer to bell hooks, We Real 
Cool: Black Men and Masculinity (New 
York: Routledge, 2004); and Audre Lorde, 
Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (London: 
Rivers Oram Press/Pandora List, 2003). 
Unless other wise noted, all translations 
are my own.
5 I always use quotation marks when referring 
to women to point out how problematic 
(how inadequate) the term is when used in 
non-Western, nonwhite contexts. 
6 Sonia E. Alvarez et al., “Encontrando os 
feminismos latino-americanos e 
caribenhos” [Encountering Latin American 
and Caribbean feminisms], Revistas 
Estudos Feministas 11, no. 2 (July–December 
2003): 548, http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ref 
/v11n2/19138.pdf.
7 We should refer here to the theoretical 
and activists productions of black positions 
such as Luiza Bairros, Leila Gonzales, Sueli 




marked by the configuration of nation-state and coloniality—of an awareness of 
“racial oppression” in the United States that is different from what would  
happen in Latin American countries where a type of “assimilationist” racism, 
derived from the strategy and ideology of mestizaje,15 prevented or delayed 
the appearance of an awareness of racial oppression and of a politics deriving 
from it.
The ideology of mestizaje has installed the idea of  the possibility of settling 
conflicts between different opposed cultural and epistemic traditions, though 
to do this it was necessary to abandon the local, native epistemologies and  
to replace them through the Latin American nation-state modern colonial matrix. 
Through a discourse that hides more than they show, “plagued by eu phe misms 
The Difficulties of Producing a Decolonial and Antiracist 
Consciousness and the Influences of Black Feminists and 
Feminists of Color in the United States and in Abya Yala
It is impossible to deny the great influence that black and women of color 
feminism in the United States has had on antiracist feminists in Latin America 
and elsewhere. This is surely, in reference to the decolonial analysis, what I 
call the “geopolitics of knowledge,”8 or, even better, a “political economy of 
knowledge.”9 Concerns about the historical impossibility of Latin American 
feminism to produce a theory of its own to reflect on its own geopolitical con-
figuration has already been expressed by authors such as Breny Mendoza,10 
Mayra Leciñana,11 and, in my own work; this was the reason that motivated me 
with a group of students and activists to carry out an independent research  
on the production of knowledge within the gender and sexuality studies in Latin 
America.12
Our status as satellite countries of European and later US colonialism defines 
us as receivers, instead of producers of knowledge. This has enabled black 
and women of color feminist thinkers, despite their status of being subaltern in 
US academia, to achieve a certain level of reception and to become a voice 
of reference for racialized and “Third World” women. Such has been the impor-
tance of this thinking about the relation between race and gender in Latin 
America that we have had to face the awkward situation when local voices, con-
tributing similar arguments, are replaced by representatives of European and 
Anglo North America. Thereafter continues the long tradition that systematically 
ignores local contributions while impeding the development of a theory of 
our own that is rooted in our own positions. This problem becomes obvious in 
a field of research such as the decolonial turn that has condemned the  
coloniality of knowledge, and yet when it comes to thinking about the relation-
ship between coloniality and gender classification, the intellectuals and re-
searchers of coloniality as well turn to the interpretations developed by voices 
from black, Chicana, and feminists of color in the United States, assuming 
that they also represent those of subalterns in Latin America and the Caribbean.13
I believe that the decisive influence that black and women of color feminists in 
the United States has had on the development of antiracist struggles in our 
region is due to certain conditions that have allowed a much earlier historical 
appearance of this thought in the United States rather than in Latin America.  
I propose that some of the conditions for the emergence of feminist antiracist 
activism and theories in the United States and Latin America might have 
something to do with what Antonio Guimaräes explained as the historical con-
struction of different models of state racism at a global level.14 Following  
Guimaräes’s hypothesis, the existence of a model of racial segregation, as  
in the United States, would allow the early emergence—within the temporality 
8 Walter Mignolo, “La geopolíticas del 
conocimento y colonialidad del poder: 
Entrevista a Walter Mignolo” [Geopolitics 
of knowledge and the coloniality of power: 
Interview with Walter Mignolo], interview 
by Catherine Walsh, in Indisciplinar las 
ciencias sociales: Geopolíticas del 
conocimiento y colonialidad del poder: 
Perspectivas desde lo andino [Indisciplining 
social sciences: Geopolitics of knowledge 
and the coloniality of power: Perspectives 
from the Andean], ed. Catherine Walsh, 
Freya Schiwy, and Santiago Castro-Gómez 
(Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar, 
Ediciones Abya Yala, 2002), 17–44.
9 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Ch’ixinakax utxiwa: 
Una reflexión sobre prácticas y discursos 
descolonizadores [Ch‘ixinakax utxiwa:  
A reflection on decolonizing practices and 
discourses] (Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón, 
2010); see also her “Ch’ixinakax utxiwa:  
A Reflection on the Practices and Dis-
courses of Decolonization,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Winter 2012, 95–109, https://
doi.org/10.1215/00382876-1472612.
10 Breny Mendoza, “Los feminismos y la otra 
transición a la democracia de América 
Latina” [Feminisms and the other transition 
to democracy in Latin America], in 
Rebeldes Ilustradas [Enlightened rebels], 
ed. María Antonia García de León (Barce-
lona: Libros de Revista Anthropos, 2009).
11 Mayra Leciñana Blanchard, “Feminismo 
filosófico en el contexto latinoamericano: 
¿Quién habla y cómo? Subjetivación 
política y subalternidad” [Philosophical 
feminism in the Latin American context: 
Who speaks and how? Political subjec ti-
vation and subalternity], Clepsydra, no. 4 
(January 2005): 23–32. 
12 Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso and Rosario 
Castelli, “Colonialidad y dependencia en 
los estudios de género y sexualidad en 
América Latina: el caso de Argentina, 
Brasil, Uruguay y Chile” [Coloniality and 
dependence in gender and sexuality 
studies in Latin America: The case of 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile], in 
Feminismos y Poscolonialidad: 
Descolonizando el feminismo desde y en 
América latina [Feminisms and 
postcoloniality: Decolonizing feminism 
from and in Latin America], ed. Karina 
Bidaseca and Vanesa Vázquez Laba 
(Buenos Aires: Godot, 2011).
13 See Breny Mendoza, “La epistemología 
del sur, la colonialidad del género y el 
feminismo latinoamericano” [The 
epistemology of the south, the coloniality 
of gender and Latin American feminism], 
in Tejiendo de Otro Modo, 91–104.
14 Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimaräes, “El 
mito del anti-racismo en Brasil” [The myth 
of antiracism in Brazil], Nueva Sociedad, 
no. 144 (July–August 1996): 32–45.
15 There is a wide range of work that 
analyzes the mestizaje as discourse of the 
Creole elites in Latin America, including 
those written by Breny Mendoza, Mary 
Louise Pratts, and Peter Wade, among 
others.
16 Rivera Cusicanqui, Ch’ixinakax utxiwa, 19. 
Breny Mendoza, “La desmitologización del 
mestizaje en Honduras: Evaluando nuevos 
aportes” [The de-mythologization of 
miscegenation in Honduras: Evaluating 
new contributions], Revista Mesoamérica 
22, no. 42 (2001).
17 Ibid.
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here to justify white superiority and that which the Marxist thought could  
not fully theorize because of its strong commitment to the program of 
moderniza tion.
This political subject produced from a race consciousness disputed both the 
epistemic Eurocentrism and the expansive colonialist project of Europe, was  
already denounced by key authors of the mid-1930s Negritude movement, such 
as Frantz Fanon20 and Aimé Césaire.21 From there, it was possible to start think -
ing about a “difference” in regard to the European subject of emancipation in 
connection with the political program of international socialism. This differ-
ence or specificity will be thematized by black feminists who will carry out a 
work of revision of the basic premises that explain the subjugation of women 
within the patriarchy—premises that had been formulated and sustained  
by bourgeois white feminism, even the one committed to the class struggle.
For Latin American feminism, on the other hand, we have needed more time 
for voices of racialized women and feminists that are aware of racist and sexist 
oppression to appear. Furthermore, much has been needed for Latin American 
feminism as a whole to become aware of the necessity to articulate concern for 
racism. Although at the beginning of the 1990s we witnessed the birth of  
a Latin American movement of black women led by black feminists,22 many  
of which, by the way, were lesbians, such a movement has developed in direct 
challenge to the interests and sensibilities of the local mainstream feminists.
As I have pointed out in a previous paper,23 it is a fact that despite the perma-
nent consumption in Latin America of feminist theories produced in the United 
States and Europe, the critical production developed by the Third World fem-
that veil reality instead of presenting it,”16 national elites offered to nonwhite 
populations a mystifying discourse of integration while broadly whitewashing 
to turn us into the type of advanced and developed nations that would emu-
late Europe. This process of whitening has been fundamental to the formation 
of both the dominant classes and the middle class and urban -working class 
formed under the ideals of modernity. Communities of resistance were system-
atically subjected to extermination and exclusion or, if not, forced to forget 
their origin and to ascribe themselves to the modern Western ideal through the 
proposal of integrative mestizaje (the process of race mixture).17
It should be said that the predominantly bourgeois and white/mestizo origin of 
feminism in Latin America has been a given, but also has a compromised rela-
tionship with emancipatory ideals of progress, equality, individual, and sexual 
freedom.18 This has involved the production of a Eurocentric view that cannot 
observe the effects of racism as an episteme on which the Latin American lib-
eration program itself is based and our contemporary forms of our political 
and social organization. And so has been difficult for feminism in Latin America 
to admit to its complicity with the expansion of the modern colonial view,  
racism, and the racialized gender system that derives from it.
This historical particularity has differentiated us from what has occurred in 
other geopolitical contexts such as in Africa and the United States, where con-
stitutive racism was evident because of direct experiences of segregation  
and the apartheid.19 Because of this, a first contemporary movement of antiracist 
feminists in the United States had a chance to emerge from the early 1970s, 
thanks to the combination of two strong movements that appeared simultane-
ously in that decade: the feminist movement and the civil-rights movement,  
later radicalized in black nationalist movements, many of them adhering to 
Marxist analysis. It is from the experience of activism in these two movements 
and the Marxist militancy that the voices of black and women of color femi-
nists emerged in the United States.
The change that inaugurates this subaltern feminism of racialized working-class 
“women” in the United States was only possible because they managed to 
conceptualize and introduce the concept of race as a historical category that 
plays a crucial role in capitalist accumulation and expansion and that makes  
it possible to understand the oppression suffered by a large number of “women,” 
an oppression the Eurocentric feminist theory has failed to account for.
Black and women of color feminists, encouraged by the experience of separat-
ism, nationalism, and black and Chicano revolutionary militancy, imbued by 
radical and revisited Marxist theory, could effectively relate to class and race. 
This relationship created, in the subaltern subject—produced by the expan-
sion of capital and through a colonizing expansion—a racialized subject that was 
18 See Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso “El futuro 
ya fue: Una crítica a la idea del progreso 
en las narrativas de liberación sexo-
genéricas y queer identitarias en Abya 
Yala” [The future already was: A critique 
of the idea of  progress in the sex-gender 
and queer identity liberation narratives in 
Abya Yala], in Andar erótico decolonial 
[Decolonial erotic walking], ed. Raul 
Moarquech Ferrera-Balanquet (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones del Signo, 2015).
19 See Guimaräes, “El mito del anti-racismo 
en Brasil.”
20 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963).
21 See Aimé Césaire, Discourse on 
Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
22 During this period, different organizations 
of black women have emerged in the 
region, including the House of African 
Women in the Dominican Republic and the 
Latin American Network of African 
Women. 
23 Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, “Los desafíos 
de las prácticas teórico-políticas del 
feminismo latinoamericano en el contexto 
actual” [The challenges of the theoretical-
political practices of Latin American 
feminism in the current context], in Crisis 
y movimientos sociales en nuestra América: 
Cuerpos, territorios e imaginarios en 
disputa [Crisis and social movements in 
our America: Bodies, territories and 
imagery in dispute], ed. Mar Daza, 
Raphael Hoetmer, and Virginia Vargas 
Yuderkys (Lima: Programa Democracia  
y Transformación Global (PDTG), 2012).
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on the level of the state, through NGOs and the development agenda. It also  
has to do with years of work and entering communities of popular and leftist  
feminism. Part of the work of autonomous and radical feminists in Latin America 
has been to maintain and commit to what has been considered “other strug-
gles” that have taken place on the continent. 
Finally, we should affirm the influences of academic feminism in terms of its 
expansion in Latin American universities and the emergence of positive action 
programs through which indigenous and African-descendant women have 
been able to access professional studies on gender and sexuality. All of this has 
contributed to the expansion of feminist ideas and to a certain level of popu-
larization of feminist ideas and interpretations about gender oppression (or of 
women as women).
As a result of these broad anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and antiracist move-
ments in Latin America, we started to incorporate, timidly, but much more 
rapidly than we were willing to admit, a concern for the reproduction of hier-
archical relations between women and men and between genders and de-
spised sexualities and those that are seen as normative bodies, which are part 
of the communities and the movements themselves. But we should be sus-
picious of the kind of truth about “gender” that Latin American feminism con-
tinues to advance in its expansion, trying to explain it as a kind of historical 
interpretation that is defined as “a common oppression against women by the 
fact that they are women.” In spite of the attempt from different fronts of  
feminist theorization to show the deep issues of a fragmented and universalist 
conceptualization of oppression, the feminist reason in Latin America per-
sists, while moving forward, in proposing an homogenizing analysis.
Here it is important define the concept of “reason” in relation to feminism and 
the way I am conceptualizing it. I argue that there is a universal feminist reason 
that consists of a set of principles in which feminists of all times and of the most 
diverse contemporary currents in the United States as well as in Europe, Latin 
America, Asia, or Africa partake. This reason has been characterized by its com-
mitment to occidental modernity and, therefore, with coloniality being the 
hidden face of modernity.25
inist movement and in the United States, as well as the first local efforts, were 
not given particular attention by Latin American feminism as a whole. I had 
warned that “we had to wait until these contributions had been collected and 
valued by white US academics to enjoy some level of [minimal attention and]  
legitimacy in Latin America.”24 
In any case, black and women of color feminists in the United States have been 
for us, the antiracist feminists in Latin America and great theoretical-political 
reference points. Their demands and criticisms have been essential in helping 
to shape a voice of their own from subaltern gender positions. This voice in 
its full production, without overlooking of course the exposed genealogy that 
nurtured it, must, nevertheless, continue down its own path. That includes 
contributing writings from real experience as subjects of coloniality of power, 
being, and knowledge in order to form a critical support coming from the  
racialized subalterns of the world.
The experience of coloniality is not something that Anglo North American anti-
racist feminists have lived and/or theorized. This is despite the fact that they 
have been attentive to colonialism and imperialism they knew because of the 
history of enslavement and internal colonialism, as well as because of the  
experience of migration that many have experienced as Latinas in the United 
States. Antiracist feminists in Abya Yala have much to contribute to a frame-
work that effectively interprets the relationship between women’s oppression/
domination and racism. This framework that, from my point of view, is the 
analysis of coloniality and the modern colonial gender system allows us  
to deepen and improve the criticism of antiracist feminists in the United States 
and the first very much appreciated segment of antiracist feminists in Abya 
Yala. At the same time, it gives new routes to overcome the epistemological 
obstacles that the theory of intersectionality contains, which as we know is 
considered to be the fundamental contribution of the so-called black feminism.
On the Limits of a Theory Centered on Gender  
Oppression and Its Negative Implications in  
a Unified Struggle
The emergence of gender awareness is quite new in the history of broad social 
movements in Latin America. We have witnessed how, over time, feminist  
discourse in Latin America has succeeded in making an impact at the level of 
ideas in certain spaces of broad anticapitalist, popular, and ethnic-racial 
movements. This can be observed in some analyses that originate from such 
discourses and where we see a growing concern to do with sexist oppression. 
The discourse on rights by the state, achieved with difficulty, is here thanks  
to the pressures of the feminist movement and the systematic work of feminism 
24 Ibid., 217.
25 According to the characterization 
developed by Mario Blaser, I say that there 
are at least three issues that are substantive 
to the modern myth and that the feminist 
program reproduces: “The great separation 
between nature and culture, the colonial 
difference between modern and non-
modern, and a linear, unidirectional 
temporality that runs from the past to the 
future.” See Mario Blaser, Un relato de 
globalización desde el Chaco [An account 
on globalization from the Chaco] (Popayán: 
Universidad del Cauca, 2013), 24. These 
ideas are developed more closely in my 
text for the book (An)danzas de los 
feminismos descoloniales y anti­coloniales 
en Abya Yala [Endeavors of decolonial and 
anticolonial feminisms in Abya Yala], ed. 
Karina Ochoa, María Teresa Garzón, 
Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, Aura Cumes, 
and Breny Mendoza (Madrid: Akal, 2017).
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The limits of such theorization are expressed daily in Latin American feminist 
strategies—which are focused on gender, or what others calls “the feminine 
condition”—that pretends to influence all women in groups and communities 
to which they belong through social, cultural, and economic circumstances.  
As I have pointed out before,26 this assumption is productive for women who 
enjoy class and racial privileges, while benefiting from a politics that leaves 
unchanged those areas of social life in which these same women occupy  
hierarchical positions and are part of those dominant groups that have histor-
ically exercised power.27
This has direct consequences on the type of feminist politics that takes place and 
on the type of value it places on the racialized “women” of marginal urban 
and peasant communities. When they are required to overlay a gender alliance 
over class and race alliances, they do not hesitate to decide with which they 
will side. They know that choosing gender alliance proposed by feminism means 
losing, since the cost required is a willingness to abandon or to relegate histori -
cal antagonisms that define them as part of a community or as a type of people. 
Once they reach those goals that are announced as “common goals,” they  
will be left alone again to face the harsh reality of a life condemned to histori-
cal forms of institutional and state violence—conditions they face daily.
This awareness of resistance and survival as people, community, and ethnic-
racial group or class is the one that intervenes in considering the pros and cons 
of whether to call themselves feminists. These are the cautious reasons why, 
with or without a great theory that supports them, they know that feminism is 
not their place, and that while the feminist proposal can open up some questions 
regarding their own resistance and liberation, it is nevertheless not their fight. 
Once I was told by Julia Ramos, an Aymara leader of the Bartolina Sisa Confed-
eration of Bolivia, the reason for her decision not to call herself a feminist. 
She said: “I will not save myself alone.”28 This was not just about the name, but 
about the objectives of the struggle. While for the consensual feminist ideo-
logy the struggle is a gender-centered struggle and it is done “among women,” 
racialized women and feminists think and make the effort to theorize oppres-
sion in a complex, multidimensional, and defragmented way. For us it is funda-
mental that we have a common struggle with the men of the commu nity, be-
cause we know that their bodies, as much as ours, are produced by the matrix 
of oppression existing for exploitation and violence.
Such a position can still not be assimilated by the great majority of mainstream 
currents of Latin American feminists produced within the colonial matrix and 
the Eurocentric gaze. Insofar as the antiracist and decolonial thinking in the  
continent is strengthened and deepened, we encounter strong resistance 
against abandoning the centrality and productivity of gender as a dominant 
26 See Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso, “Y la una 
no se mueve sin la otra: descolonialidad, 
antiracismo y feminismo: Una trieja 
inseparable para los procesos de cambio” 
[And the one does not move without the 
other: Decoloniality, antiracism, and 
feminism; Inseparable threesome for the 
processes of change], Revista Venezolana 
de Estudios de la Mujer 21, no. 46 (2016).
27 This is what I have named gender racism, 
when it becomes the principal category of 
feminist analysis: “An impossibility of 
feminist theory to recognize its privileged 
place of enunciation within the modern 
colonial matrix of gender.” In Espinosa 
Miñoso, “Y la una no se mueve sin la otra,” 
50.
28 Julia Ramos, in discussion with the author, 
La Paz, Bolivia, 2010.
category to explain oppression. Latin American feminism today may be more 
willing to pay attention to racism and the effects of colonialism, though its 
view of racism remains superficial, particularistic, and, above all, fragmented 
and summarized. Their understanding and treatment of racism and the mod-
ern colonial capitalist world system maintain the view that the dominant cate-
gories of oppression were of a different nature and historical matrix. In the 
end, even the most well-meaning feminism continues to think of these issues 
as separate issues, as an addition to gender domination and thus less funda-
mental for women’s struggles.
As long as we are unable to change this point of view of oppression in Latin 
American feminism, it will be doomed to be the struggle of a few; what is more, 
it will be the struggle for the emancipation that will only benefit a small num-
ber of people, and not against the widening oppression of racialized subjects, 
regardless of gender.
Translated from the Spanish by Marina Gržinić
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We’re doing well. 
We found a well in the middle of the desert and we’re growing flowers.
 
They say the struggle is real but the lines are blurred — What language do we speak?
The fastest growing language in the world. 
Fitting the aesthetic of mainstream visions as they appreciate the wild, flicking 
braids for their photo and video shoots. Internalizing and mocking realities by 
channeling their very own inner diva. Don’t believe her, leave her.
Alone. She is grown. 
Ask her first. 
Ask. 
That’s all it takes. 
But. 
You narrow it down to performativity. Performing the reduction of these exquisite 
femmes to the buttocks. That ass. That big juicy ass. Oh, yes. 
Who needs them when anyone else just gotta do some squats. Boom! Booty pops.
Celebrating curvaceousness is apparently not innocent. 
And I’d like a portion of lips, but hold the racism. 
Or… She is Mother Earth. Reproduction. Nurturing. 
They are sick and tired. Her bosom raised a nation. 
You’ve had it? 
Listen, nobody wants to hear what you’re really going through sweetheart ... 
Your analysis has no place on this here dance floor. You’re a party stopper. 
You’re not representing the struggle 24/7. Chill. Relax my love ... 
You can create your own heaven right here on Earth and for what it’s worth, this 
party is deep and spiritual. 
Steer away from it all ... hollow as you are, because you’ve clenched your fist one 
too many times. Yet they’ve turned to you for your rhymes, your voice. 
Shining that light on you and now look: you’re the diva. Leave her and best 
believe her when she tells you: “I’m tired. 
As you define my being, my existence as intersectional and cannot think outside of 
your gender parties and racializing races. On your mark. Get set. 
Biological-izing all femininity and womanhood. Measuring the mix. Dividing the 
diversity. 
Classifying a class, putting us in our place. Hungry, Fat, Poor, Rich, Struggling, 
Unemployed, Hustle. 
Trace it. Trace the line. Take a ruler. Measure it. Be a ruler but hold the 
colonization. 
I ain’t on your frequency, tune in to another station.” 
A monkey in heels or a thug. She came out of prison, straight out of prison. 
That’s the only explanation for her look. She’s tattooed. Oh. Bet you didn’t know 
she sued. Yes. She sued a policeman for calling her the n-word. She’s what you 
would call fierce for all the reasons you do not know. Camera in the face of the 
displaced. Their obstacles are live, as in: Stream. You can watch them overcome 
hurdles from the comfort of wherever the heck you are. Willingly or unwillingly 
they have cameras in their faces. 
Joining my sisters and siblings on the margins as we barge into your sitting 
rooms, your computer screens, your memes, do they know what it means? 
D’you know whattamean? Who’s on your team? 
Have you got the time to listen while you type and speak the fastest growing 
language in the world? 
10 second attention span. 
Lives have become trending topics. 
They say the struggle is weak. No, weekly. 
A Diva’s Dish 
Darling and You 




We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges 
behind us. [...] Now, little ship, look out!
—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
In Isaac Julien’s film installation Western Union: Small Boats (The Leopard) 
(2007), we face the in-between in its multiple dimensions.1 Julien’s images of 
Libyan migrants, “clandestines” as they are called, who have voyaged to  
contemporary Sicily, are layered with strong visual echoes of the transatlantic 
slave trade and at the same time layered against the visuals of Palermo in 
Luchino Visconti’s 1963 film, The Leopard. What links these three historical 
phases is the topic of adaptation, the struggle to become new people, and of 
being between histories, between times, between places, between elements; 
bound up in the movements of humans, goods, and capital. An emblematic 
image of a figure looking out from the slave dungeon on the West African 
coast speaks of the possibility, at least, of the movement from darkness into 
the light, from the confinement of land to the open sea, with all of its unknown 
promises and terrors.
This is the exhilaration and warning that animates the Nietzschean epigraph 
above. The same epigraph is also one of the points of departure in Paul Gilroy’s 
foundational text The Black Atlantic,2 with its remapping of Western modernity 
from the vantage point of the Middle Passage: the instant of embarkation,  
the leaving behind the limits of the known, and those bearings that signify the 
border between land and sea. The passage speaks of terror, but also of pos-
sibility in the instant of being unmoored, of casting away, in all its ambiguities.
The frameworks I have been working with for the last few years center on  
the ocean as a space through which bodies move and are transported, on the 
technologies that enable this movement, and the shifting geographies, econo-
mies, and ecologies these movements in turn produce.3 The ocean becomes 
visible not simply as a surface, capricious, unknowable, elemental, over which 
these operations take place, but as made up of multiple historical and political 
currents and flows; of ecologies of complex media; oceans as characterized  
by depths as well surfaces, as sites constituted by sedimented layers, by spec-
tral genealogies, iconographies, and epistemologies as well as constituted  
by changing geographies, within which multiple forms of the traffic and move-
ment of labor and commodities take place. 





2 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity 
and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
3 Suvendrini Perera, Australia and the Insular 
Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and 
Bodies (New York: Palgrave, 2009). 
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Faced by the daily toll of deaths in the Mediterranean, the European Union  
recently sought to dissociate itself from the violence in which illegal migrants 
are caught by invoking a selective history of the slave trade, and to take on  
the mantle of abolitionism. In this narrative, migrants and refugees became sub-
jects the EU aspires to “rescue” from their traffickers by the use of  
military force, by “bombing the boats.”5
This EU narrative echoes the stance taken by the Australian government.  
For at least the last decade, Australia has managed to combine the rhetoric of 
“saving lives” with ever more hardline military tactics of deterrence and pun-
ishment. Implicit in Australia’s actions is the same rationale articulated by the 
European Union: that is, one that places states in the role of opposition to 
that of demonized “people smugglers” as the contemporary heirs of slavers, 
whereas, in fact, states themselves are deeply implicated with those they 
term “people smugglers.” In place of this self-serving, selective, and ahistori-
cal narrative adopted by the governments of Australia and Europe, what can  
be learned from critical genealogies of the Atlantic slave trade, focused on the 
technologies, practices, and artifacts of a traffic that, in the movements of 
empire, labor, capital, and value that it set in place, is constitutive of today’s 
geopolitical, economic, and globalized racial order? Even as we refuse to 
gloss over or ignore the specific forms of horrific violence inflicted on those 
abducted and forcibly rendered into slavery, how can we consider its con-
nection with people now impelled into flight by starvation, war, and insecurity, 
forces produced by these same logics of empire and colonization? “Choice”  
or “agency” as deployed by the group of academics who protested the EU posi-
tion are, I submit, inadequate terms in which to describe the forces that  
drive many people into desperate acts of escape. Rather, many of those now 
in flight explicitly invoke the conditions produced by these same forces of 
colonization and empire in the age of the slave trade as responsible for their 
present dislocation and dispersal.
Martina Tazzioli notes in a recent commentary in the journal Radical Philosophy 
that knowledge production about the movements of illegalized migrants  
is couched largely in the mode of enumeration—of counting (border deaths in 
Julien, whose early work focused on the African-American diaspora has more 
recently has begun to imagine voyaging across time and across place. Ten 
Thousand Waves (2010) is an immersive film installation whose starting point 
was the 2004 Morecambe Bay scandal in which twenty-three Chinese migrant 
laborers from Fujian province drowned in the rising tides as they picked cockle 
off the coast of northwest England. In Julien’s installation images of Mazu,  
the sea goddess of southern China, floats between scenes of past and present, 
threading together these historical and contemporary voyages for sur vival, an 
aspiration summed up in the phrase “better live,” with its multiple resonances— 
as in “better live than dead,” or the perennial aspiration of migrants who are in 
search of better lives. 
The installation centers on a poem that Julien commissioned from Wang Ping: 
 We know the [death] tolls … 
We know the methods: walk, swim fly, 
metal container, back of a lorry, ship’s hold 
We know how they died: starved, raped, 
dehydrated, drowned, suffocated, homesick, 
heartsick, worked to death, working to death 
We know we may end up in the same boat.4
The installation puts contemporary African and Chinese migrants who are 
looking for better lives in the same boat, locating them within the framework of 
the movement of global capital, despite their historical differences. If I return  
to Western Union, the title alludes to the disembodied mobility of capital across 
space, seemingly free of the complicated business associated with the move-
ment of bodies, in all their materiality: the intractable corporealities that must 
be squeezed into the holds of boats, stacked into the cavities of airplanes; 
their inconvenient need to inhale and exhale, and their unrelenting routines of 
ingestion and excretion; the inconvenience of bodies that are given to drown-
ing, freezing, starving, suffocating, and an infinite number of ways of not arriv-
ing, of failing to comply with the aspiration/injunction, “better live.” 
I begin with this discussion of Julien’s work to introduce the notion of the pas-
sage as a process. My interest is in the processes and the modalities of illegal 
passages or flights, and the media and technologies that enable them—what  
I have elsewhere termed “survival media.” 
4 Cited in Andrew Shiue, review of Ten 
Thousand Waves by Issac Julien, Cinevue, 
accessed June 1, 2017, http://www 
.asiancinevision.org/review-isaac-juliens 
-ten-thousand-waves/.
5 See the response to the EU statement by 
over three hundred scholars of migration 
on the site Open Democracy. See the 
letter, “Twisting the ‘Lessons of History’  
to Authorise Unjustifiable Violence:  







the Guardian tells of a woman aboard a passage across the Mediterranean beg-
ging for water for her child to drink. The captain of the boat responds to her 
plea by flinging the infant into the sea where, he said, there was plenty of water.10 
Other incidents tell of asylum seekers being dropped into the sea far from  
the coast, directed to sink or swim, or abandoned on boats without food or water 
as the crew make their escape. In the Bay of Bengal in 2015, as many as eight 
thousand Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were stranded in the bay and 
along the edges of the Indian Ocean, left to drift or die, with Thailand,  
Indonesia, and Malaysia adopting turn-back policies for boats that Australia itself 
had put in place some years ago. These covert and overt policies are directly 
implicated in the avoidable deaths and deliberate killings of refugees and ille-
gal migrants. 
As the historian Marcus Rediker writes, “The slaver is a ghost ship sailing on 
the edge of modern consciousness.”11 Such accounts have prompted a number 
of commentators to recall the case of the Zong massacre in 1781, a notorious 
incident in which slaves were thrown overboard by the crew when the ship ran 
out of drinking water on the middle passage between Accra, in what is now 
Ghana, and Jamaica. After arriving in Jamaica, the ship’s owners made an insur-
ance claim for their lost property, that is, the lives of potential slaves. The 
case became notorious and is often taken to have inspired J. M. W. Turner’s fa-
mous painting, originally known as The Slave Ship. The Zong incident repre-
sented a landmark case in which the value of slave lives as property was first 
brought before the law. 
It is against the backdrop of the Zong that Saidiya Hartman writes of the con-
temporary relationship between death, profit, and capitalism: 
Today we might describe it as collateral damage. […] Death wasn’t a goal of 
its own but just a by-product of commerce, which had the last effect  
of making negligible all the millions of lives lost. Incidental death occurs 
particular), of sorting (for example separating the “genuine refugees” from the 
bad “economic migrants”), and channeling; and through the entwined, not 
opposite, technologies of security and humanitarianism, where surveilling/ 
monitoring on the one hand and rescuing/protecting on the other operate within 
a governmentality that encompasses states, transnational bodies, and NGOs 
alike.6 Apart from such forms of knowledge-making, how might critical gene-
alogies of transportation, trafficking, the enforced and violent movement  
of bodies, and the technologies that enable them, reframe an understanding  
of contemporary refugee passages? 
In a stirring piece on the afterlife of slavery, Stephen Dillon identifies the artifacts 
of contemporary punishment and imprisonment—such as manacles, shackles, 
bars, coffles, the holding pen, the barracoon—as forms in which slavery leaves 
its marks in the present on racialized bodies. In Dillon’s words, a “necropoli-
tics of slavery haunt the biopolitics of neoliberalism” and its landscape of incar-
ceration and impoverishment of racialized populations; indeed, the logics 
and technologies of slavery “not only haunt but also possess the present.”7  
Is it possible to extend Dillon’s argument from the prisons of settler colonies in 
North America to globalized economies, and their complex relation to illegal-
ized passages and the traffic of peoples; to the drag and pull of cheap labor 
and human capital to the fringes of the global north, their imbrication in global 
orders of value and waste, war and peace, living and dying? In the techno-
logies of transport, trade, exchange, warehousing, corralling, enclosing, detain-
ing, punishing, and killing that make up today’s illegalized passages, slavery’s 
pasts seem to be reflected back as if in some submarine mirror. In such returns, 
today’s desperate migrations sound the possibilities of untapped historical 
depths, even as they track new geographies across the frontiers of the global 
north. 
While terminologies of “haunting” and “afterlife” are widely used in writings on 
slavery’s role in the present,8 critical genealogies of sea trafficking also reflect 
back on our still-unfolding understanding of the era initiated by the Atlantic 
slave trade. Michelle Wright critiques the use of “middle passage epistemo-
logies” as promoting a static understanding of today’s diasporic complexities.9 
Can thinking middle passage epistemologies in the context of contemporary 
globalized diasporas forced by war, displacement, grinding poverty, hunger, and 
impelled by global demands for labor and human capital, reflect back on our 
understandings of the former? 
Disposable Lives
In the spectral genealogies with which I began, lives are weighed in the balance 
and found disposable, valueless. A story cited in a 2015 article published in 
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Review, no. 112 (Winter 2012): 115.
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of History (Durham, NC: Duke University 
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when life has no normative value, when no humans are involved, when 
the population is in, effect, seen as already dead. Unlike the concentration 
camp, the gulag, and the killing field, which had as their intended end 
the extermination of a population, the Atlantic trade created millions of 
corpses, but as a corollory to the making of commodities. […] Death was 
simply a part of the workings of the trade.12
The lives of the cockle pickers of Morecombe Bay are part of this same pattern of 
the “workings of the trade,” disposable lives tossed in the tidal movements  
of global labor. Their unfinished passages are caught up in capital’s unpredict-
able ebbs and flows. Julien’s Ten Thousand Waves compulsively restages  
their unfinished passages in that instant between their dreams of return and 
their inundation. 
Gazing at Turner’s painting, the visual theorist Nicholas D. Mirzoeff, too, reflects 
on that instant of suspension between the living death of the slave ship and 
the moment of fleeting freedom from it: “In turbulent water, an African body 
thrown off the slave ship is suspended between life and death, between the 
beginning of enslavement and a temporary freedom. The fish, birds and the sea 
monster Typhon swarm around them. What if, I wonder, they are not eating 
but trying to support them, to keep the weighted body at the surface? These 
little fish and gulls are not flesh eaters. Those are the slavers.”13
Oceanic Ecologies
Let us end by staying in this state of suspension, the in-between of life and 
death, slavery and freedom; remaining within the incomplete passage by refer-
encing the work of an artist whose point of departure is the disposable body, 
flung into the water as worthless, excess, and without value. 
The series Watery Ecstatic by the African-American artist Ellen Gallagher draws 
on the myth or oral tradition of Drexciya, the undersea continent peopled by 
the unborn babies of slaves who were tossed or fell overboard during the 
Middle Passage. The dying women gave birth in the water, where their children 
formed a new population under the ocean’s surface, comingling with fish, 
bones, weeds, and coral. The layers of waste and sediment accumulate and spread 
out underwater to form an invisible land of the lost and drowned merpeople, 
eventually connecting all the continents under the sea. In Gallagher’s images 
of this unseen world in the depths of the ocean, a ghostly, fragile, and exquisite 
community lies hidden among seaweed, fish, coral, and other marine life.  
Gallagher enjoins us to consider movements under the surface, in the unknown 
depths, after the moment of casting out; to think about the voyage as a  
continuation of movement, not as salvage of that which was cast away as waste, 
but of the making of another order of value, as potential for something other, 
for other lives.
The myth of Drexciya reminds me of the narrative of Amal Basry, an Iraqi refugee, 
one of the few survivors of SIEV X, a boat mysteriously destroyed on its way 
to Australia. As more than three hundred of her fellow passengers drowned 
around her, Basry stayed afloat in the water for twenty-three hours, clinging to 
the body of a dead woman, fending off the sharks, speaking to the dead and 
dying, recording everything she saw, like a camera in the water. In the months 
and years after her rescue, Basry returned again and again to how she wit-
nessed three infants who died in the moment of their birth, who were being born 
and dying as their mothers drowned in the water; the infants floated in their 
death, like dead birds in the water. She was witness to the scene in the water, to 
the dead woman and the floating infant bodies, to the people she saw just  
12 Hartman, Lose Your Mother, 31.
13 Nicholas D. Mirzoeff, How to See the World 
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before the boat sank, people she witnessed writing letters to the angel of the 
ocean, which they then cast into the water, shortly before they themselves were 
cast into it. Although she survived, Basry never left this scene in the water. In 
her narrative, documented by the author Arnold Zable, she addresses her inter-
locutor: “My brother, I am not like I was before […]. I think I lost something  
in the ocean I want to go back to the ocean. I want to ask the ocean, what did 
I lose? Is there something the ocean has to tell me?”14
Against the necrogeographies that block and terminate refugee passages, 
I want to consider these as traces of oceanic ecologies in which the expendable 
bodies of the drowned and castaway interpenetrate with oceans, in all their 
complex affectivities and charged materialities, in watery “corpo-graphies,” to 
borrow Joseph Pugliese’s beautiful phrase. Refugees write letters to the an-
gels of the ocean, or entrust the waves with messages in bottles. Oceans,  
invested with these poetics of hope and survival, become custodians for refu-
gee stories and bodies, living and dead. In these fragile, watery zones of other 
lives, the ocean is not only a death zone. Through motley, evolving tactics, 
through contingent media of survival, refugees re-world the submarine, the 
seascapes, and border geographies through which they move. They fashion 
new points of transition and embarkation, sound new depths, make other 
passages.
14 Arnold Zable, Violin Lessons (Melbourne: 
Text, 2012), 148.
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In the mid-1990s, radical Right groups in Hungary established a memorial site  
to remember the so-called Tiszaeszlár affair—the first anti-Jewish trial in the late 
nineteenth century in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.1 The trial, in which Jews 
were falsely accused of the murder of a non-Jewish girl in the village of Tiszaeszlár, 
was held from 1882 to 1883 and signaled the beginning of anti- Semitism in 
the country. For proponents of early anti-Semitism, the Tiszaeszlár case became 
a symbol of the “threat” coming from Jewish immigration from the east— 
from Austrian Galicia and the Russian Empire—as well as from the recently 
emancipated local Jewish communities.2 The image of the dead girl, Eszter 
Sólymosi, was meant as “an enduring reminder for the Christian nations” of 
Europe. In the 1930s and ’40s, the Tiszaeszlár case reemerged from the margins 
of cultural memory and entered radical nationalist discourse.
Although the gravesite that was erected more than a century after the case  
is actually empty, it houses an image that has circulated from picture to picture, 
from discourse to discourse from 1882 onward. The establishment of the  
memorial site relied on a long tradition of anti-Semitic imagination, created be-
fore 1945, recreated in the national socialist exile after 1945 and transmitted  
to emerging radical Right groups after 1989. In the course of this long history, 
the image of Sólymosi transformed according to different concepts of the  
nation and the changing notions of Others.3 Nonetheless, the transformation of 
her image tells us about territorial imaginations, ethnic borders, and trans-
gressing aliens.
Setting the Scene
The oldest image depicting the girl is the reproduction of a painting, also lost 
like the body itself. It presents the figure of a girl standing in the foreground, 
barefoot, with the path under her feet leading to the scene of her death, a 
synagogue, depicted in the background. Her clothes refer to her humble birth 
and peasant parentage. The bag she carried on that fateful day indicates the 
sequence of events that led to her disappearance. In the public imagination, 
these details became iconographic signs of her. On the other hand, the simplicity 
of the painting’s style corresponded to the simple life it represented. Both  
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Speaking about Russian Jews in (Austria-)Hungary, using the term muszka  
(a slightly derogatory Hungarian term for Russian), as Istóczy did repeatedly in 
his speeches, might have had anti-Russian undertones as well. The “immi-
gration question” and the Tiszaeszlár case were addressed from the beginning 
in the context of allegations that interpreted the anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia 
as an attempt to undermine the power of the monarchy by forcing the mass im-
migration of Jews into its territories.10 Russophobic sentiments became more 
apparent in Istóczy’s later articles, published during the 1900s. Concerned about 
the emergence of pan-German and pan-Slavic ideologies, and about the  
so-called question of national minorities within the country (that is, the conse-
quences of the suppression of mostly Slavic ethnic groups), he started to  
see Hungarians (a people of non-Indo-European origin) as being isolated and 
threatened in the midst of a transnational conflict described in thoroughly  
racialized terms.11
 
The speech, which at the congress unveiled the painting, introduced a pat-
tern of emotional responses that has persisted, despite many transformations 
of the symbolic meanings attached to the image. The speech was delivered  
by Géza Ónody, a representative in the Hungarian parliament and member of 
the delegation, who read a chapter of his book Tisza-Eszlár in der Vergangenheit 
und Gegenwart (Tiszaeszlár in the past and the present) that was due to be 
published.12 In this primal scene of what would become a cult image, the speaker 
described the way the painting should be viewed, understood, and cultivated: 
the dead girl and the painting needed to be “sounded” in order to acquire 
meaning and arouse emotions: only words, only discourse, could give this im-
age the power to travel through space and time, and to create bonds be-
tween people.4 
The painting was exhibited for the first time at the international anti-Jewish 
congress held in Dresden in 1882. At the conference, where delegates from the 
Austro-Hungarian empire and Germany gathered to discuss their political pro-
gram and to establish an international movement in Europe, speakers stood be-
fore the busts of the Austrian and German emperors, the monarch of Saxony, 
and the painting of the girl.5 The manifesto of the congress, drafted by Hunga r-
ian delegate Győző Istóczy, proclaimed that for the “European nations” any 
coexistence with the Jews was impossible. “Europe,” it said, “belongs to the 
Christian people.” For many of the delegates, this entailed demanding the end-
ing of Jewish immigration from the east, the annulment of Jewish emancipa-
tion (introduced in 1867 in Austria-Hungary and in 1871 in the German empire), 
and the resettlement of Europe’s Jewish communities in non-European terri-
tories, either in Palestine (then ruled by the Ottoman Empire), at the margins of 
Eastern Europe (in the Russian empire), or in “Africa’s vast inner lands,” as 
Istóczy formulated.6
In post-emancipation Austria-Hungary and Germany, the image of the “eastern 
Jew”—or, as mostly referred to before 1900, the Polish, Russian, or Galician Jew—
already had a long history: it permeated the public debates on Jewish eman-
cipation from the beginning.7 As a product of both the non-Jewish and Jewish 
imagination, it was deeply embedded in the history of Germany’s and Austria-
Hungary’s relationship to its eastern neighbors, especially to Poland and Russia, 
and in the attitudes of the assimilated (or, at least, acculturated) Jews of Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary toward the less or not assimilated Jewry of the neigh-
boring countries—or of their own. Prejudices against Polish, Russian, or  
Galician Jews intensified at the time of the congress in Dresden and the Tisza-
eszlár case because of fear of mass migrations owing to the Russian pogroms  
of 1881 and 1882. Istóczy himself depicted the Russian pogroms as legitimate 
self-defense of the Russian people and made a reference to the Tiszaeszlár 
case, calling Russian Jews “a Tiszaeszlár sort of populace.”8 In his speeches, the 
image of Russian (or, in other cases, Galician) Jews and the Jews of Tiszaeszlár 
merged.
On the other hand, the image of the eastern Jew cannot be detached from the 
long history of changing imaginations about Slavic peoples, and the “Orient”  
of Europe. Especially in Germany, imaginations about Eastern Europe blended 
with strong anti-Slavic sentiments and, from the late nineteenth century,  
with a racialized image of Slavic people. For the anti-Semites, the Eastern Jew,  
being both Slavic and Jewish, embodied “a double danger and a double 
inferiority.”9
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as well as the Treaty of Trianon in 1920—the latter resulting in losing some 70 
percent of the country’s territory—the Kingdom of Hungary was  reestablished 
under the regency of Miklós Horthy. His regime, lasting until 1944, was found-
ed on counterrevolutionary politics, territorial revisionism, and ethnic nation-
alism. It called for the restoration of the “Christian nation,” implying the repeal 
of liberal policies that in post-1867 Hungary instituted Jewish emancipation 
and facilitated Jewish integration and progress.15 Thus, the educational bill of 
1920 ended equality for Jewish Hungarians, restricting their access to higher 
education. For the decades to come, anti-Jewish arguments and atrocities be-
came common. Similar to other European countries (both inside and outside  
of the eastern part of Central Europe), the combination of anti-communist and 
anti-Jewish racism came to be prevalent.16 The belief in a worldwide Jewish 
conspiracy offered explanations for just about everything: Jews were made re-
sponsible for losing the war, the revolutions, and the devastating territorial 
losses as well. Besides its anti-Jewish connotations, the concept of the Christian 
nation had geopolitical implications, too. It suggested that Hungary belonged 
to the “Christian West,” as opposed to the barbarian East, and reformulated 
earlier notions about Hungary being Europe’s easternmost border region  
(traditionally interpreted in relation to the Ottoman Empire). Furthermore, it  
implied that Hungary’s “natural borders” and its supremacy in the region should 
be restored so that it could fulfill its historical mission to defend Europe 
against the East—meaning, around and after 1920, mainly Soviet Russia. In  
addition, imagining Hungary as a Christian nation established a powerful culture 
of national self-understanding based on suffering and sacrifice.
In Milotay’s 1933 article, Sólymosi reawakens as a furious ghost from the past 
and as a symbol of the present: “And now, after fifty years, she rises from her 
unknown grave and, on the pages of this gruesome book, she opens her eyes 
and raises her arms, asking for our help […]. Thus she stands before us, as if 
she would be a symbol of our own innocent Self, abandoned by all.”17 For Milotay 
and other Hungarian national socialists, the image of the dead girl ceased  
to be just a “reminder” of the “Jewish threat.” Rather, it referred symbolically to 
the nation itself, imagined as an ethnic body subjected to hurt, muti lation, and 
murder. The slaughter of the innocent girl stood for the “mutilated” or “bleeding 
country,” as post-Trianon Hungary was commonly called. In Milotay’s metaphor, 
spectators should imagine the terrible death that the girl suffered at the hands 
of Jewish men, surrounded by a hostile race, left by her own people. The 
spectators should imagine that the girl in the image begins to speak, addresses 
us, calls for our help, and tells us about her agony. They should empathize 
with the mourning mother and see the girl as a daughter: it is a parental relation 
that is projected onto the image. For to defend or avenge one’s own child is 
commonly understood as a justification for violence. Being sympathetic with the 
mourning mother is thus a precondition for a mor ally justified violent response. 
Certainly, part of this emotional setting usually involves—throughout the later 
history of the image—a male subject speaking for the image and telling the story 
of Sólymosi’s death. In this emotional setting, the symbolic position of the  
patriarchal subject is open, inviting the storyteller and the viewer to fill it.
Awakening the Dead
In 1933 István Milotay, a prominent journalist and founding figure of counter-
revolutionary press in interwar Hungary, reviewed the anti-Jewish memoir  
of József Bary, an investigator in the Tiszaeszlár case, published posthumously 
that same year.13 Milotay read the memoir as a “ghastly memento” of the old, 
prewar liberal Hungary that settled masses of Jewish immigrants in the country. 
Through Jewish immigration, he writes, something “arcane, indecipherable, 
incomprehensible” appeared in the country, a “terrible foreignness” that “the 
Hungarian soul hadn’t encountered before.”14 In his reading of the memoir,  
it was “the Tiszaeszlár case that revealed the depths and horrors of this other, 
impenetrable soul.” The drama that Milotay presents arises from the encounter 
of the unsuspecting, trustful, and generous Hungarians with that terrible  
foreignness. Fallen prey to this alien force, Sólymosi embodies the innocent 
Hungarian soul. Bary, on the other hand, stands with Milotay’s ac count of the 
liberal sentiments of post-1867 official Hungary and the ruling elite. Milotay 
depicts him as a respectable, old-time nobleman, who demonstrates patience 
and emotional restraint while investigating—and later recounting—a horrible 
crime. Certainly, self-restraint and “honest and plain” style is often regarded as 
part of respectable manliness, and helps generate compassion. Moreover,  
if the patient and moderate falls—as Bary does by losing the case—it can incite 
indignation and an eruption of anger. Hence, beyond Sólymosi’s innocence,  
it is Bary’s manly self-control that should evoke emotional excess. All in all, 
reading about the Tiszaeszlár case was a lesson in the Jewish question, one that 
in interwar Hungary had to emotionally justify following the rise of anti-Jewish 
sentiments and, ultimately, the reversal of Jewish emancipation. 
By 1933 Hungary had been turned into a right-wing authoritarian state that  
rejected the liberal traditions of the late nineteenth century. Subsequent to the 
dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the leftist revolutions of 1918 and 1919,  
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would suspend class and ideological differences and a new community would 
arise.22 For him and many other Hungarian national socialists, it was this new, 
ethnically defined, manly community that post-occupation racial policies had 
to bring about.
In his article about the air raids, Marschalkó spoke about “Jewish bombs” that 
“tear and rip the bodies of our children.”23 In a second article, he accused the 
“Jewish masters of America” and the “Negro bombers” of aimed attacks on Hun-
garian children, connecting the dead children symbolically to Eszter Sólymosi.24 
In a later report, he again envisioned “child murdering, dark-skinned Negroes 
and Jewish pilots” behind the air raids.25 His articles relied on a long tradition 
of combining anti-black and anti-Jewish racism and created a composite image 
of “abnormal” masculinities, a threatening mixture of effeminate-manipulative 
and supermasculine-barbaric manhoods.26 Eszter Sólymosi’s image had thus the 
potential to evoke and combine the image of different aliens, and helped create 
a changing constellation of different racisms. In 1944 readers of Marschalkó’s 
articles could see posters on the streets of Budapest depicting women and 
children as victims of the air raids alongside the racialized images of African-
American and Soviet soldiers.
Finding a Place
In post-Socialist Hungary, with the establishment of the memorial site, the cult 
of Sólymosi received a designated, sacred place, leading to the introduction  
of annual commemorations.27 Participants in the pilgrimages to Tiszaeszlár navi-
gate through a landscape that is both real and symbolic. Certainly, the sym-
bolic geography has changed profoundly since the late nineteenth century. The 
river Tisza, flowing just outside Eszlár, originates in the northeast, in today’s 
Ukraine. For Eszlár’s location within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, this meant 
that the river connected the village directly to what was then Galicia, enabling 
readers could easily decipher the connection between the Christian blood for 
which the Jews supposedly sacrificed Sólymosi, and the image of the Christian 
nation, supposedly sacrificed by the Jewish people following the belief in a 
Jewish conspiracy. Since its reawakening in the 1930s, the image of Sólymosi 
has spoken the post-Trianon language of loss and national suffering.
Cleansing the City
Ten years later, during the war that Hungary entered in order to reclaim its ter-
ritories lost in 1920, journalist Lajos Marschalk was working on a book about 
the Tiszaeszlár case. There, he imagined an ethnic-Hungarian community 
against and without Jews: “In our defensive fight against the Jews,” he con-
cluded, “we cannot leave behind one single Hungarian […] we should hold the 
ghost hand of Eszter Sólymosi and embrace all Hungarians.”18 His book was 
launched on June 1, 1944, on the “the first National Book Day without Jewish 
writers and Jewish publishers,” as he reported.19
From March 19, 1944, following the German occupation and the establishment 
of the Sztójay government, Budapest had undergone a process of rapid racial  
restructuring. In early April that year, as a response to an Allied air raid, Jewish 
Hungarians in Budapest were ordered to leave their homes for the first time 
on a mass scale. Similar to all later stages of spatial restructuring, the order 
reflected symbolic, socioeconomic, and strategic concerns.20 The Allied bombings 
were seen as a “war against Christian Europe,” Marschalkó commented, as-
cribing American intervention to Jewish influence.21 Proclaimed as a symbolic 
“retribution” for bombing the capital, a city hitherto unaffected by the war, 
the order had to demonstrate an act of “revenge” on the “enemies within.” Simul-
taneously, it expropriated Jewish residents of the city, making their homes 
available for non-Jewish use. Furthermore, it put strategic concentration—a pre-
condition for later deportation—into motion. In the subsequent months, both 
public and residential places in the city became racially segregated. By early 
June, plans were outlined for the establishment of a “dispersed ghetto,” a system 
of about 2,600 designated houses, where Jewish residents were to be con-
centrated by the end of the month. From mid-April, ghettos were established 
throughout the country, leading, from mid-May, to the mass deportation of 
Hungarian Jews to the death camps.
In early April 1944, commenting on the Allied air raids, Marschalkó envisioned 
the city as a site of “spiritual resurrection.” The war would destroy the “alien 
Babel,” as he called Budapest, the “Jewified city,” but restore the bond among 
ethnic Hungarians. From the cellars, “holding each other’s hand […] bloody, 
but cleansed,” he wrote, a new and “indestructible community” would emerge. 
In the cellars where “there is nothing that could divide us,” ethnic belonging 
18 Lajos Marschalkó, Tiszaeszlár (Debrecen: 
Magyar Nemzeti Könyv- és Lapkiadó 
Vállalat, 1943), 214.
19 Marschalkó, “A magyar könyv napja” [The 
day of the Hungarian book], Függetlenség 
[Independence], June 1, 1944, 2.
20 For a detailed account, see Tim Cole, The 
Holocaust City (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 81–130.
21 Marschalkó, “Magyar nagypéntek”  
[The Hungarian holy Friday], Függetlenség, 
April 7, 1944, 3.
22 Marschalkó, “Magyar feltámadást!” 
[Hungarian resurrection], Függetlenség, 
April 9, 1944, 1.
23 Marschalkó, “Magyar nagypéntek,” 3.
24 Marschalkó, “A hajmási vérvád” [Ritual 
murder in Hajmás], Függetlenség, April 15, 
1944, 5.
25 Marschalkó, “A ledőlt szobor” [The fallen 
statue], Függetlenség (July 5, 1944): 3.
26 See George L. Mosse, The Image of Man 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
65–66.
27 On spatialization and performative 
practices in relation to Hungarian radical 
cultures, see Nemzet a mindennapokban 
[The nation in everyday life], ed. Margit 
Feischmidt (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2014).
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transregional communication and transit among Jewish (and non -Jewish) 
communities. Thus, around 1882, Tiszaeszlár could be symbolically located in 
unsettling proximity to a region regarded by anti-Semites as the “European 
mass depository of Jews.”28 For them, Galicia was from where the Jews flooded 
the country, and the region around Tiszaeszlár was the area most exposed  
to this influx.
The symbolic geography in which Tiszaeszlár is located today follows different 
notions of borders and ethnic landscapes. Radical Right discourse often refers 
to Tiszaeszlár as a place “close to Olaszliszka,” a village in the same region that 
was the site of the murder of a non-Roma Hungarian man in 2006 and be-
came, for the radical Right, conterminous with “gypsy crime” and “racial violence 
against Hungarians” (meaning against non-Roma).29 Locating Tiszaeszlár in re-
lation to Olaszliszka implies that the region today is associated in right-wing media 
with “racial conflicts” between the Roma and non-Roma population. Locating 
Tiszaeszlár on the symbolic map of anti-Roma discourse extends the meaning 
of the commemorations at the memorial site. At the same time, it potentially 
transforms the appearance of militant groups at the memorial site into a demon-
stration against the local (and non-local) Roma population. All the more so 
because for radical communities (Hungarian National Front, Pax Hungarica, 
Conscience 88, different branches of the Hungarian National Guard, and several 
others) commemorations at the memorial site offer a way to practice and 
publicly expose militant masculinity.
Indeed, the post-Socialist cult of Tiszaeszlár combined anti-Jewish and anti-
Roma sentiments from the beginning. In 1997, Far Right rock band Egészséges 
Fejbőr (Healthy scalp) released the song “Remember!,” which connected the 
story of Sólymosi to that of a confrontation between Roma and non-Roma 
Hungarians in 1993 in Kecskemét, another town in eastern Hungary, in which 
a young non-Roma man, a member of the radical Right community, died.30  
The band originates in the skinhead subculture of the late 1980s and came to 
be one of the hits of the more recent radical consumer culture of the 2000s 
and 2010s. “Remember!” has been frequently used at annual commemorations 
in both Tiszaeszlár and Kecskemét, connecting anti-Jewish and anti-Roma  
discourse through symbolic geography, public performances, and popular cul-
ture. Cultural products such as this song, and the associated commemoration 
rituals, indicate the central significance of anti-Roma racism for the creation  
of exclusionary (white) identities in contemporary Hungary. Since the late 1980s, 
racist discourses against Jews and Romas (and, more recently, non-European 
immigrants), have produced a constellation in which racist imaginations 
about different Others do not simply replace, but rather, reinforce each other.
28 Ónody, Tisza­Eszlar in der Vergangenheit 
und Gegenwart, 156.
29 On Olaszliszka, see Andrea Pócsik, 
“Közszolgálatiság és diskurzus”[Public 
service and discourse], Beszélő 12, no. 5 
(2007), http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek 
/kozszolgalatisag-es-diskurzus.
30 See Dániel Véri, “ A Sakterpolkától az 
Egészséges Fejbőrig: a tiszaeszlári vérvád 
zenei szubkultúrái [Polka and skinheads: 
Musical subcultures of the Tiszaeszlár 
blood libel], Múlt és Jövő, no. 1 (2016): 
81–103.
31 On ethnic landscape, see Róbert Keményfi, 
“The Notion of Ethnic Space,” Acta 
Universitatis Sapientiae, Philologica 3, no. 2 
(2011): 123–33, www.acta.sapientia.ro 
/acta-philo/C3-2/Philo32-1.pdf.
32 See for example the commemoration held 
on April 6, 2013, www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=hYGiG7CZFVg.
Pilgrimages to Tiszaeszlár end in nearby Tokaj, a wine-growing area, which figures 
as another, more traditional, element in the construction of national -ethnic 
landscape.31 It embodies age-old culture connected to the land (or territory) 
and evokes the lost grandness of premodern times. At the same time, it is  
a site for social rituals—for consuming Tokaji, telling stories about “the king of 
the wines, the wine of the kings,” and singing and reciting poems and hymns 
from the national canon. For the performers, all of these rituals mean preserv-
ing traditions, recreating the ethnic community, and reinforcing the bond 
among members of radical nationalist culture. Social drinking, talking, and 
performing in the wine cellar is a way to experience and express feelings  
of pride, pleasure, and melancholy. Furthermore, Tokaj is the site for a Trianon 
monument, first erected in 1934, demolished after 1945, and reconstructed  
in 2013. Thus, by touring the site participants of the commemoration connect 
Tiszaeszlár and Trianon both symbolically and spatially, reaffirming the his-
torical connection that ties the emergence of the cult to the post-Trianon cul-
ture of loss and melancholic national self-construction. Without the latter,  
the story of Eszter Sólymosi couldn’t evoke the image of the bleeding nation. 
That is, symbolically, participants return at the end to the “original loss.”
Commemorations in Tiszaeszlár take place on the anniversary of Sólymosi’s dis-
appearance, entering the symbolic calendar of the radical Right. Both the  
memorial site and the annual acts of remembrance evoke the voice of parental 
mourning: the epitaph on the tomb invokes the imagined voice of the mother: 
“To the memory of my dear daughter, your mother.” Similarly, speeches often 
enact parental intimacy while recalling the memory of the girl, “our little  
Eszter.”32 On the tombstone one finds a picture that resembles an old photo-
graph, a portrait showing the outlines of a head, but not the face, connoting 
“fading” in order to present the picture as the material trace of a lack, or the 
leftover of the lost object of love. If one asks with W. J. T. Mitchell “What do 
pictures want?” one could say that the image of Sólymosi—an object of love—
calls for reassuring emotional ties and repeating and reexperiencing communal 
loss.
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Of course, it asks for more. Once tied emotionally, one is committed to testify 
and tell the true story of Sólymosi’s death. The same way as her death is 
linked symbolically to the fate of the entire ethnic community, the speaker (pre-
dominantly male) is linked, by way of telling, to the authors he conjures up,  
to the (male, white) ancestors who once unearthed and passed on Sólymosi’s 
story (Istóczy and Ónody, Bary, Marschalkó, and others), establishing a tradi -
tion to rely on. Thus, the act of retelling recreates bonds that tie the speaker 
and his or her audience to an imagined community, a cultural tradition, and a 
regime of historical truth. Certainly, it summons the image of the Other and 
the phantasma of threat as well, and calls for restoring the community and de-
fending it from Others. Both the self and the Others can be seen as pro-
tagonists emerging from, inhabiting, and haunting a changing landscape of 
territorial imaginations and ethnic borders.
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Juan Guardiola: In 2014, I had the opportunity to curate the exhibition “Colonia 
Apócrifa: Imágenes de la colonialidad en España” (“Apocryphal Colony:  
Images of Coloniality in Spain”) for the Museum of Contemporary Art of Castilla y 
León (MUSAC).1 This exhibition attempted to question the meaning, pro-
duction and diffusion of colonial images in the history of Spanish art from the 
fifteenth century to the present day. One of the works produced specifically 
for this exhibition was your work, C.A.S.I.T.A., titled Vallas de la frontera  
en Ceuta y Melilla 1985–2014 (Infografías) (Fences at the Border in Ceuta and 
Melilla 1985–2014 [Infographics]). This work appropriates a set of existing 
prints and facsimiles from the workshops of the Spanish Army Geographical 
Service, to intervene in them with printed images. How was the work born 
and what was the production process like?
C.A.S.I.T.A: This work arises from the need to address the problems crys-
talized in the strait (of Gibraltar) between Spain and Morocco. Concretely, 
the work identifies the fences at Ceuta and Melilla as crucial elements 
that solidify many of the political, social, and cultural layers that are cur-
rently in place in the geopolitical plans for the strait.
On one hand, 1985 is the year Spain entered the European Union (EU) 
and marks the beginning of a gradual process of social and economic 
transformation for the country as well as for its borders, which gradually 
became more highly protected places, as they became the EU’s first  
line of protection, losing their local character and becoming an EU interest. 
The strait is undoubtedly one of the key entrances to the EU from North 
Africa. Control and security measures have gradually and substantially in-
creased from 1985 to the present day. 
On the other hand, 2014—the year the work was produced—was  
also one of the most conflictive years, with tensions growing between 
migrants and the police in several states. Also that year, owing to the lack 
of application of the most basic of human rights, some of the most re-
grettable photographs from around the world emerged of police violently 
stopping the entry of migrants who had tried to jump a high double fence 
between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In  
doing so, the police violated the basic principles of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, because they mistreated or injured migrants when they have 
managed to climb the highest part of the fence. The police forces tried 
to prevent them from reaching Spanish soil.
The fence at Ceuta is an eight-kilometer physical barrier that separates 
the autonomous city of Ceuta and the neutral zone that separates Spain 
and Morocco. Similar conditions can be found at the fifteen-kilometer 
Diffractions  
at Borders
C.A.S.I.T.A. (Loreto Alonso, Eduardo Galvagni, Diego del Pozo 
Barriuso) in Conversation with Juan Guardiola
1 See http://musac.es/#exposiciones/expo 
/?id=6240&from=buscador*colonia 
_._apocrifa.
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Since the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM) policy in 2005 by the EU, border “management” and “security” activi-
ties have moved to territories far from conventional state boundaries. What  
is officially termed the “external dimension” of European border policy is actu-
ally a process of border stretching by way of border “fractalization.” In this 
way, the Mediterranean has ceased to be the natural border, which has been 
moved to the south of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. In other 
words, the border of the European Union has been outsourced to thousands 
of kilometers to the south of the strait. This strategy of control is also re-
flected in your prints. What strategies of representation operate in your work?
C.A.S.I.T.A: We use a series of prints in our work originating from reproduc-
tions of those in the workshops of the Spanish Army Geographical  
Service, which anyone can buy. The prints are panoramic views of maps 
from the Spanish Army’s atlas of the 1959–60 Spanish-Moroccan War 
(known as La Guerra de Africa in Spanish). We intervene with printed  
images, superimposing infographic images of the fences currently found 
at Ceuta and Melilla, which separate Spanish territory from the Moroccan 
one. We try, in the work, to generate different levels of complexity with 
the representation. 
At the moment, when we appropriate the series of nineteenth-century 
Spanish Army facsimile prints, we are pointing to a very concrete repre-
sentational paradigm. The panoramic depictions of war that were created 
through prints at that time were realistic—images understood to be ob-
jective—while charged with the aesthetically romantic thought of their 
recent past, which contributed greatly to reinforce the epic, the saga, and 
the heroic nature of nation-states in armed conflict at that time. With  
the history painting and its print versions, there comes a time when new 
nationalisms, those that will set the political agendas of the twentieth 
century and new colonial cycles, are exalted and shaped. These printed 
images are deceptive as they are intended to provide objectivity through 
realism as a witness to the veracity of the history of those who have  
written that history as victors. According to Walter Benjamin, only historians 
capable of inspiring hope are those who are “firmly convinced that even 
the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has 
not ceased to be victorious.”2
As such, they are images that idealize their imperialist rhetoric. 
Through these images, romanticism seeks to convey a de-ideologized 
depiction of the events surrounding the Spanish–Moroccan War, natural-
izing the victors’ version. The elegance of the line of the lithographic 
technique, the beauty of the panoramas of the chosen landscapes, the 
fence at Melilla. The Ceuta border fence consists of two parallel six-meter 
fences topped with barbed wire, with regular watch posts and a road 
running between them to accommodate police patrols or ambulance ser-
vices if needed on the Spanish side, and there is a third two-meter-high 
fence on the Moroccan side. The fences contain extremely dangerous 
devices: concertina wire, blades, hawthorn wire, sharp cables, and special 
wire mesh to make it even harder for migrants to scale the fence. The 
fences are also equipped with high-intensity lights, surveillance camcorders, 
night vision equipment, underground cables that connect a network of 
electronic noise, and motion sensors. From 2008 to 2014 alone, the Spanish 
government, with EU support, spent more than seventy- two million euros 
to build, fortify, and maintain the fences of Ceuta and Melilla, incorporating 
all kinds of elements that cause injuries to those trying to jump to the 
Spanish side. To this amount, we must also add the millions of euros  
invested in previous decades. Providing this data seems important to  
us as it gives us a materiality that is very determinant of and contradictory 
to the positive, honorable, intangible, symbolic rhetoric of production 
generated around what the EU means and its values and standards of life. 
We used the EU’s corporate blue and yellow colors to create the info-
graphic drawings of the fences in the piece to cause a shift in the use of 
EU symbols and highlight the most obscure policies, which contradict 
the values proclaimed by various EU treaties.
 
JG: In 1985, Spain and Portugal signed the European Economic Community 
Accession Treaty as a result of them joining the EEC, the predecessor of the 
EU, and the need arose to draw up laws on the transit of non-EU citizens. 
Spain has traditionally been a country of emigration and legislation output has 
focused on this area. The Organic Law of 1985 was the first attempt to re gu-
late emigration, but it was strongly criticized for its police-style treatment of 
the migratory phenomenon. The deficiencies of this law were subject to ap-
peal based on unconstitutionality, and the transformation of migration in the 
late 1980s and 1990s revealed the need to draft a new law adapted to the 
new circumstances. Current immigration law known as the Ley Orgánica of 
2000, amended in 2003 and 2009, on “Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in 
Spain and their Social Integration,” is the Spanish rule that regulates the  
entry and stay of non-EU citizens in Spanish territory, as well as the rights and 
freedoms that are recognized. The new law introduced integration policies, 
expanded the rights of migrants, and established a prin ciple of equality with 
Spanish citizens. 
The law was passed by all parliamentary parties except the Peoples’ 
Party, which argued this would effectively mean a “call” resulting in a massive 
influx of migrants. The Peoples’ Party won the following general elections  
by a majority and amended the law significantly, in many cases going back to 
the solutions of the 1985 law, which is why it is truly considered a counter - 
reform. 
2 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, 
ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 255.
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crossings, police stations, or foreign national detention centers. At the 
same time, they are spaces of prevention and testing for all the logics on 
control and surveillance that must keep the EU shielded from “infection” 
and “invasion” (using certain conservative rhetoric). During the production 
process of the work, we did a lot of research on different systems and new 
technologies—some using satellites being developed to view the earth—
and on borders and hotspots of conflict. Infrared shooting techniques 
provide us with images of migrants walking through the desert toward the 
fences at Ceuta and Melilla. The migrants look almost like tiny cells, small 
moving dots that are almost impossible to identify as people, as human 
beings. This is precisely one of the effects produced by these images: the 
migrants’ identity is erased, leading to indifference and lack of empathy  
by those who are monitoring them. We are witness to processes, which 
make these facts and bodies abstract.3 
If certain images from a specific type of war photojournalism have 
contributed to the victimization of the people represented and the  
processes of desensitization of the population due to overuse and satura-
tion, then infrared photographs or infographics accelerate the lack of 
empathy with the reality produced in the places they record or intend to 
represent. These images and representational methods have the effect  
of diffracting what physically happens to the bodies trying to cross the 
border. Therefore, pointing out, interpreting and subverting, with our 
work of art, how these instruments of reality production operate through 
these types of images, as well as how new acquisition and visualization 
technologies would be appropriate. With the work, we have created a 
place in which intersecting perspectives of times and contexts, separated 
by more than one hundred years, offer us an architecture of impossible, 
ghostly landscapes with aberrant perspectives of terrible events. We’ve 
gotten used to these methods of reality production through images since 
the first war in Iraq, where we saw the green night-vision images of the 
first bombing for the first time on February 21, 1991. These images gave 
credibility to discourses that present civilian casualties as “collateral dam-
ages” resulting from the “surgical bombing” of chemical weapons facto-
ries or depots on the basis of the putative accuracy of these same images, 
thereby reducing among Western populations any solidarity with the  
victims of the catastrophes generated by such acts of war.4
In the nineteenth century, tents erected by soldiers of both armies 
subtleties of the vegetation on the hills and mountains, and the gray and 
black qualities of the sea on coasts near the battlefields hide the brutality 
of the violence suffered by those who lived through the war and the  
culture imposed upon them. Today something similar occurs with the info-
graphics spread by the police and the media about the surveillance and 
control equipment, which form part of the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. 
These infographics are also considered objective images, however, while 
simultaneously harmless or neutral, the infographic technique eliminates 
the footprints of the events, the wounds, and the suffering of migrants 
jumping the fences. Infographics merely represent, technically, the types 
of materials, measurements, angles of inclination, and the wonder of 
construction engineering in an attempt to fascinate the viewer from a 
technological perspective, through a representation of rationality, clarity, 
and accuracy. Thus, both the historical prints of the nineteenth century 
and the infographics of our day—supposedly objective representational 
systems—are completely void of empathy and conceal and justify state 
violence, violence exercised by the EU.
The fences at Ceuta and Melilla are architectural models of neoliberal 
exclusion, control and surveillance. As spatial and functional models, 
they are test prototypes on the processes of segregation of certain bodies, 
subjects. They can then be replicated in other spaces and in other con-
texts, with other scales and functions, such as airports, customs, border 
Diffractions at Borders C.A.S.I.T.A. in Conversation with Juan Guardiola
Fig. 16
C.A.S.I.T.A., Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 1985–2014 (Infographics), 2014
3 To see the video of infrared images from 
the Spanish military police taken close to 





4 See “CNN ganó el respeto del mundo tras 
la Guerra del GolfoExpansión,” YouTube 
video, 4:57 min., posted by “Expansión,” 
June 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=k52Z4Sl7w_o.
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Spain joined this colonial movement in 1859 when it declared war on 
the sultanate of Morocco. From 1860, the Atlas of the War of Africa was pub-
lished regularly in order to make the Spanish public aware of the peninsular 
armed forces’ military activities. At the same time, the publication of maps 
and plans of the occupied and besieged areas allowed Spanish citizens  
to become familiar with a totally unknown territory and topography. The first 
war took place in Castillejos and shortly thereafter, following the battle of 
Tetuán (March 23, 1860), the end of the war was declared. Borders in your 
“post-prints” are situated in a no-man’s-land between the previous limits of the 
Spanish protectorate in Morocco and the present ones located in the autono-
mous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and they cause us to reflect on our history. 
History is a social science whose object is the study and interpretation of  
humanity’s past. As a product of a subjective narrative, history can generate a 
true or fictional account depending on the writer’s own interests. On the  
other hand, historical facts are often interpreted, distorted, and reoriented 
according to the historical period in which they are narrated. The history of 
Spain is not alien to this process of construction, and one prime example can 
be found in a unique, historical event within the context of Spanish 
colonialism. 
In 1859 the Spanish–Moroccan War took place between the kingdom of 
Spain and the sultanate of Morocco, and was the consequence of nineteenth- 
century Western colonialism. The violence toward the neighboring territory— 
promoted by Spanish military officers in Africa to cause suffering to the civilian 
population, which continued during the Rif War, and culminated in the estab-
lishment, by force, of the Spanish protectorate over Morocco—was the seed 
that gave rise to the use of indigenous regular forces by the troops that revolted 
during the Spanish Civil War; and which continues today with the occupa-
tion of the Sahara after an unsuccessful process of decolonization. This story 
of violence comes up time and time again like the contemporary infographics 
on the nineteenth-century prints of Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 
1985–2014 (Infographics). What other elements can we find in your method 
of superimposing images?
C.A.S.I.T.A: As we previously explained, all representational methods that 
we use in the work do indeed involve the identification and, above all, 
the overlap, of different times, spaces, representational techniques, sym-
bolic fictions, aberrations of perspectives, and landscapes. But there is 
another superimposition—the name of our collective and the names of  
its members over another name, that of the Spanish Army Geographical 
are reminiscent of the rickety shops and structures used by migrants in the 
Moroccan territory, which are close to the fences at Ceuta and Melilla, 
where people congregate, waiting for the best moment to jump the fences.5
Through the work we also identify the nineteenth-century colonial  
occupation and armed conflict between Spain and Morocco—involving 
another war—which the media and the EU never defined as such and that 
continues between the EU police forces and migrants so as to prevent 
their entering the EU territory. The British National Front (NF), for example, 
speaks of the “soft or light touch” treatment of migrants or those apply -
ing for political asylum in the United Kingdom.6 Sara Ahmed carried out a 
study on hatred and hate policies. Although she understands there is  
a clear difference between fascism and neoliberalism, she calls on us to 
recognize that deep down the difference between both is not absolute 
because of the changes in the immigration policies of EU nations that have 
been taking place in recent decades. That the British government has 
turned the narrative of “soft or light touch” into a rule is evidence of this, 
as the hardening of asylum policies has been justified on the grounds 
that Britain cannot be “soft,” since this would call into question its own 
strength as a state. 
Thus, in reference to Ahmed, we can state that the UK has ended 
up giving credit to the NF as it tries to prevent “others” from attempting 
and finally entering European nations to have a life with “easy comforts” 
and to prevent in essence that the body of the nation be a feminized 
body “penetrated or invaded by others,” following rhetoric of the NF. The 
changes made on immigration policies in 2015 by David Cameron’s govern-
ment confirm that these rules will become harsher, with reductions on 
the time migrants may receive unemployment benefits or increased  
restrictions, which would allow for migrants to study in the UK based on 
income levels. In this regard, we must also add to this the uncertainty 
that has arisen from Brexit. In other EU states, these types of policies are 
also spreading or their application is being seriously investigated.
JG: Since the creation of the Spanish nation-state in 1492, the border between 
Spain and Morocco has experienced many changes. After the “reconquest,” 
the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon established a series of military settlements 
in the North Africa intended to be the first line of defense and to provide 
support against the attacks of Berber pirates. The enclaves of Ceuta and  
Melilla date back to this period (1415 and 1497, respectively) and they have re-
tained the same status until the present time, which currently makes them the 
only EU territories on the African continent. During the nineteenth century, 
Euro pean nations began to colonize Africa, a process that culminated in the 
Berlin Conference of 1884–85. The Berlin Conference, which regulated Euro-
pean colonization and trade in Africa, is usually referred to as the starting 
point of the scramble for Africa.
Diffractions at Borders C.A.S.I.T.A. in Conversation with Juan Guardiola
5 The way the film Les sauteurs [Those who 
jump] by Moritz Siebert, Estephan Wagner, 
and Abou Bakar Sidibé (Denmark, 2016) 
addresses the topic is quite interesting.
6 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004), 2.
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putting ourselves in their skin, assuming their logic, and going beyond that 
which has traditionally been recognized as human.
In the work Fences at the Border in Ceuta and Melilla 1985–2014  
(Infographics), we want to examine these complex structures for access 
to production and the systems of representation and legislation that  
dictate who are “dispensable” and who are allowed “to earn a living.”9
JG: In my opinion, your work reflects on concepts such as internal colonialism, 
sovereignty, and migration through a critical reading of Spanish immigration 
law. In contrast to dictatorships or absolute monarchies, sovereignty in a  
democracy resides in the civilian population. Democracy today, however, far 
from being participatory, has become a system of power distanced from  
citizens. Social citizenship is the status granted to full members of a commu-
nity, that is, the set of civil, political, social, cultural, and other rights derived 
from there that society attributes to its citizens. This right or juridical status 
entails a differential, exclusionary dimension, as it constitutes a privilege not 
afforded to anybody outside the community. This is one of the paradoxes  
of the concept of citizenship that, while representing integration and equality, 
also implies inequality, especially in the case of refugees—(non)citizens 
without rights—which colonialism has generated. An increase in the migrant 
population has brought economic growth, improved individual wealth,  
provided the labor market with more flexibility, reduced the rate of structural 
unemployment, maintained demography, and contributed to the surplus  
in public treasury (according to a report from the Spanish Government’s Eco-
nomic Office). Despite all these benefits, the regularization process for  
migrants continues to be just as precarious, long, and confusing, with queues 
outdoors under subhuman conditions that undermine the dignity of the  
person. This same wait ing scenario can be seen in relation to the hundreds 
of migrants who, in their attempt to enter to live in Europe, are detained and 
held in foreign national detention centers until their probable deportation. 
No crime has to be committed: simply not having one’s residence card in order 
is enough to be locked up in the centers. For this reason, detention centers  
Service, the institution that holds the rights to reproduce the facsimile 
prints we have used. Like most contemporary artists, we never explicitly 
sign the works we make—on the media or material elements—except  
on this one occasion. In fact, anyone who knows our history knows that as 
an art collective, although we also work as individual artists, we have 
spent a lot of time working on the possibilities of blurred authorship in con-
trast to artistic individuality to generate collaborative cultural-creation 
and production methodologies. Thus, the gesture of superimposing our 
names over the Spanish Army is another allusion to the need we have  
to open and explore ways of working, producing, and living together 
with collaborative systems. We believe that the future lies in these critical 
collaborative productive methodologies. In a way, this act also advocates 
the necessity in and the importance of being involved as citizens in the 
rereadings of official history and public institutions in a highly critical 
moment of crisis for a system that, for the majority, is becoming more 
and more unjust. 
Through the work, we also recognize a key concept in our previous 
works, that is, transparency. The infographic drawings allow us to see the 
panoramas of the nineteenth-century prints thanks to a grid of lines and, 
above all, transparent spaces. Transparency allows us to represent this in-
tangible presence that can be sensed but not seen clearly. It is that form  
of the structure of power—which does not allow itself to be identified  
and appears in the guise of other dialogues— that tries to blend in with the 
landscape, to camouflage itself with an idyllic past; transparency is a 
strategy, a form, an image. 
The relationship between transparency and control regimes has been 
a key concept in our work since 2006 when we started the project Ganarse 
la Vida: El Ente Transparente (Earning a living: The transparent entity),7 
where we reflected on how the conditions of the recent shift in the model 
of productivity—with the incorporation of the immaterial capitalist uni-
verse into the Fordist world of material production—accentuate the discom-
fort of both the social body and individual bodies and their subjective 
possibilities. We approach the concept of work in a broad context of pro-
duction that involves not only the workplace but also entertainment,  
culture, art, sociopolitical phenomena, and subjective conditions. We iden-
tify the consequences of work methods in a neoliberal regime with a 
transparent entity, an entity that we perceive mainly for its effects, but is 
difficult to identify, place, or limit as an object.8 This invisible entity 
tends to condition the totality of our time and space, traversing most of 
our experiences, aspirations, and discomforts. 
In one of our last productions Asamblea de Máquinas (Assembly of 
machines) which was produced for ARTBO in Bogota, Colombia, in 2015, 
we examine the subject of economic, political, and subjective production, 
from the perspective of appliances, technological devices, and machines, 
Diffractions at Borders C.A.S.I.T.A. in Conversation with Juan Guardiola
7 See documentation from the project on 
C.A.S.I.T.A.’s website: http://www.ganarse 
lavida.net/ganarseLavida/ELPROYECTO 
_en.html. 
8 The transparent entity also represents the 
spirit of the surplus, of the excess, of  
what has been wasted nowadays. It has to 
do with Georges Bataille’s notion of 
excess, of the capitalist system’s 
programmed necessity for constant profit, 
with the Marxist notion of added value, 
both concepts being typical of the 
societies of control, which, since defined 
by Gilles Deleuze, have given rise to a 
large body of literature on the contemporary 
forms of power and the development of a 
certain understanding of labor. See http://
www.ganarselavida.net/ganarseLavida 
/ELENTE_en.html.
9 We find the meaning that Michel Feher 
gives to the word “dispensable” quite 
appropriate, in that it refers to subjects 
that aren’t allowed to have a social 
existence. See Michel Feher, Yates McKee, 
and Gaëlle Krikorian, eds., Nongovern­
mental Politics (New York: Zone Books, 
2007). See also https://vimeo.com 
/80882516. 
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are not exactly prisons, but something quite different. The media and human-
itarian organizations have exposed how these places are governed by laws 
from outside of the states in which they operate, and that these places oper-
ate with total opacity, systematically violating the fundamental rights of  
the individual.
Translated from the Spanish by Raymond Kuh
Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004.
Benjamin, Walter. “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History.” In Illuminations, 
edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by 
Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 
1968.
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The project Politics of Fear intends to give a critical analysis of the repeated use 
of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim slogans that expose existing fear of and  
discriminatory structures toward people with Muslim backgrounds. The project 
recontextualizes this content by shifting its meaning from a national to trans-
national right-wing and extreme right-wing contexts.
The work presents campaign posters used by different Far Right political par-
ties in Europe such as: the National Front (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Dawn—
National Coalition (Czech Republic), National Democracy (Spain), Freedom 
Party of Austria, Pro NRW (Germany), National Democratic Party of Germany, 
Swiss People’s Party, and Vlaams Belang (Belgium).
Politics of Fear is part of an ongoing research project dealing with the topic of 
cultural racism. The project focuses on this interaction of elements such as 
culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, and identity in Islamophobic discourse.
Fig. 17 
Neda Hosseinyar,  
Politics of Fear,  
2015–ongoing
1) National Democracy (Spain): Behave or Get Out! Against the High Rates of Foreign Crime
2)  Swiss People’s Party: Maria Instead of Sharia!
3)  Spain 2000: No to the Mosque
4)  The National Democratic Party of Germany: We Clean Up!
5)  Pro NRW (Germany): Against Islamization and Alienation!
6)  Dawn—National Coalition (Czech Republic): Support for Families: Not for deviant families! Give 
Work to Our People Not to Migrants









Taking into account the genealogy of global changes that have led to the current 
mass migrations, commonly known as the “refugee crises,” I will look at the 
process of dehumanization and desubjectivization that precede the mechanisms 
of subjugation and of othering. I intend to analyze the technologies of control 
participating in such process in the context of Europe today and beyond  
in order to address the questions: What is the human? Who creates borders?
Who decides whom should live and whom must die? Contesting the “post- 
human hype,” I will question the new subjectivities and embodied politics that 
could emerge under the above-mentioned conditions. Within the discursive 
framework of biopolitics and necropolitics, as well as concepts of performativ-
ity, I will examine the potential and the political and revolutionary possibilities 
of liminal bodies, liminal spaces, and new radical subjectivities created by 
these reconfigurations in, as Gilles Deleuze phrases it, a “society of control,”1 
addressing the manifestations and representations of the body and the corpo-
real as sociocultural, political, psychological, physiological, and virtual entities. 
Who Is the Human?
To understand the newly established power relations implied by the above-
mentioned shifts and changes, we need to critically reexamine the question of 
the human, especially in relation to the actual “post-humanist” discourse that 
seems to abandon humanity as a category of the past. At the beginning of her 
book The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti declares: “Not all of us can say, with any  
degree of certainty, that we have always been human, or that we are only that. 
Some of us are not even considered fully human now, let alone at previous 
moments of Western social, political and scientific history. Not if by ‘human’ we 
mean that creature familiar to us from the Enlightenment and its legacy.”2
 
However, I would argue here that it is precisely the colonial construction of 
the notion of human that stays problematic in a large portion of post-humanist 
discourses. While it claims to overcome the anthropocentric positions of the 
old humanities, the post-humanist position often lacks a clear relation to onto-
historical formations in doing so. It is crucial to understand that the human is 
not some kind of a homogenous block that can be just overcome with a theoret-
ical paradigm shift. Therefore, I find it necessary to introduce a decolonial 
perspective into this debate as well as the shift from biopolitics to necropolitics 
to question who has the position and the privilege to proclaim the human as 
obsolete and what are the politics that are revealed in such a theoretical and 






1 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies 
of Control,” October, no. 59 (1992): 3–7.
2 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 1.
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This becomes quite evident in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers  
at EU borders, or as put forward by Marina Gržinić: “The new proposed measures 
to control the external borders of the Schengen agreement may be seen as 
those lines of division that will regulate the process and politics of death. Those 
who will be stopped at the EU frontier are already the living dead: those who 
have nothing to lose, not even life. The EU’s improved and coordinated immigra-
tion policy is obsolete, as it is nothing more than a policy enabling the setting  
up of a system to select, reject, and ultimately kill.”5 
The sharp cut between those who can choose to be post-human and those who 
are, on the contrary, considered subhuman becomes brutally obvious in this  
situation. The privileged biopolitical human of the first world can proclaim the 
post-human condition and declare the situation in which all matter equally 
matters, but the same regime does not work for the whole world. On the con-
trary, the necropolitical human can be treated as already a living dead be-
cause it has been brought to the level of a subhuman—the one who is not human 
enough. It is precisely through these processes, which are grounded in racial-
ization, that dehumanization is being enforced. The technologies of control by 
which they are enforced, regulated, and maintained are present on every  
possible level of existence in the form of governmentality that Deleuze calls a 
society of control.
Following Deleuze we can trace the passage from Michel Foucault’s disci-
plinary society to the society of control in terms of the dealing with the mass/ 
individual pair.6 According to Deleuze, disciplinary society didn’t see any incom-
patibility between these two poles and operated by recognizing an individual  
as a singular entity and an administrative numeration that designates her  
position in the mass. As Deleuze further explains, the governmental structure 
in disciplinary society constitutes those over whom it exercises power into  
a body (masses them together) and at the same time gives shape to each 
member of that body (individualizes them).7 On the contrary, in a society of 
control the administrative numeration is no longer at stake, but what we  
have instead is the more complex conception of a code, which leads to further  
uncoupling of the mass/individual pair and recognition of individuals as  
“dividuals.” As stated by Deleuze: 
We can make the analogy with decolonial position that states, as argued by 
Aníbal Quijano, that the darker side of modernity is the colonial matrix of power 
and say that the darker side of post-humanism is de-humanization.3 To under-
stand how these processes function, I will here briefly address the shift from 
biopolitics to necropolitics. Necropolitics was conceptualized by Achille 
Mbembe in 2003 in order to define the transformations of the regulation of life 
within the extreme conditions of the war machine produced by contemporary 
capitalism. The term “necropolitics” emphasizes the governmentality of death. 
According to Mbembe, because of the war machine and the state of excep-
tion, biopolitics as one of the major logics of contemporary societies is no longer 
a sufficient way to explain current forms of governmentality and power. Unlike 
biopolitics that governs from the perspective of the production and regulation 
of life, necropolitics regulates life from the perspective of a production and 
regulation of death.
Necropolitics, therefore, refers to life reduced to its bare existence; in other 
words, to life at the verge of death. The form of capitalism that was established 
under such a process and condition is the necrocapitalism. Necrocapitalism 
presents contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involves dis-
possession and subjugation of life to the power of death. According to Mbembe, 
necropolitics as a contemporary form of subjugation of life to the power of 
death essentially reconfigures the relations between the resistance, the victim, 
and the terror. Necropower as a form of governmentality goes one step further 
from biopower: “Technologies of destruction have become more tactile, more 
anatomical and sensorial, in a context in which the choice is between life  
and death. If power still depends on tight control over bodies (or on concen-
trating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned 
with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them,  
when the time comes, within the order of the maximal economy now repre-
sented by the ‘massacre.’”4
The age of necropolitics is characterized by production and localization of 
the death-worlds where whole populations are brought to the life under the con-
dition of death and whole societies are reduced to the status of the living 
dead. Necrocapitalism and necroeconomy produce and exploit this form of life 
on the verge of death. Although Mbembe articulated this concept to explain 
the process in the context of the third world, necropolitics today also operates 
within the context of the first capitalist world. These relations are important  
to understand because they define the social, political, and economic reality 
of neoliberal global capitalism. In the first capitalist world, there is a life with  
a style (biopolitics), and outside of the first world, the process of necropolitics 
is happening, and death is the major regulator of life. However, it is crucial  
to understand that biopolitics and necropolitics are not separate processes, but 
quite the contrary: they are connected and together explain the complex 
power relations today. 
(Dis)embodied Subjectivities and Technologies of Control Aneta Stojnić
3 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/ 
Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21, nos. 2–3 
(2007): 168.
4 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,”  
Public Culture 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 24, 
doi: 10.1215/08992363-15-1-11.
5 Marina Gržinić, “Necropolitics and Global 
Capitalism,” in The Crisis in the Humanities, 
ed. Žarko Cvejić, Andrija Filipović, and 
Ana Petrov (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 39.
6 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
7 Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 5.
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certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks 
each person’s position—licit or illicit—and effects a universal modulation.10
What About the Subject?
The processes discussed above are directly connected to questions of subject 
and subjectivity. Therefore, I will here take a detour to analyze why it is nec-
essary to precisely go back to this question (what about the subject?). I will 
consider the concept of a subject in terms of shifting the source of meaning 
from the individual to the structures, processes, and ideologies, meaning that 
the individual is not the source but the product of those structures. 
I will deal, therefore, with the government of one’s self (subjectivation) and with 
the government  of others (subjectification). Subjectivation and subjection 
are distinguished technologies of domination of the self and of technologies 
of self. I find it important to emphasize the link between subjectivation and 
subjectification, or of their relation to the actual reality, as it is not a matter of 
some kind of abstract meta-theoretical philosophical problem but the ques-
tion of real historical circumstances. Therefore, I believe that from the question 
“What is the subject?” it is necessary to make a shift toward the question 
“Which subject?” Philosophically, the question “What is?” implies one unified 
answer, while the question “Which?” implies a multiplicity of possible meanings 
that need to be actively analyzed and interpreted.11 
Julia Kristeva uses the phrase “subject in process” (sujet en procès) to suggest 
the tension between a subject as a passive (subjected to) and an active  
(subject that acts). In other words, the subject in process is both included in 
the process and produced by it. We can similarly observe what is proposed by 
Jacques Lacan when he makes a clear distinction between the subject and 
the ego. The ego is a product of the mirror stage and as such belongs to the 
registry of the imaginary, while the true subject of the human behavior is  
the unconscious.12 The entry of the subject into the symbolic order (i.e., the  
moment when it falls under the law of language) leads to subject splitting.
If the subject is located in the unconscious, then there is always a difference 
between the “I” that utters and the “I” behind the uttered message. In other 
The code is a password, while on the other hand disciplinary societies 
are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration 
as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made  
of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find 
ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become 
“dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks.” Perhaps  
it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, 
since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold  
as numerical standard, while control relates to floating rates of exchange, 
modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies.8
 
This transition toward data banks is crucial in understanding how the contempo-
rary digital modes of control operate on the level of dehumanization. I would  
argue that the individual is being transformed into the dividual and dehumanized 
in a twofold process. On the one hand we have the body that is being inscribed 
into the digital regimes of control (divided and translated into multiple data), 
while on the other hand the digital is being inscribed into the body. As argued in 
Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos’s text “Erase Them! Eurodac and Digital  
Deportability,” when refugees are fingerprinted at the borders of fortress EU, 
their bodies are immobilized because of the speed of this digital information, 
which is at once, in a matter of seconds, sent to all the border crossings inside 
Europe: “Digital deportability is the result of the permeability of Europe’s  
borders, making deportation at any given moment a constant threat within the 
slick space of the data flow. It is not the migrants themselves who circulate 
here, but rather the ‘embodied identity of migration,’ as the sum of their ‘data 
doubles.’”9
In other words, by translating a dividual body into digital data (via fingerprints) 
the border is digitally inscribed into the body. The body is thus forced to  
carry the border in itself and is prevented from free movement. This presents 
a specific form of digital dehumanization that is being performed by an al-
gorithm and imposed through a violent and oppressive process that is masked 
and normalized as regulative of data collection in a society that has already 
been made compliant under such regulations by earlier disciplinary procedures. 
We can understand this as yet another symptom of the mode of governmen-
tality that Deleuze articulated in terms of the society of control already in 1992: 
The conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element 
within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a  
reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not nec-
essarily one of science fiction. Félix Guattari has imagined a city where 
one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighbor-
hood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given bar-
rier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between 
8 Ibid. 
9 Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos, “Erase 
Them! Eurodac and Digital Deportability,” 
Transversal (March 2013), http://eipcp.net 
/transversal/0313/kuster-tsianos/en.
10 Deleuze, “Societies of Control,” 7.
11 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzche and Philosophy, 
trans. High Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 75–78.
12 See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1981).
(Dis)embodied Subjectivities and Technologies of Control Aneta Stojnić
226 227
words, the subject is constituted through the tension between the symbolic 
and the imaginary, which is permanently decentered through the real. In his the-
ory of ideology, Louis Althusser designates the subjects in terms of interpel-
lation.13 He explains it as a mechanism that transforms individuals into subjects 
who self-identify in terms of the current dominant ideology. As an example  
of interpellation, Althusser cites a situation in which a policeman calls, “Hey, you 
there!” and a person stops and turns around. It is precisely in this response 
that the subject recognizes oneself as the one who has been called, and in this 
act the individual is interpellated and constituted as a subject.14 In reference  
to Althusser, this shows that the subject is always already a subject of ideology, 
that is, the subject does not exist prior to interpellation. 
However, the question that arises is: What does this mean for subjectification 
in the present conditions of the “triumph of the economy” that denounces 
the ideological?15 As indicated by Agamben, the triumph of the economy is a 
form of governmentality whose only goal is its own infinite reproduction.16  
It is precisely the reality of contemporary neoliberal capitalism that demands 
the blurring of the clear ideological positions. At the same time, it perpetu-
ates itself on the processes of racialization, segregation, and exploitation that 
are all concealed, institutionalized, and normalized by the “postideological” 
agenda. As stated by Gržinić: “We are in the middle of a voracious, unrestrained 
capitalism (that is again called ‘late capitalism,’ as it was in 1984 when  
Fredric Jameson started his discussion about postmodernism and multinational 
capitalism)—a  financial capitalism, that is more than just a cultural condition,  
it is our reality. But what is the relation between capitalism and reality? Santiago 
López Petit, in his online essay published in Spanish “Reivindicación del odio 
libre para una época global” (2008) argues that reality has gone totally capital-
ist.”17 As stated by Gržinić,18 in reference to López Petit, capitalism has become 
equal to reality, where globalization as a total process creates a network of  
interrelated relations that combines simultaneous reterritorialization and deter-
ritorialization as well as integration with fragmentation.19 
In order to understand the processes of subjectification in such political con-
ditions, and in the light of the technologies of control, I refer to Agamben’s 
theorization that places the subject between the substance and the appara-
tus. Agamben suggests a general division of all beings into two major classes: 
1) living beings or substances; and 2) apparatuses in which beings are cap-
tured. This means that, on one hand, we have ontological theory of living beings 
and, on the other hand, the economy of apparatuses that govern them.20 He 
derived his definition of apparatuses from Foucault’s term “dispositive.” In his 
writings from the 1970s, Foucault frequently used this term to address govern-
mentality in order to explain the relation between individuals as living beings 
and the “historical element” as a collection of institutions, procedures, and 
rules whereby power relations are established and executed. Agamben starts 
his book with a discussion of Foucault’s description of the dispositive. He  
reports that Foucault explained that the term encompassed a vast class of het-
erogeneous elements: discourses, institutions, architectural forms, govern-
mental and regulatory decisions, laws, scientific claims, and administrative 
measures, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic attitudes. All listed are,  
for Foucault, the elements of an apparatus, while the apparatus itself is consti-
tuted in the network of relations established between those elements. Then 
Agamben explains what Foucault meant by the apparatus: “By the term ‘appa-
ratus’ I mean a kind of a formation, so to speak, that at a given historical  
moment has as its major function the response to an urgency. The apparatus 
therefore has a dominant strategic function […] The apparatus is precisely 
this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, 
certain types of knowledge.”21
The strategic function of the apparatus is key because it is directly connected 
to the manipulation of the power relations. This means that it is possible to  
influence those relations through concrete rational interventions into specific 
apparatuses. In other words, the apparatus is always inscribed in the relations  
of power and knowledge and produces its own limitations.22 Agamben expands 
Foucault’s already vast understanding of apparatus, stating that it encom-
passes “literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, 
determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, 
or discourses of living beings.”23
He thus places the subject between those two great classes that are the ap-
paratuses on one side and living beings on the other: “I call a subject that which 
results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between 
living beings and apparatuses. Naturally, the substances and the subjects, as 
in ancient metaphysics, seem to overlap naturally, but not completely. For  
example, the same individual, the same substance, can be the place of multi-
13 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy 
and Other Essays (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1971), https://www.marxists 
.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970 
/ideology.htm. 
14 In French the term “interpellation” usually 
refers to police questioning. See David 
Macey, Dictionary of Critical Theory 
(London: Penguin, 2001), 203.
15 See Giorgio Agamben, What Is an 
Apparatus? (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 8–12.
16 Ibid.
17 Marina Gržinić, “Subjectivization, 
Biopolitics, and Necropolitics: Where Do 
We Stand?,” Reartikulacija, no. 6 (2009): 22. 
18 Marina Gržinić citing Santiago López Petit, 
“Reivindicación del odio libre para una 
época global” [Claiming free hate for a 
global age], 2008, https://hernanmontec 
inos.com/2009/03/29/reivindicacion 
-del-odio-libre-para-una-epoca-global-2/. 
19 Gržinić, “Subjectivization, Biopolitics, and 
Necropolitics,” 22. 
20 Agamben, What Is an Apparatus?, 13–14.
21 Ibid., 2.
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Ibid., 15.
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decentered position, in the position of the ungovernable that could trans-
gress the dehumanizing logic of capital.28 If the possibility for a revolutionary 
subject still exists anywhere it is at and across the border. 
ple processes of subjectification: the user of cellular phones, the web surfer,  
the writer of stories, the tango aficionado, the anti-globalization activist, and 
so on and so forth.”24
Agamben further shows that proliferation of the apparatuses is a sign of the 
latest stage of capitalism, and is followed by a “proliferation in processes  
of subjectification.” However this does not mean that subjectification has been 
erased; on the contrary, it is being disseminated while exposing “to the ex-
treme the masquerade that has always accompanied every personal identity.”25 
The question is: How we can think about subjectification in the last stage  
of capitalism?
If there is no subjectification outside of the apparatus than some kind of counter-
apparatus to the dominant formations of power would need to be construct ed. 
Agamben here suggests a concept of profanation of the apparatus, which 
means “the restitution to common use of what has been captured and sepa-
rated in them.”26 Profanation as a counter-apparatus would require a new form 
of subjectification that would reconfigure the difference between subjectifi-
cation and desubjectification. Namely, with a rapid proliferation of apparatuses 
we have come to the point where processes of subjectification and desub-
jectification have become mutually exclusive, where the dominant mode of 
governmentality no longer relies on the production of subjectivity but on  
the process of desubjectification.27 I argue that this process is directly connected 
with the process of dehumanization. Bodies that are turned into data at the 
borders of the Schengen zone present one of the darkest and most brutal real-
izations of Deleuze’s anticipation of a society of control. As necropolitical  
already living dead, they are being existentially and ontologically incorporated 
into the same apparatus, the same digitalized hi-tech society that in fact  
dehumanizes them—turns them into bodies stripped of any political subjectiv-
ity. A similar process can be observed in the proliferation of death-toll sta-
tistics that are presented in a way that exactly normalizes deaths at the borders. 
The death of the already living dead is not perceived as a loss of human life 
but as a data entry. 
Coda
Today, the processes of neoliberalism, fascism, and racism are the realities of 
Europe, in which the global power relations are reflected. The division be-
tween citizens, noncitizens, and refugees (as the lowest category of noncitizens) 
has sharpened the processes of fascism and racialization to their extremes 
and is spilling out on both sides of the borders of fortress Europe. Therefore, 
there is a need for the total political re-subjectification or reembodiment of 
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In 2014, the world suddenly discovered a local armed force that was able to suc-
cessfully resist ISIS. The group, which was the Syrian wing of the Kurdish 
armed forces, prevented ISIS from capturing the city of Kobanî after three months 
of intense battles and thereby managed to stop the expansion of ISIS in Syria  
for the first time in the five years of civil war. This resistance in Kobanî made the 
Kurdish forces and also the Kurds in general more visible and acknowledged  
in the world.1 Despite being one of the largest autochthonous people in the  
Middle East without a state of their own, the Kurds have been neglected for a 
long time internationally. Their mere presence has been systematically denied 
and repressed by the states in which they live; their language, culture, and  
social values have continuously been assimilated and criminalized.
Another reason for the international interest in Kurds is the originality of the 
autonomy model in the north of Syria (Rojava, West Kurdistan), which was first 
declared in 2012 and has been further developed since and in mostly Kurdish- 
inhabited region in Turkey (Bakur, North Kurdistan).2 The theoretical framework 
of the Rojavan self-governance model, called “democratic autonomy,” was  
developed by the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in the early years of his 
imprison ment in Turkey. This concept proposes a model of self-governance for 
Kurdish people that rejects the need for a nation-state and instead is based  
on direct democracy, public participation, and plurality.
Drawing on original texts of the movement, this essay aims at giving an in-depth 
analysis of the theoretical framework of this model of democratic autonomy, 
which Öcalan and the Kurdish political movement have strongly insisted on from 
2000 onward. Thereby, I first discuss the importance of this model in the con-
text of one of the key questions of political philosophy: How to limit the power 
of the state? I address how the critique and rejection of the nation-state is  
expressed within this movement of a people who has throughout history never 
had their own nation-state in the modern sense, and in which way the model  
of democratic autonomy proposes an alternative. Thereby, I will consider the polit-
ical practices of the Kurds in Turkey that have developed a de facto local self-
governance like the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, in spite of the Turkish 
state.
1 For example, Even Elizabeth Griffin, a 
columnist of the well-known magazine 
Marie Claire, wrote a piece about the 
YPG’s Women Fighters in 2014 titled 
“These Remarkable Women Are Fighting 
ISIS: It Is Time You Know Who They Are.”
2 Among those specifically internationally 












rights and freedom, and, on the other hand, the need for a state and government. 
These two tendencies shaped the need to a certain system of limiting state 
power in order to protect the individuals and minorities against any despotic 
exercise of political authority.6
Jean Bodin, who is one of the first theorists of sovereignty, defined it as an 
absolute, permanent, and indivisible power. The sovereign is the center of 
power that holds both the origin of power (auctoritas) and its use (potestas) at 
the same time. According to him, although sovereignty itself is indivisible,  
the use of power can be shared with other parties. Similarly, the absoluteness 
of sovereignty does not mean that it is also limitless. For him, there are three 
components that limit sovereignty: divine and natural laws, basic laws, and 
economic issues (the right to property).7 
In contrast to Bodin, Thomas Hobbes does not formulate particular arguments 
about limiting power, since he assumes that the absolute power of sovereignty 
also determines its own limits.8 However, this approach does not help but exalt 
the absolute power of the sovereign. In fact, Hobbes believes that the sover-
eign cannot surpass the boundaries of its power, because it is absolute and thus 
no other power is beyond it. Therefore, limiting its own power would mean 
eliminating itself. To share, divide, or delegate power contradicts its own  
nature. The sovereign holds the absolute rationality. All its actions are faultless 
and rational. Accordingly, it is impossible for the sovereign to endanger the 
existence of society, even if it would like to.9 The sovereign cannot strive for jus-
tice or righteousness because the sovereign itself is the justice and the 
righteousness.10
The first thinkers we see who propose concrete solutions to the problem of lim-
iting state power are Locke and Montesquieu. Both philosophers point out  
the necessity of  division of power in order to avoid absolute power from being 
ruled with only one hand. This division of power, called “separation of powers,” 
forms the base of debates about constitutionally limiting of the government 
and the power of the modern state. Locke argued that legislative and executive 
powers should function separately and independently from each other. How-
ever, in Locke’s understanding there is no independence of the judiciary,  
because he regards the judiciary as a subordinate function of executive power. 
Theoretical Background: Limiting the Power of the State
Since the birth of the modern state in Europe, Western political philosophers 
have dealt with the question of how to limit state power. Thinkers like Jean 
Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de Montesquieu attempted to 
define modern state power with theories of sovereignty and at the same time 
produced arguments on how to limit the power of the modern state. Using the 
notions of “state of nature” versus “civil society,” they started discussing sover-
eignty, state, and power from the sixteenth century onward. Hobbes and Locke 
described the state of nature as a permanent state of war, in which violence  
is the driving force, whereas in “civil society” the individual’s right to use violence 
is handed over to the sovereign (state) so that peace would reign. However, 
these theorists saw an important potential threat in the renunciation of the right 
to use violence and the delegation of this right to a sovereign. Because what 
would happen if that sovereign as the sole authority arbitrarily decided to use 
violence against its own people? This question provoked the debates around 
both inviolable rights and the limiting of sovereignty, power, and government. 
Historically, these debates reached their peak after the American and French 
revolutions, finding in constitutionalism a practical answer to how to limit 
state power.
Even though individuals delegate certain rights to the sovereign and thus con-
tribute to the transition from state of nature to civil society, they still possess 
several rights that are neither delegable nor inviolable. These are natural rights 
that are acquired by birth. One of the most fundamental natural rights is the 
right to life. Accordingly, no sovereign may own such limitless powers with which 
it could extinguish the individual’s right to life. Another innate natural right is 
the right to property. This right to property was most clearly expressed by Locke. 
According to Locke, the main condition for property is labor. Individuals own 
property only to the extent to which they transform nature though their labor. 
Consequently, the right to property is regarded as a basic principle of liberal- 
ism. In that sense, a sovereign state may not make use of its legitimate right to 
violence in order to extinguish the individual’s right to property.
In his book Limited Government: A Comparison (1974), Carl J. Friedrich states 
that there are two significant roots that play a role in the rise of the idea of 
limiting the state power.3 One is the medieval heritage of a natural law doctrine. 
The royal bureaucrats, the barons, the free towns, and above all the church 
developed secularized versions of natural law. After the French Revolution, when 
the unity of the country was reestablished, these groups promoted the idea 
of the separation of power.4 The second root is specifically the Christian doctrine 
of personality shared by medieval and modern constitutionalism.5 Its central 
idea is that there should be a balance between two tendencies in a society:  
on the one hand, there is a need for the individual to have his or her own 
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3 See Carl J. Friedrich, Limited Government: 
A Comparison (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974), 13.
4 Ibid., 13. 
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 Ibid.
7 See Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları and Levent 
Köker, eds., Kral Devlet ya da Ölümlü Tanrı 






In Turkey, the denial and assimilation of Kurds started in 1924. It was the year 
when the official second constitution of the new Republic of Turkey was written 
that legally denied the existence of the Kurdish people.13 As a result of this  
denial, the Kurds in Turkey were exposed to systematic violence and assimilation, 
which led to numerous Kurdish uprisings in the first years of the new republic. 
Throughout the history of the republic, Kurds have attempted twenty-eight armed 
revolts, some of them aiming for independence, while others aim for recog-
nition of their cultural and political rights.
The most extensive last armed revolt against the Turkish state was started  
by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1984. This uprising, which the Turkish 
state has not been able to suppress until today, has been the longest revolt 
and claimed the largest number of losses. The PKK is an armed organization, 
which was founded in the mid-1970s by a group of Turkish and Kurdish stu-
dents, who had separated from the Turkish socialist youth movement. The PKK 
was officially founded during a meeting in the village of Fis, Diyarbakır, in 1978. 
The ideology as well as the military strategy of the PKK was highly influenced 
by the Cold War atmosphere of the time. Taking up a Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
the group argued that Kurdistan was colonized, and they took up arms to  
es tablish an independent united Kurdistan. Hence, in its analysis and its guerilla 
strategy, the PKK did not differ from the typical national liberation movements 
of the time. Vladimir Lenin’s approach to the right to self-determination, Mao 
Zedong’s people’s war theory, and Karl Marx’s socialism were the main influ-
ences on the PKK’s ideology and military strategy. Accordingly, the armed struggle 
starting from the rural areas would push back the forces of the colonialist 
(Turkish) state. The people would gain awareness through guerrilla propaganda 
and subsequently push the Turkish state out of their lands through a people’s 
uprising, which would lead to independence. Eventually, a socialist society gov-
erned by the working class would be established in Kurdistan.14
More than thirty years after the beginning of the armed revolt, the original goal 
of a unified, independent Kurdistan has still not been achieved, and in this 
time the PKK has made significant changes in its demands and goals. Nonethe-
less, through this revolt the PKK contributed highly to substantial achievements, 
including making the Kurdish issue public, achieving a national conscious-
It was Montesquieu who first clearly distinguished between judicial, executive, 
and legislative power contributing greatly to the concept of the separation  
of powers.11 
Montesquieu defined these separate powers through their relation to the law. 
The legislative branch is in charge of making laws, the executive branch ap-
plies these laws, and the mission of the judiciary branch resolves any disputes 
that occur in their execution. According to Montesquieu, these three branches 
of power must exist independently in separate hands in order to ensure a situ-
ation of political freedom in which all members of society feel safe and  
without fear. 
As Friedrich points, these aforementioned debates build the basic idea of 
modern constitutionalism “which rests upon the distrust of power.”12 Liberalism 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not go further with regard  
to the limitation of state power than the separation of powers on the level of 
the constitution and accepted this as its final solution. It is difficult to say if 
the liberalist theorists of the twentieth century, such as Jürgen Habermas, con-
tributed anything new beyond “constitutional limitations” to that debate. 
However, it must be said that there are new supranational and international 
institutions established after World War II that are acting as effective actors to 
limit and control state power beyond national constitutions. The global con-
cerns are the other new players that affect national state power.
The concept of democratic autonomy developed by the Kurdish movement 
presents a new model to further limit state power without rejecting the mecha-
nism of liberal theory. This approach claims that constitutional mechanisms 
are necessary, but not sufficient to limit the state power. Instead, the most effec-
tive way to limit state power is by organizing, strengthening, and defending 
the society against the state, and this can only be done by adopting a system 
of participatory citizenship and direct democracy through establishing citizen 
assemblies (yurttaş meclisleri). This proposal, which I will discuss in more  
detail below, distinguishes democratic autonomy from liberal models and high-
lights its libertarian, communalist basis.
Historical Background—Kurds as a Stateless People
What is being called the “Kurdish problem” today is a phenomenon that begins 
with the separation of Kurdistan into different nation-states at the beginning  
of the twentieth century. In this respect, there have been no structural changes 
for Kurds in the twentieth century so far. They remain a people without a legal 
status (except in Iraqi Kurdistan nowadays), which continues its struggle for cul-
tural and political recognition in Turkey, Iran, and Syria.
11 See Mehmet Ali Aliağaoğulları et al., eds., 
Kral­Devletten Ulus­Devlete [From the 
king-state to the nation-state] (Ankara: 
İmge Yayınevi, 2005), 423.
12 Friedrich, Limited Government, 19. 
13 Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel­Türk’ten Sözde 
Vatandaşa [From prospective Turks to 
pseudo-citizens] (Ankara: İletişim, 2009), 
52–53.
14 The best account of the aims and 
strategies in founding the PKK is in fact 
given by Öcalan himself in his book, 
Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu [The path of 
Kurdistan revolution], written in 1978.  
See Abdullah Öcalan, Kürdistan 
Devriminin Yolu (Cologne: Wêşenen 
Serxwebun, 1993).
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with natural society. A hierarchic state society developed as an anti-thesis to 
this.18 Öcalan’s notion of natural state corresponds to the sociological and  
anthropological term “primitive society,” which describes a society that lives in 
harmony with nature, is based on a simple division of labor, and has a non-
hierarchical, communal character. For Öcalan, in natural society there is “no 
privilege, class, hierarchy, or exploitation.”19 Nevertheless, he does not glorify 
or romanticize natural society in his analysis, for he knows that there is not 
much left of natural society today. All that is left of natural society are the tiny 
traces and the knowledge of it, which lets us assume that natural society  
was a nonexploitative, non-repressive, and cooperative society that was based 
on the constitutive power of women and existed in accordance with the nat ural 
environment. According to Öcalan, the suppression of women is the first  
form of the enslavement that is linked directly with the formation of the hierar-
chical state society. Therefore, Öcalan’s critique of state is also a critique  
of patriarchy. Hence, the women’s liberation in the Kurdish movement is being 
seen as a constituent part to build the democratic autonomy. 
As Öcalan does not consider historical process as linear, and he does not  
assume the transition from natural society to hierarchical state society as inev-
itable. Although state society has become far more dominant than natural  
society today, this does not mean that natural society has completely disap-
peared. In the course of human history, the values of natural society have 
been suppressed, concealed, and forgotten. However, they continue to exist, 
at least potentially. For Öcalan, the goal of the political struggle is to uncover, 
act as a reminder of, and reanimate the principles of natural society.
According to Öcalan, the first state society in world history existed in form  
of the Sumerian city-states (4000–2000 BC). In these states, in which shamanic 
priests formed the ruling class, centralized power and empowered men there-
fore set the base for patriarchal societies.20 Öcalan expands this critique of 
state, beginning with the Sumerian city-state to the modern state of our time. 
For him, the ultimate form of state society is capitalist society. In his view, capi-
talist society expanded the form of expropriation of the Sumerian city-states  
to the whole planet. Although state society might seem to have won a historic 
victory with the establishment of capitalism, the struggle between natural  
society and state society has not yet come to an end.
ness, the Kurds in Turkey becoming a political actor and even gaining some 
cultural rights. While the Kurds have maintained their support for the armed 
struggle, the strategies, methods, and practices of their struggle have multi-
plied. Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, Kurds have achieved pres-
ence in the Turkish parliament by founding legal political parties. At the same 
time, they have become organized in the realm of civil society through the 
establishment of various NGOs, and made Kurdish people’s demands for 
rights and freedom public by developing local, national, and international 
media networks. Finally, they have extended the space of democratic struggle 
and gained power on the local level by winning several municipalities in  
the region.15
The first years of the new millennium constitute a crucial phase of transformation 
in the Kurdish political struggle. In 1999, Öcalan was captured by a joint opera-
tion of international intelligence agencies in Nairobi, Kenya, and handed over to 
the Turkish state. Subsequently, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and 
has been serving time on an island in the middle of the Marmara Sea ever since. 
It was in these years that Öcalan developed this model of democratic auto-
nomy. For the first time, in his defense at the Turkish court in 1999, Öcalan clearly 
states his rejection of the idea of independency or a separate Kurdish state. 
Instead, he suggests that concepts such as “democratic republic,” “democratic 
confederalism,” “democratic nation,” and “democratic autonomy” all condemn 
secession and emphasize the importance of mutual peaceful cohabitation  
between the Kurds and Turks in Turkey, as well as radically criticizing the state, 
power, and the nation-state. Öcalan’s new approach was a crucial turning 
point and fundamental transformation in both his thinking and the demands  
of the Kurdish movement.16 
State versus Society
In their Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote: 
“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”17 
This famous statement tells us that change in society can be achieved through 
the struggle between existing classes in a society and that this struggle is the 
main reason for historical progression. Öcalan, a self-designated Marxist, uses 
a similar dialectic approach in his writings after 1999. However, unlike Marx 
he sees the main struggle in human history to be between state and society. 
For him, the main antagonism between state and society leads to an unfin-
ished struggle, which acts as the driving force of social change.
Öcalan explains this main antagonism by differentiating between “natural  
society” and “state society.” According to him, natural society is the original 
form of human existence. Human beings emerge and gain their existence 
15 For an in-depth analysis, see my own 
study Demokratik Özerklik Bir Yurttaşlık 
Heterotopyası [Democratic autonomy as  
a heterotopia of citizenship] (Ankara: 
Notabene, 2015).
16 Ibid., 134. Unless otherwise stated, all 
translations are my own.
17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto 
of the Communist Party (1848), Marxists 
Internet Archive, https://www.marxists 
.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf 
/Manifesto.pdf.
18 Abdullah Öcalan, Bir Halkı Savunmak 
[Defending a people] (Istanbul: Çetin 
Yayınları, 2004), 21. 
19 Ibid., 16. 
20 Ibid., 21.
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is effective without strict bureaucratic rules.25 Such a model of democracy 
overcomes the given liberal democracy with its radical critique regarding partic-
ipation, self-government, and the state. To make this function, certain social  
institutions need to be established, and how well these institutions function 
determines the quality of the democracy. Öcalan thinks that the most important 
institutions are “a congress at the highest level, and local communes, cooper-
atives, NGOs, human rights associations, and municipal organizations at the 
grassroots level.”26
Defending Society against the State
In all these debates, the key question for Öcalan is how to defend society 
against the state. No matter how strong the state has subjugated society over 
the course of history, society maintains its quest for autonomy and its strug-
gle for independence from the state.
In the context of the democratic autonomy, in order to defend society we must 
first acknowledge that society exists independently from the state and that 
this independence must either be preserved or regained. In other words, the 
strong “ontological link” between state and society, which developed with 
moder nity, must be torn apart, and the identity of state and society must be 
abandoned. Any society has the capacity to survive without the state. The 
Democratic Society Congress (DTK) supposes that the state has always been 
in a tense relationship with society.27 This historical contradiction is rooted  
in the divergence between the state as an instance to centralize the power and 
society trying to stay autonomous. While the state constantly attempts to 
subjugate society by centralization and the concentration of power, society, in 
turn, permanently resists it. This conflict is a permanent one, for the state and 
society pursue different interests (centralization and autonomy). In that regard, 
defending society against the state means defending society as an autono-
mous, separate form of existence independent of the state against the state and 
its tendency to centralize all powers and competencies.
Another dimension of defending society against the state in the concept of 
democratic autonomy is the reunion of society and politics; in other words, to 
remove politics from the monopoly of the state and return it to society.  
State versus Democracy
Öcalan assumes that state society represents power, hierarchy, and exploitation, 
while natural society stands for equality, democracy, and statelessness. 
There fore, the struggle between the state and society is at the same time a para-
dox and struggle between state and democracy. For him, state and demo-
cracy are two phenomena that exclude each other. Therefore, democracy cannot 
be reduced to the state and to governing the state. Öcalan summarizes: “The 
more state, the less democracy; or the more democracy, the less state must  
be regarded as a golden rule.”21 This clearly shows Öcalan’s objective to critique 
an understanding of democracy that is tied to the state and therefore to free 
both society and democracy from the state. He argues that it is practi cally im-
possible to build a democratic system without distinguishing the notion of  
democracy from the state.22 In this regard, his understanding of democracy is 
as a “stateless democracy.” Such a concept of democracy points toward a  
society where the people directly govern themselves without the need for  
re presentatives, which eliminates the separation between rulers and the ruled, 
and enables the demos to actually autonomously determine its own future  
by participating in a decision-making process.
Since Öcalan understands democracy as the direct government of the people 
by the people without any representatives, it cannot be limited to a certain 
social group or class. Hence, expressions like “proletarian democracy” and “bour-
geoisie democracy” harm the comprehensiveness of the notion of democracy. 
Therefore, Öcalan’s concept of democracy contradicts the debates of “class de-
mocracy.” His criticism of class democracy follows a similar logic found in  
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s critique of the politics of identity. For Hardt 
and Negri, “revolutionary politics has to start from identity but cannot end 
there. The point is not to pose a division between identity politics and revolu-
tionary politics.”23 If a revolutionary political movement gets stuck on an identity 
problem, the source of the problem, namely, the divergence of identities,  
will continuously be reproduced. Consequently, instead of being a tool of liber-
ation, identity becomes a medium of captivity. Similarly, the struggle for democ-
racy cannot be limited to or reserved for one specific class or identity. On  
the contrary, the struggle must be inclusive and overcome and destroy class 
differences. Since democracy is a regime, which should expand freedom  
and strengthen equality, it must not rely on social inequalities. Therefore, the 
people’s democracy cannot function with categories like peasants, workers, or 
slaves, nor can it approve of the socioeconomic system that generates them.24
Stateless democracy, as a system where the people govern themselves, should 
not be mistaken for a state of chaos and anarchy. It should rather be seen  
as a system based on the virtue of citizenship, in which people participate volun-
tarily, and in which the principle of the delegating and withdrawing powers 
21 Ibid., 124. 
22 Ibid., 123. 
23 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 
326.
24 Öcalan, Bir Halkı Savunmak, 124.  
25 Ibid., 123.
26 Ibid., 127. 
27 Demokratik Toplum Kongresi, Kürt 
Sorununun Çözümü İçin Demokratik 
Özerklik. [Democratic autonomy for a 
solution of the Kurdish problem] 
(Diyarbakır: Aram, 2012), 52.
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Conclusion
To a great extent, these grassroots institutions of democratic autonomy are the 
devices for limiting and undermining the power of the Turkish nation-state. 
Owing to the increase in hegemonic activities, especially from 2009 onward, the 
Turkish state faced a crisis of its legitimacy in the Kurdish region in Turkey. 
For the people, these self-established, self-run institutions have become more 
important than those of the state. As soon as these self-ruling institutions 
managed to solve the people’s problems, they began to take over the function 
of those of the state and therefore gave an impression of a dual power. The 
state has started to hollow out and redefine the lines it had drawn in the name 
of citizenship, rights, and the public sphere. It is precisely because of this  
effect and the legitimacy of form of politics that the Turkish state has directly 
attacked the achievements of the Kurdish movement since 2009. State bu-
reaucrats are appointed in unlawful, antidemocratic ways especially to replace 
the democratically elected administration of local municipalities. There is 
great danger that this illegitimate method of appropriation will lead to the loss 
of each of these widely established self-governing institutions of the Kurdish 
movement. However, the importance, strength, and effect of these institu-
tions have not been lost completely; at least they live on in people’s minds as 
positive experienced knowledge. 
Democratic autonomy suggests a communal self-governance model in order to 
bring together society and politics. Thanks to this model, politics, or the ability 
to govern oneself—which had once been withdrawn from the realm of society— 
can be regained.28 For this reason, democratic autonomy may function as a 
model for all groups, especially the Kurds, whose existence is endangered by 
national states to protect and defend themselves. This model provides an  
opportunity for all of the oppressed peoples to establish their own alternative 
economic, cultural, and governmental institutions in order to get involved  
in politics. In this way, intervention of the state into society will be limited, be-
cause society will be able to govern itself direct through these institutions, 
without a representative government structure.
Citizen assemblies (köy meclisi and mahalle meclisi) are the cornerstones  
of democratic autonomy. These institutions, which are established at the local 
level, serve to enable self-governance and self-defense. Communes and  
assemblies present the local base of society that is organized in a confederal 
manner. While communes refer to a small organization of people, mainly 
made up of citizens from a village or an individual street, assemblies exist at 
the level of neighborhoods, which are made up of several communes, dis-
tricts, towns, and provinces. This grassroots organization empowers society 
against the state, while society solves its own problems and meets its own 
needs with its own competences without being dependent on the state. How-
ever, the structure of councils is not solely organized according to size.  
Additionally, all sorts of ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender-related groups as 
well as NGOs, professional unions, and so on, organize themselves as assem-
blies. This means that different social groups, which are often being pushed out 
of the political sphere, are denied representation and participation by the  
nation-state, are able to participate in the political decision-making process.
In the Turkish part of Kurdistan, citizen assemblies first assembled in 2005.  
In every Kurdish province and district, legal associations were founded with the 
name “free citizen initiatives.” Over time these associations transformed into 
the self-governing institutions such as neighborhood assemblies or communes. 
A neighborhood assembly is at the same time a local authority where people 
find solutions to individual problems, a space where people can go every day 
to socialize and a center where political education is provided. Participation 
in the work of the assemblies is voluntary. Each neighborhood council consists 
of at least seven people and has an individual administration that deals with  
a practical agenda. The founding and operating principles of the assemblies 
are based on democracy, ecological responsibility, and gender equality. Literally 
as a fundamental, constitutive approach that everyone agrees on, decisions 
and activities of the assemblies cannot contradict these principals.
A Stateless People against the State Çetin Gürer
28 Ibid., 18. 
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Plus Ultra is the national motto of Spain meaning “further beyond.” Since 2006 
the Spanish government signed several agreements with governments of  
several countries in Africa, and started a special collaboration with Morocco for 
the control of the Spanish borders and the European ones within it. This ex-
ternalization of border control has also been implemented by other countries, 
such as Italy, and the most recent case has been the EU polemical agreement 
with Turkey. For practical purposes this means that border control is extended 
further away than the geographical border, creating a space beyond the  
ju ridical control of the European liberal “democracies.” But Spain was not only 
the model for the border externalization; it was also a model for the construction 
of walls, playing an important role in the fabrication of the fences for other  
EU countries.
Fig. 18 
Miguel González Cabezas, Plus Ultra, 2016
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I wanted to tell the boxers that the only chance to beat the referees who 
are against you or against the country is to win by knock-out.
—General Idi Amin Dada speaking with delegates from Uganda’s national 
boxing team in Barbet Schroeder’s Idi Amin Dada—Self Portrait, 1974
There are many reasons for the current condition of deadlock in Israel. As much 
as it is specific to the unique regime that has been established since the  
occupation of Palestinian territories, this condition highlights several character-
istics of contemporary sovereignty models, which are widespread worldwide, 
especially since 2001.
Today, deprived of any macro-politics through the collapse of political parties 
and unions, we are left with phantom-political entities like NGOs who rely  
on funding abilities rather than analysis, organization, and solidarity. Lingering 
on micro-political strategies from twenty-five years ago seems today to be 
the only option leftist politics is committed to.1 
Hyper-neutrality
Basically, the aim here is to map the problems. Focusing the attention on this 
cartography will help to outline the different contradictions that enable the  
situation to continue and proliferate. In this respect, this essay is concerned with 
a specific form of dialectics—the dialectics of hyper-neutrality. 
The epigraph above introduces how power is managed in the state of Israel: 
brutal and shameless and at the same time assuming the position of a victim; 
it involves rational violence that is inflicted both as a pedagogical and as  







1 As Maurizio Lazzarato puts it, micro must 
always be thought with macro, and vice 
versa. With authoritarian governments 
throughout the Middle East suppressing 
political activities outside religious 
institutions and with different EU and 
US-led “civil society” initiatives, NGOs 
have come to dominate leftist politics in 
the Middle East. This caused a disastrous 
brain drain in leftist political parties 
throughout the region prior to the 2011 
uprisings called the Arab Spring. The book 
Nongovernmental Politics proposes the 
NGO as a model of engagement in politics 
without aspiring to govern. Although 
fruitful as a proposal for “another” kind of 
politics, the reality of its achievements is 
reliant on sovereign power. See Michel 
Feher, Yates McKee, and Gaëlle Krikorian, 
eds., Nongovernmental Politics (New York: 
Zone Books, 2007). For a problematization 
of the humanitarian position in Israel-
Palestine, see Eyal Weizman, The Least of 
All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence 
from Arendt to Gaza (London: Verso 
Books, 2011).
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ians, like the Syrians, when faced with such mass killing should not expect that 
the international community will do much to help them. 
Twenty years ago, after the first Gulf War, the Middle East crisis was the place 
where states in the northern hemisphere such as the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Scandinavian countries were looking for  
a stature of world power. But today, the Israeli occupation in Palestine is just 
one of the many conflicts in the region from West Africa to Iraq; from Shiites 
and Sunnis, to Muslims and Christians, to Kurds and Yazidis, to Israelis and 
Palestinians—also for neighboring Arab countries Israel is no longer the center 
of attention. As time goes by, Israel-Palestine conflict becomes just another 
malignant and cureless violent conflict along this territory of the imploding 
Middle East. What still makes the situation in Israel and Palestine unique (and 
in this sense so effective and useful for world powers still) is the way this  
conflict is set and managed within a disproportionate power relation.
The two predominant economic theories on the Israeli Left, saw the occupation 
as either “costing too much money” or as a “money maker.” The Oslo years 
presented an economic logic that was critiqued by Israeli scholars Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler as a globalized new world order based on agree-
ments for offshoring industries and outsourcing security—according to this 
logic, there was much more economic potential in peace than in war.3 But this 
logic was no longer relevant by the year 2000 when it became obvious that 
the Israeli military-financial nexus relied on the occupation for its information 
technologies. This meant that the occupation was to Israel’s economic advan-
tage as a beta for high-tech research-and-development operations. This logic 
was celebrated by Dan Senor and Saul Singer,4 and critiqued by Eyal 
Weizman.5 
Jeff Halper, of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), 
coined the phrase “matrix of control” when he compared the occupation to a 
game of immobilization. He writes: 
side by its other that constitutes its negation. At the same time, this dichotomy 
delineates an all-inclusive notion of the conflict in which religious, military, 
economic, social, national, and diplomatic tensions serve as different facets of 
the same conflict. This formation offers itself as negation and therefore prom-
ises for the counterpart an erasure of its negation, but never a negation of 
negation.  
The condition of Israel-Palestine continues and intensifies through a mechanism 
of heightened contradictory internal relations. This intense political reality in 
which everything is cancelled out is proposed here as a form of hyper- neutrality, 
where repetitions and contradictions seem to dictate the conditions for a 
heightened standstill. 
Disproportionate Power Relations
In Jean Luc Godard’s film Notre Musique (2004), the renowned Palestinian 
poet Mahmoud Darwish asks the Israeli journalist Judith Lerner (played by the 
French/Israeli actress Sarah Adler), who had come to Sarajevo to interview 
him, “Do you know why we Palestinians are famous?”  
Darwish continues: “We are famous because you are our enemy. […] The interest 
in us stems from the interest in the Jewish issue. The interest is in you not  
in me. So we have the misfortune of having Israel as an enemy because it enjoys 
unlimited support. And we have the good fortune of having Israel as our  
ene my because the Jews are the center of attention. You’ve brought us defeat 
and renown.”2 
This statement could have been held as truth for some time, but now it seems 
it is no longer accurate. If we were to take Protective Edge, the last Israeli  
military operation in Gaza from the summer of 2014 as a point of departure, we 
could see how the international community does not care for Palestinians at 
all. Two thousand people were killed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) over fifty 
days of fighting and nothing much happened. NATO, for example, did not even 
consider denouncing or threatening Israel, though it proved extremely eager 
to act in the Ukraine after the Malaysian airplane was shot down by pro-Russian 
militias. In several occasions in the past few years, the Israeli prime minister, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, chose to use the devastating tragedy of the Syrian people 
to explain to Israelis why they have to be aggressive in defending themselves, 
otherwise their fate will be similar to that of massacred Syrians. Israelis should 
not expect the international community to come to their aid, he said. While 
this scenario may sound like a mere disingenuous manipulation, it does have 
currency in Israeli politics. Moreover, one can take from Netanyahu’s analysis a 
hor rifically realistic conclusion that Protective Edge has proved—the Palestin-
2 These quotes by Darwish are based on an 
interview he gave to Helit Yeshurun, 
publisher and editor of the literary review 
Hadarim (published in Hebrew, Hadarim 
12, 1996). The interview was translated to 
the French and published in Revue d’Études 
Palestiniennes [Journal of Palestinian 
studies], no. 9 (Autumn 1996). It appeared 
in English in the Journal of Palestine 
Studies 42, no. 1 (2012). Unless otherwise 
noted, all translations are my own.
3 See Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
The Global Political Economy of Israel: 
From War Profits to Peace Dividends 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002). Another book 
that introduces a specific critique of 
Zionism’s economic logic as a colonial one 
is Tamar Gozansky’s The Development of 
Capitalism in Palestine (1988).
4 See Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-Up 
Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic 
Miracle (New York: Hachette Book Group, 
2009).
5 See Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s 
Architecture of Occupation (London: 
Verso Books, 2007). 
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any agreement. At the same time, we have to scale this tragedy in relation  
to its target—or to put it differently, this new problem was a solution for some-
thing. What was the problem that this mass killing was supposed to solve?
Neoliberal Sovereignty
With Protective Edge we can recognize a model of sovereignty that, for lack 
of a better word, we can call neoliberal sovereignty.9 While escalating the tar-
geting of civilians in Gaza and intensifying its use of firepower, Israel was  
operating in what seemed like a contradictory manner. It initiated and accepted 
all ceasefire proposals throughout the fighting. This, together with the sud-
den withdrawal of ground troops with no clear military results, raises questions 
as to what exactly the fighting was about. It seems that the battle did not  
aim to insure the security and well-being of Israelis in towns and settlements 
neighboring the Gaza Strip. Although these were declared by the Israeli  
government as the initial goals for the military campaign, it was the security, 
reassurance, and well-being of another public that was the concern of this war. 
With a month-long disruptive shooting of primitive missiles by Hamas from 
Gaza and a twenty-four-hour shutdown of Israel’s only international airport, the 
government’s actions suggest a different constituency than that of tax-paying 
citizens. The military’s operations attempted to secure and reassure bondholders 
and to make sure they felt that the government takes care of the well-being  
of their investments. As Michel Feher explains, this basic shift from taxpayer to 
the Japanese and East Asians have a game called “Go.” Unlike the Western 
game of chess, where two opponents try to “defeat” each other by  
taking off pieces, the aim of “Go” is completely different. You “win” not by 
defeating but by immobilizing your opponent by controlling key points  
on the matrix. This strategy was used effectively in Vietnam, where small 
forces of Viet Cong were able to pin down and virtually paralyze some 
half-million American soldiers possessing overwhelming fire-power. In  
effect Israel has done the same thing to the Palestinians on the West Bank, 
Gaza and in East Jerusalem. Since 1967 it has put into place a matrix,  
similar to that of the “Go” board that has virtually paralyzed the Palestinian 
population. The matrix is composed of several overlapping layers.6
With this in mind, the above-mentioned hyper-neutrality is manifested through 
immobilization and paralysis. The internal dynamics of such deadlock brings  
to mind a possible resolution in the form of implosion. Having silenced any op-
position and being militarily unassailable, the idea here is basically that the  
Israeli government will dismantle itself through the internal contradictions of 
its own actions.7
The fact that US dependency on Saudi oil has diminished in recent years has 
made the US reevaluate its interests in the Middle East. In turn, this has  
compromised Israel’s strategic position. As it no longer falls within the core US 
doctrine for control and influence over the Middle East, Israeli governments  
in recent years have had to pull strings in Washington, DC, much harder and to 
lobby more aggressively. The unlimited support once gained without much 
discussion now demands bullying. This process has caused, among other things, 
a real division among American Jews and between American Jews and Israeli 
officials. One of the manifestations of this break can be observed in the different 
approaches to the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement.8
If we were to go back to Protective Edge and see it in the light of biopolitical and 
necropolitical logic that it entails, we can observe that Palestinian civilians are 
not the only ones who are regarded as acceptable collateral damage. For now, 
the most extensive report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination  
of Humani tarian Affairs (OCHA) presents these numbers: 2,189 killed, of whom 
1,486 are believed to be civilians, including 513 children (323 boys and 190 girls, 
70 percent under age 12) and 269 women, 557 have been identified as mili-
tants, and 146 are of unknown status. This is a tremendous human tragedy on a 
personal as well as social scale. At the same time, this is also a disastrous politi-
cal problem. With such a scale of mass killing, any possible agreement between 
Israelis and Palestinians is simply pushed a generation at least down the line. 
But then, in addition to this tragedy, we should ask ourselves: In what way was 
this new problem supposed to provide a solution? For the Israeli settler - led 
government it is obvious that this is exactly the solution, as it sees no point in 
6 See Jeff Halper, “The Matrix of Control,” 
Media Monitors Network, January 29, 
2001, https://www.mediamonitors.net/
perspectives/the-matrix-of-control/. 
“Blockade,” “containment,” “qua rantine,” 
“paralysis,” “control,” and “im mobilization” 
are some of the terms used to describe 
the current stage of the occupation. With 
these shifts in paradigm, one is tempted 
to use Boris Groys’s description of the 
former USSR’s self-destruction as a 
possible solution for Israel. See Boris 
Groys, The Communist Postscript, trans. 
Thomas H. Ford (London: Verso Books, 
2009), 115–20.
7 Groys claims that the dismantling of the 
USSR by the party leadership was in 
accord with dialectical materialism. Noam 
Yuran, in a brilliant reading of this passage 
from Groys, finds that its true meaning 
lies in what it says about capitalism, which 
is that capitalism cannot do what the 
Soviet leadership did. Because capitalism 
does not have a sense of its own negation, 
it cannot think its opposite. 
8 For the BDS movement, see https://
bdsmovement.net/. In this context it is 
important to expose the gap that is created 
between Israeli Jews and Jews around the 
world. In addition to theological differences 
that can be outlined, Judaism can be seen 
as a cultural identity, on the one hand, or 
as an ethnicity in a nation-state. This means 
that the experience of being a minority 
and personifying cosmopolitanism are 
deprived from Israelis who can no longer 
occupy the historical position of the Jew, 
but rather instrumentalize its history for 
their purposes.
9 In a series of lectures on the neoliberal 
condition at Goldsmiths, University of 
London, in 2016, philosopher Michel Feher 
portrayed a model of sovereignty that 
operates following the logic of the 
corporation. See http://www.gold.ac.uk 
/visual-cultures/guest-lectures/.
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of agreements that benefited the settler movement, construction companies, 
ex-military officials, and big industrialists who were able to maintain their 
contracts with the Israeli military as they left Israel for cheaper labor in neigh-
boring countries; all this at the expense of the Palestinian and Israeli working 
class.11 Being dependent more and more on its military industries, Israel is 
gradually becoming an economy that relies on one product—military techno-
logies. These are the bedrock of Israel’s information industries. 
The State of Bartleby
The Israeli Right has been so efficient with cracking down on opposition at home 
and abroad that its victory leaves it with no rivals. Now it has only enemies. 
The situation is such that for those wishing to act in solidarity with the Palestinians, 
there is no available project other than to join the call for a cultural and eco-
nomic boycott on Israel. As a movement, the BDS relates to the activist line of 
engaging with politics. By that I mean that this is not an organization or  
a political movement, but a movement of individuals that acts directly under a 
project toward an aim. On the tactic level, this may prove to be efficient,  
but on a strategic level, as dialectics would have it, the outcome would be very 
different from the cause it aims at. This is not a revolution/counterrevolution 
scenario but rather a symptomatic condition to the direct-action mode of  
neoliberal political engagement. Being that there are objective conditions  
(resources, employment, judicial system, media, military, and so on), which the 
direct action has no control over, we see how time and time again the result  
of a tactical victory is a strategic defeat (be it in Israel, Egypt, or the Ukraine). 
The Bartleby model of passive and non-conflictual resistance is offered by 
neoliberal protest through boycott. This form of withdrawal delineates political 
activism within patterns of individual consumerism. Interestingly enough,  
it is exactly the neoliberal state that has become a kind of a Bartlebian machine, 
which to any request by its citizens replies with the same answer: “I would 
prefer not to.” In Israel, this Bartleby model has become a form of managing 
bondholder is the shift of neoliberal sovereignty. Unlike the liberal scenario  
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century politics, in which the site of politics takes 
place between government and citizens, neoliberal politics is concerned with 
the power relations between government and holders of the external debt. All 
governments are preoccupied with this matrix of power relations surrounding 
their external debt. The model here is Germany after Versailles. 
Ensuring external investors that Israel is safe was the actual objective of the 
operation, not the safety of its citizens. Managing the conflict by excessive use 
of power, while signaling to a potential exit strategy, was the way this risk was 
managed. But the solution for potential investors is the problem for the citizens. 
The realization that politics takes place between government and bondholders 
is shared also by boycott movements. These operate as activist-resignation 
movements, choosing withdrawal as political strategy. The BDS movement for 
example, does not have an Israeli addressee. It has already come to terms 
with the understanding that Israeli citizens cannot influence their government 
and change its policies. In this respect, the analysis of the BDS is extremely 
poignant and merciless. The BDS therefore aims to shame and intimidate poten-
tial investors and existing ones, so that they will pull their businesses out of  
Israel. This is supposed to cause the external debt to increase, downgrading  
Israel’s credit ratings and making the interest it pays for its debt to skyrocket. 
This, they feel, is the place where the Israeli government feels it needs to answer. 
This form of sanction touches neoliberal sovereignty where it really hurts.  
In this respect, the BDS is a form of neoliberal protest. It is an extreme symptom 
of post-Oslo Palestinian dependency on the international community, or better 
said, individuals with international stature. Because it is actually based on indi-
vidual moral positions and not on a political project of strategizing new Jewish-
Arab subjectivities, the BDS reflects the collapse not only of a Jewish-Arab 
common political project, but also a Palestinian project of solidarity.10
With this scheme of sovereignty and protest, the situation in Greece becomes 
the model for neoliberal activism. If only international economic and financial 
institutions would assume absolute control over the external debt of the coun-
try, like they have in Greece, then they could force their policies on this  
country from the outside. But if we apply the Greek predicament of neoliberal 
statehood to Israel, we might have an opposite effect than the one intended 
by the BDS movement. This is simply because any external debtor would want 
the occupation to continue. What makes Israel a special case is it being a  
war state, like the United States and Russia. Under this logic, its business is war, 
meaning that for Israel, the moneymaker is the occupation itself. The occu-
pation is the safe investment. At the end, any solution based on the current eco-
nomic con dition is in itself a problem. Ultimately, the solution suggested by 
the call for BDS poses a problem similar to that of the Oslo accords—a series 
10  “Gone are the days when solidarity 
formations worked with Palestinian 
communities in the dias pora, the PLO, and 
kindred Palestinian political parties,” write 
Mezna Qato and Kareem Rabie. “Instead, 
and in part because there is no longer  
a Palestinian representative body,” they 
explain, “Increasingly, the movement 
seems composed of constellations of 
well-known figures—academics, artists 
and poets, journalists, activists, and 
Twitterers—who generate thinking and 
rhetoric that becomes associated with 
them as individuals. In the past, this kind 
of thinking was collectively deliberated 
and determined. But the way the 
abundance of voices maps onto the wider 
strategy of public en gagement here has 
had the unintended conse quence of 
crowding out collective work.” See Mezna 
Qato and Kareem Rabie, “Against the 
Law,” Jacobin, no. 10 (Spring 2013): 75–78.
11 See Adam Hanieh, “The Oslo Illusion,” 
Jacobin, no. 10 (Spring 2013): 68–74.
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and conflict? How did the ostensible markers of Arab (an “ethnic” marker) 
and Jew (a “religious” one) come to inscribe themselves so forcefully  
on modern discourses of the most varied kind—political, religious, cultural, 
and so forth—even when accompanying distinct or even opposed poli-
tical agendas, caveats and sophisticated critiques and debunkings?16
From the British invasion of Palestine during World War I and their dissection 
operations of Jaffa during the Great Arab revolt, to the Italian bombing of Jaffa 
during World War II, to the 1948 Nakba and 1967 occupations, to the first and 
second US wars in Iraq, to the two Israeli wars in Lebanon, and to the recurring 
attacks on Gaza and the recent bombings of Syrian cities by Assad’s govern-
ment, “urbicide” is the term best applied to this century-long war against Arab 
urban life.17 This period of modernization and nation building in the region, is 
the era of imperialism. During this time, Arab urban life has been under an  
intensifying attack. One should recognize that within this also lies a theological 
meaning, especially with regard to the repeated bombing of Gaza by Israel.  
the conflicts that arise from the occupation. No annexation and no two states, 
no one-state solution, and no return to the 1967 ceasefire lines.12 
The logic of Bartleby, when applied by the war state, becomes a vicious and 
cruel mechanism of erasure. “Hamas is conducting massive self-genocide,” said 
Naftali Bennett, Israeli Minister of Economy, to Wolf Blitzer on CNN (July 16, 2014). 
With Protective Edge, what Israel was proposing was again double erasure— 
it attempted to flatten and erase Gaza while erasing its responsibility for these 
actions.13 This corresponds with the cultural kernel of Israel as a state of dis-
placed refugees. Being Israeli entails erasing one’s previous identity. Israel is 
not a migrant state—languages are silenced, the “old-country” becomes an enemy 
state, the birthplace is deep behind enemy lines. In a way, the only thing  
Israelis do have is erasure. And this is exactly what they force on the Palestinians. 
The Israeli project of Palestinian politicide involves exactly this double-erasure: 
first the refugees, and then the erasure of any Palestinian collective -political 
project. The pathologies caused by these multiple double-erasures abound.14 
Strategy and Apocalypse
“Having despaired of the world, of the fear, of the blood, the only refuge left to 
us was the earth. We buried ourselves alive,” wrote Israeli-Palestinian play-
wright and theater director Amir Nizar Zuabi in an op-ed published in Haaretz 
during Protective Edge. Zuabi projected the reality of the tunnels in besieged 
Gaza onto the physical and mental experiences of Israelis and Palestinians. He 
finished the article with these words: “And an entire people will rise to the 
surface of the earth, pale and faded, blinded by the sun that beats down on the 
land. And we will stand in silence, waiting for our eyes to adjust to the light. 
And as we stand there in silence, the fear and anxiety will gradually creep into 
our heart, that while we were finding refuge in subterranean Gaza, the land 
above took its own life, was left behind and emptied out.”15 He says that the process 
of erasure, therefore, not only has an effect on the Palestinians but also on  
the Israelis themselves.
In his investigation of the construction of enmity between Jews and Arabs, Gil 
Anidjar poses the question:
 
Beyond the horridly all too familiar and inescapable “cycle of violence,” 
what is it that maintains the distance and kindles the enmity between the 
Arab and the Jew? What purposes are served by, what are the reasons 
for, the naturalization of this distance, the naturalization of the opposition, 
of the enmity between Arab and Jew, one that, as prominent narratives 
would have us believe, goes back to ancient biblical times, the ineluctable 
legacy of “the Middle East,” a region and a land eternally ravaged by war 
12 The immense influence of Deleuze’s 
reading of Herman Melville’s short story 
“Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall 
Street,” should be evaluated in light of the 
time it was written, waiting for the rupture 
in 1989. Gilles Deleuze, “Bartleby; or, The 
Formula,” in Essays Critical and Clinical, 
trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. 
Greco (1993; repr. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1997), 68–90.
13 The notion of self-inflicted tragedy on the 
side of the Palestinians is shared also by 
others from the Left as well. For example, 
Hakan Topal, who wrote: “Hamas knows 
that their stupid rockets do not provide 
any tactical advantage; nonethe less they 
fire them anyway. War, blood, and defeat 
is simply a show of force for Hamas. Its 
rockets do not carry any war heads. They 
are empty statements for the Palestinians 
themselves. Hamas promises a future 
without peace, a state without content, a 
religion without ethics.” Hakan Topal, “The 
Overlooked Besieged Alternative in the 




14 Israel’s ongoing armament with a fleet of 
nuclear submarines in recent years draws 
on remarkable historical trajectories. It 
has been reported that the German federal 
submarine subsidies to Israel settle a 1953 
German-Israeli reparations agreement for 
$500 million for the crimes of the Nazis 
that had been attributed to East Germany 
in the agreement, but were never paid. 
After 1989, it was unified Germany who 
took upon itself to pay the sum attributed 
to the DDR with nuclear submarines, that 
have been supplied to Israel since the 
1990s.  
15 Amir Nizar Zuabi, “The Underground 
Ghetto City of Gaza,” Haaretz, August 4, 
2014, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion 
/.premium-1.608653.
16 Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History  
of the Enemy (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), xiii. Anidjar 
extends on this enmity in a long footnote 
in which he provides a genealogy of  
the dichotomy. He explains that in Israel, 
nationality (“Arab” or “Jew”) is a category 
distinguished from citizenry (“Israeli”)—
both Arab and Jew are divorced from 
religious meaning here and come to denote 
an ethnicity. Anidjar quotes Amnon Raz-
Krakotzkin in saying: “Palestinian history 
and Palestinian national identity are part 
of the discussion of Zionist history, 
essential parts of the context of responsi-
bility. The definition of Palestinian rights 
and the definition of Jewish rights are one 
and the same. This is the context of re -
sponsibility that Zionism has created […]. 
A bi-national perspective leads to […] the 
definition of a common Jewish-Arab 
space.” In this context, we can say that the 
two communities already constitute the 
same society. See Anidjar, 163–64. 
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the Israeli nuclear project and subsequent policies are based—that is, a device 
is most effective when you do not use it. And so we are now faced with a  
possible devastating outcome of the condition of hyper-neutrality. Netanyahu’s 
continued threats to bomb Iran, together with the de facto annexation of  
Palestinian territories means that the only way Netanyahu and Israel are able 
to do any good is to not do anything at all.
Israeli theology scholar Ofri Ilany has claimed that the bombings of parts of the 
holy land by the state of Israel have become not only acceptable, but to some 
extent literally part of Israeli sovereignty. This new situation can testify to  
the ongoing political project of double-erasure through politicide and urbicide, 
but it also creates a skewing of historical time in relation to the political conflict; 
up until the 1990s, the mainstream project was basically focused on 1967  
and that is what both the PLO and the Israeli “peace camp” were fighting for. 
Since the 2000s, the conflict expanded to 1948—this conceptualization is 
mainly identified with the Israeli Right and with Hamas politics. Now, through the 
operations of ISIS in Syria-Iraq, we are already returning to 1917, the Balfour 
Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Parallel to this, mainstream Zionist 
reasoning leaves any pragmatic rationalization for its extensive use of violence 
(the Holocaust was one example used often in the past, and another was the 
claim that Israel is a tiny territory surrounded by enemies). Now it is almost offi-
cial doctrine that the biblical divine promise of the holy land to the Israelites  
is the premise for the existence of the state of Israel and the reason for all its 
actions.18 With this, the land itself changes its function—the flattening of  
Gaza seems to literalize this new form of politics.19
The disengagement plan and subsequent withdrawal from the Gaza settlements 
by Israel in 2005 were key moments where the two main Zionist camps of  
security reasoning (Holocaust), on the one hand, and of biblical reasoning (holy 
land) on the other, were confronted. In each camp there is a spectrum of 
ideas—the biblical one has on one side an anarchic strand that calls for freedom 
of religion, and on the other is a logic of full Israeli sovereignty over the holy 
sites in Jerusalem. The security camp is promoting the logic of agreements 
and subcontracting of policing to the Palestinians but is not reluctant to use 
doomsday military technologies. The settlements and the Israeli nuclear project 
were supposed to achieve both camps’ worldviews. After the Israeli with-
drawal in 2005, and once Hamas took over power in the Gaza strip, the balance 
of power within Zionist hegemony shifted. The events were proof that the  
biblical camp that divines promise also holds for security reasoning. Here we can 
see how someone like the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, performs 
the contradictions and tensions of the two camps and their extremes; the plan  
to use nuclear weapons against Iran and the de facto annexation of the occu-
pied Palestinian territories and the speeches on annihilation and divine 
promise. 
But Netanyahu is also a product of Cold War game-theory politics. This school 
of thought sees a lot of potential for maneuver within nonaction. That is the 
difference between George Bush senior and George Bush junior. One left Saddam 
Hussein in power and the other did not, unleashing a restructuring of power 
relations and violence in the Middle East that is yet to be contained in any 
foreseeable order. This game-theory school of thought is also the one on which 
17 In this context, the US wars in Iraq (1991 
and 2003) and the destruction of ancient 
Syrian cities since the civil war began in 
2011, show an intensification of urbicide 
patterns throughout the region, patterns 
that seem to have begun parallel to the 
discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf in 1911. 
18 This point relates as well to the question 
of Talmudic diaspora Judaism versus 
biblical Israeli Judaism.
19 Abstraction of the actual land is one 
scenario. Another would conceive of the 
actual land as the object of worship for the 
Jews today. After the Israelites had to 
accept an abstract non-visual monotheistic 
divinity, the holy land became their object 
of worship. See for example: W. J. T. Mitchell, 
“Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the 
American Wilderness,” Critical Inquiry 26, 
no. 2 (Winter, 2000): 193–223.
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The one-hundred-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1917 occurs in 
post-Soviet Russia in the crisis moment of its history.1 This crisis should be 
characterized not only as economic and social,2 but also as an ideological crisis 
of the ruling elite, which has no vision of the future, or any intent on aiding 
the social and political progress of the country. The lack of understanding by 
the ruling elite of its own place in history, as well as the deepening gap between 
those ruling on one side and the majority of people in Russian society on  
the other, is now covered by an imaginary continuity with the historical idea 
of “great Russia.” This type of history as an “eternal present,” without ruptures 
and contradictions, is one that always repeats itself—it became a pure form  
of this ideological crisis.
In January 2014 the world held its breath and observed the opening of the Winter 
Olympics in Sochi. The spectacular opening ceremony, “Dreams of Russia,” 
was not simply a technical triumph but also a marvel (a dream form) of national-
history building. The depicted historical events acquired a certain mutual 
continuity, building a chain of bright and majestic images told through a vision 
dreamed by a young girl.
It must have been difficult for the modern Russian state to find a better form  
to invent its own place in history, one without any contradictions and conflicts, 
than the reconstruction of a dream. It is precisely in a dream space, which 
Freud called “the dream work,” that it is possible to realize the most cherished 
of repressed desires. The place of authentic history is taken up by an imag-
ined history in which dreams form a “logical connection by approximation in time 
and space.”3 Freud compared the energy of dreams to an artist portraying all 
the poets who, in reality, had never been assembled together on the summit of 
Parnassus in a single group. The restless dream state in which slumbering  
Russian society continues to dwell remains the strongest substance with which 
the Putinist state connects the disparate, and successfully resolves the ago-
nizing issue of its own legitimacy.
Indeed, it was precisely according to a Parnassus-like principle that the program 
of historical exhibitions of recent years have been constructed and organized  






1 This text was commissioned and published 
in 2015 in WdW Review. See http://wdw 
review.org/desks/the-russian-revolution 
-in-dreams-and-reality/. It has been slightly 
reedited for this book by the author. 
2 This pessimistic view on perspectives of 
the Russian economy was confirmed by 
the experts, despite some small growth 
after the Russian financial crisis that was 
the result of the collapse of the Russian 
ruble beginning in the second half of 2014. 
See, for example, Pavel Koskin, “Why the 
Russian Economic Crisis Is Far from Over,” 
Russia Direct, January 17, 2017, http://
www.russia-direct.org/analysis/why-russian 
-economic-crisis-far-over.
3 Sigmund Freud, Sigmund Freud on Dreams, 
trans. M. D. Eder (Mineola, NY: Dover Thrift 
Editions, 2001), 16.
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year was the “objective evaluation” of the events of 1917 not just for historians 
but for the society as a whole. He stated that lessons should be learned— 
by which he meant that they need to find a way to ensure there would be no 
repetition of the revolution in the future.5 
Vladimir Medinsky, who lays claim to the role of chief ideologue of the “historical 
policy” of the current regime, outlined the main points of these “lessons.”6 
They include recognition of the continuity of historical development from the 
Russian empire, through the USSR to contemporary Russia; recognition of  
the tragedy of social schism; understanding the error of relying on the help of 
foreign allies; and condemnation of the ideology of revolutionary terror. The  
culmination of this government program, according to Medinsky, should be the 
inauguration of a monument to the “reconciliation of the civil war” in Crimea. 
In Medinsky’s view, “a visible and powerful symbol erected where the civil war 
ended will be the best way to demonstrate that it really has ended.”7 In this 
construction, Crimea plays not just the role of the symbol of historical integrity, 
but a central element of the actual identity between the government and  
the people. After the events of 2014, the political climate in Russia has been 
designed as the “Crimean consensus,” where questions regarding annexation 
are approved by all political and social groups. Those who are not ready to 
justify this action are proclaimed in the media as “national traitors” and expelled 
from the healthy body of the nation. 
So the main lesson that society, in accordance with this plan, should draw on 
is not only that the revolution was terrible but also that it was superfluous.  
It turns out that the 1917 revolution had no constitutive meaning (even though 
one pays one’s dues by mourning its unnecessary sacrifices); it was not the 
end of an old era and the beginning of a new one, because “fortunately” both 
eras are united in the logic of the existing state whose monument will be the 
reconciling “Parnassus” of Crimea.
In this way, the “objective evaluation” that Putin expects from historians comes 
down to proving that the revolution was the result of a foreign conspiracy  
devoted to the Romanov and Rurik dynasties. The series of exhibitions “Russia— 
My History” started in 2013 as the joint project of the Orthodox Church and the  
government of Moscow. “Russia—My History” includes several cycles of Russian 
history. The Rurik dynasty tells about the formation of the Russian state sys-
tem, and the history of reign of one of the oldest dynasties in Europe, the Rurik 
(or Rurikids), which was founded by the Varangian prince Rurik, who estab-
lished himself in Novgorod around the year AD 862). The Romanov dynasty 
shows all the vicissitudes of history that Russia passed through during the 
three-hundred-year reign of this royal family. The exhibition “The XX Century: 
From the Great Upheaval to a Great Victory, 1917–1945” contains the most  
important events of the twentieth century: the participation of the Russian 
empire in the World War I, the events of the civil war, and periods of collectiv-
ization and industrialization as well as the victory and losses of the Russian 
people in World War II. In 2017 new multimedia exhibitions of the events of 
Russian political history from 1945 to the present were added. All of the exhi-
bitions are presented today as part of the permanent pavilion in Moscow’s 
VDNH Park.4 These exhibitions are accompanied by quotes by Vladimir Putin, 
foreign affairs minister Sergey Lavrov, and Patriarch Kirill I.
Though they belong to different epochs and often find themselves antagonistic 
toward one another, they greet, in unison, the museumgoers rushing to an 
appointment with their own history. It is in this harmony, created by the fantasy 
of the Russian state, that the pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet epochs of 
Nikolai II, Stalin, and Putin, respectively, all rub shoulders. This imagined unity 
is bound by one thing only: the displacement of the revolution, a historical ex-
plosion that must be consigned to oblivion and have an anathema pronounced 
upon it. Countering the revolutionary threat in Russia is one of the pillars of 
the present reign-ing ideology, accompanied by a strategy of repressive work 
on the past that is trying to criminalize the 1917 events and remove it from  
actual social memory. 
The displacement of the revolution acquires special significance in 2017 with 
the centenary of the second Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution was a 
pair of revolutions that dismantled the Tsarist autocracy and led to the even-
tual rise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire collapsed with the abdication 
of Emperor Nikolai II, and the old regime was replaced by a provisional gov-
ernment after the first revolution in February (March in the Gregorian calendar; 
the older Julian calendar was in use in Russia at the time). In the second  
revolution—the October Revolution (November in the Gregorian calendar)—the 
Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, and the soviet workers overthrew the pro-
visional government in Petrograd and established the Russian SFSR, eventually 
shifting the capital to Moscow in 1918. In December 2016 Putin especially 
stressed this in his annual address to the federal assembly (that consists of both 
houses of parliament). He pointed out that one of the main tasks of the com ing 
4 Vystavka Dostizheniy Narodnogo  
(VDNH) translates as “Exhibition of achieve - 
ments of national economy.”
5 See the annual address by Vladimir Putin 
to the federal assembly on December 1, 
2016: http://kremlin.ru/events/president 
/news/53379.
6 Vladimir Medinsky, patriotic pro-Kremlin 
politician and historical writer, became a 
minister of culture in 2012, in the beginning 
of Putin’s third presidential term. This 
moment marked a “conservative turn” of 
Putin’s regime, and was accompanied by 
anti-Western, nationalist, and clerical 
rhetoric. In this context Medinsky lays 
claim to the role of chief ideologue of the 
“historical policy” of the current regime.
7 See Vladimir Medinsky’s speech at the 
roundtable discussion “100 Years of the 
Great Russian Revolution: Judgment in the 
Name of Consolidation,” at the Museum of 
Contemporary Russian History in Moscow, 
May 2015. Unless otherwise noted, all 
translations are my own.
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In Echoes of the Marseillaise (1990), Eric Hobsbawm presents a substantial 
picture of the transformation of interpretations of the French Revolution in the 
subsequent two centuries. The great revolution of the eighteenth century  
remained an incomplete project, but its significance and meaning was constantly 
subject to redefinition while still remaining at the center of political discus-
sion and of utmost significance at each new historical turning point. According 
to Hobsbawm, “In the year of its bi-centenary the French Revolution was no  
jolly old holiday at which millions of tourists gathered […] for it represented a 
set of events so powerful and universal in their influence that they had trans-
formed the world in many ways and roused […] forces which continue this work 
of transformation.”13
These “roused forces” that revealed new elements of the revolutionary legacy, 
became manifest in the uprisings of the nineteenth century and the Paris 
Commune, in the struggles of the communists in the 1920s, the resistance dur-
ing World War II, and the students protests in May 1968.14
The recognition of the French Revolution during each of these periods was in 
constant flux but nevertheless remained a territory within which one could 
continually reevaluate the main protagonists and parties. Yet there was an un-
changing appreciation that this was a large-scale event after which nothing 
could remain as it was before. The revolution remained on its path as memory, 
preventing society from falling into slumber, time and again marking points  
of discord, and thus creating obstacles to the installation of any post-political 
consensus. Toward the end of the 1980s, when French intellectuals registered 
the crisis of mass movements, traditional political parties, and the devaluation 
of political meaning, “the fidelity to the event” (in the words of Alain Badiou)  
of universal revolutions15—both the French and the Russian—remained a  
constant horizon of hope that history would continue on its path and that the 
sacrifices had not been in vain.
and the extremist ideology of a bunch of malefactors. It is already clear that the 
old myth that financial support from the German general staff was the main 
reason for the Bolsheviks’ success is once again gaining power. Among histo-
rians, Boris Mironov, a professor from Saint Petersburg University, stands out.  
In his sweeping work The Standard of Living and Revolutions in Russia 1700–
1917, aided by a massive quantity of anthropometric data, he attempts to prove 
that the weight, height, and quantity of calories consumed by the majority  
of the population in prerevolutionary Russia was inexorably rising.8
According to Mironov, even World War I did not prevent the Russian peasants 
from enjoying their abundant diet. Poverty and the exploitation of peasants  
in the Russian empire are part of a myth that implies the revolution was nothing 
other than the result of the active role of “Russian radicals.” Mironov constitutes 
a particularly impressive example of how a vulgar materialist analysis can be 
successfully combined with an equally vulgar conspiracy theory. The re vo-
lution took place only because the conspirers were not rendered harmless in 
time. So the “lesson” of the revolution is intended, first of all, for the police. 
Again returning to Freud, one can compare it to the “censorship” function  
of the dream, a function that includes a repressive crackdown on any unsanc-
tioned interventions of the unconscious. 9 Freud says that “dreams are the  
removal of disturbing stimuli by way of hallucinated satisfaction.”10
Before us is a new model, striking in its coherence and base nature, of the 
“normalization” of the revolution with which Russia will greet its centenary. 
Outside the limits of this model, there is nothing but a tinkling of tacit approval. 
The liberal opposition, for all its hatred of the existing regime, is remarkably 
ready to accept this version of events: one must liberate oneself from the revo-
lution. Such liberation from the revolutionary legacy is seen by the Russian 
liberals as a necessary part of the program of “de-Sovietization,”11 which proposes 
the dismantling of “Soviet” institutions and monuments symbolizing revolu-
tionary violence against citizens.
The functionaries of the Russian Communist Party (KPRF), who almost vanished 
from the public sphere, are also ready to accept the lessons of the revolution 
proposed by Putin and Minister Medinsky. If liberals choose to disavow the revo-
lution and also display a willingness to demolish statues, then the communists 
choose to preserve monuments while renouncing revolution. Buried alive in the 
monuments and symbols of the Brezhnev era, and being presently entirely 
devoid of political meaning, the memory of the revolution morphs into an  
organic, seamless part of the conservative, anti-revolutionary, ruling-class proj-
ect in Russia.12 This emerging consensus of consigning anything reminiscent  
of the revolution to oblivion is connected with the displacement of politics in 
contemporary Russia.
8 See Boris Mironov, The Standard of Living 
and Revolutions in Russia 1700–1917,  
ed. Gregory L. Freeze (London: Routledge, 
2012). The book was originally published 
in 2010.
9  Freud, Sigmund Freud on Dreams, 36.
10  Sigmund Freud, “The Dream Censor,” in  
A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 
trans. Stanley G. Hall (New York: Boni and 
Liveright, 1920), accessed July 17, 2017, 
http://www.bartleby.com/283/9.html.
11  A law for the de-Sovietization of Ukraine 
in 2016 is such a case. Soviet names of 
cities and towns were removed and 
changed. 
12  A large number of existing “revolutionary” 
monuments from the Soviet time were 
established during Brezhnev’s period of 
zastoi (“stagnation”), especially in the 
time from 1967 (on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the revolution) and in 1971 (on the one 
hundredth anniversary of Lenin’s birth).
13  Eric Hobsbawm, Echoes of the Marseillaise: 
Two Centuries Look Back on the French 
Revolution (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1990), 103.
14  The volatile period of civil unrest in France 
during May 1968 was punctuated by 
demonstrations and massive general 
strikes as well as with the occupation of 
universities and factories across the 
country.
15  Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the 
Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward 
(London: Verso, 2001), 42.
The Russian Revolution in Dreams and Reality Ilya Budraitskis
270 271
Today in Russia the sense of ideological deadlock and a deep political crisis  
are felt more acutely, dramatically, and with greater pessimism than in France 
on the eve of the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution in 1989. 
The desire to bury the revolution by erecting a preposterous monument of 
“reconciliation” on its tomb is a desire sealed by fear. An attempt is being made 
to persuade us that violence and terror are the only results when society  
reawakens, and is, in fact, the main lesson we are all obliged to learn from the 
revolution. Yet what happened in 1917 is already impossible to expunge, not 
only from the past but also from the future. Revolutionary events, anathematized 
or hidden under lock and key, probably have not yet had the moment when 
they can be revealed and grasped.
Translated from the Russian by Giuliano Vivaldi
The Russian Revolution in Dreams and Reality Ilya Budraitskis
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The commemorative year 2014 was an occasion for some EU member states 
to carry out a major European commemoration to mark the one hundredth 
anniversary of the outbreak of the World War I, in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herze-
govina. For a moment, in the summer of 2014, Sarajevo was brought into  
focus by the mass media and internationally. The commemoration was organized 
as a multidisciplinary festival that included a number of cultural, sporting,  
educational, and scientific events, all presented under the same banner:  
“Sarajevo, Heart of Europe.” 
This title was given to Sarajevo by EU states that wanted to present the city as 
suddenly being in the center of European concerns and emotions, even though 
this is not the case. In fact, the EU despises Sarajevo, not only because the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie on 
June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo (the capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time), is considered to have sparkled the World 
War I, but also because Sarajevo is today seen as a kind of the retrograde 
post-socialist Islamic center (rather than as the “Jerusalem of Europe,” which was 
the case before the 1990s). Naming it the heart of Europe is paradoxical given 
the fact that this region has been completely abandoned by the European Union. 
It was abandoned during the horrendous war in the 1990s (where Sarajevo 
was under siege for the longest time in modern history, and where some of the 
worst crimes were committed against humanity throughout the country, with 
mass executions and genocide in UN safe zones, as seen with the Srebrenica’s 
genocide, among others). The city is abandoned today, left to poverty and 
misery produced by the regime in power. Sarajevo, “the heart,” is actually seen 
by former imperial and colonial forces as a kind of a ticking emotional bomb. 
My analysis aims to unpack these celebrations from the perspective of those 
who have been silenced and erased from the picture. I want to contextualize 
these memorial events in relation to necropolitics,1 tactics of de-historicization, 
and of humanitarianism. I want to reconsider what is the social, economic, 
and political reality of Sarajevo today. I argue that this reality is a reality of pure 
abandonment of the city and Bosnia and Herzegovina by the EU to the extent 
that it is possible to state that the proclamation of Sarajevo as a heart is rather 
that of a “rotten heart.” Necropolitical reality is the reality of Sarajevo today. 
My main argument is that the dominant and systematic de-contextualization, 
de-historicization, and de-politicization of persistent racializations of the  
region and the current historical revisionism of remembrance, or, rather its 
Sarajevo, 
Rotten Heart  
of Europe
Adla Isanović
1 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. 
Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, no. 1 
(2003): 11–40.
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In the context of ex-Yugoslav countries, these tendencies, together with the 
brutal and systematic de-historicization (on which Marina Gržinić, Boris Buden, 
and Rastko Močnik have written extensively) and the ideology of transitology 
(presented as process of “normalization” of the violent suspension of socialism 
and introduction of bloody neoliberal capitalism in the 1990s) are functions  
of neo-colonialism (which occurs under the mask of a democratization of former 
as it is named totalitarian Eastern European countries).7 
Practices of othering are deeply interweaved with the logic of the ideology of 
transitology (that I described in the previous paragraph as “normalization”  
of the violent suspension of socialism and introduction of bloody neoliberal cap-
italism in the 1990s). Those who accept the standards of modern develop-
ment (fast modernization that includes a thorough implementation of neoliberal 
global capitalism) are seen as “normal” post-socialist or former Eastern Euro-
pean states. All the others that failed for different reasons to quickly embrace 
hyper-economic rationalism are seen as supposedly underdeveloped and 
therefore (historically, politically, culturally) “abnormal.”8 Within the narrative of 
transition, the fate of ex-socialist and ex-communist societies in such dis-
course is that they will always be perceived as outdated, backward, always at 
loss (losers), sometimes even as a failed state (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
not only in terms of politics but also culturally.9 The same applies to ex-colonial 
states. Each of these societies is considered to take on the role of the loser, 
desperately trying to catch up with the West.
Systematic de-historicization is a strategy used in the case of so-called countries 
in transition. Transition failed because it was never supposed to succeed,  
but in that process we have forgotten from where we started. By “evacuating 
memory,” neoliberal capitalist governmentality prepared ground for the nec-
essary humanitarian action of normalization and the transnational capital.  
As Agamben, Gržinić, Buden, and Močnik have recognized, former Yugoslavia 
erasure, are in service of the normalization of death, of necropolitics, that 
works along the ongoing coloniality and growing fascistic politics that are all 
central to global neoliberal governmentality and Europe today.
Relating Politics of Visibility to the Coloniality of Power, 
Capitalism, Necropolitics, Tactics of De-historicization,  
and Humanitarianism
To understand the politics of in/visibility of Sarajevo and the whole region we 
need to analyze and contexualize it in relation to the coloniality of power and 
current forms of capitalism, and their tactics and strategies of discrimination 
that are de-historicization and humanitarianism.
The concept of coloniality of power articulates the interrelation among modern 
forms of exploitation and domination (of power).2 Coloniality identifies and 
describes the living legacy of colonialism in contemporary settings that has sur-
vived formal colonialism and became integrated in succeeding political and 
social orders (defining culture, labor, nature, gender, subjectivities, and knowl-
edge production, too).3 As Aníbal Quijano articulates it, coloniality as a Euro-
centric project is based on the (inferior/superior) racial classifications of world 
populations (into ranks, places, and roles in society’s structure of power), 
where the idea of race is a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of dom-
ination that are being imposed. In Quijano’s words, “The model of power that  
is hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality,”4 and this is closely 
related to the coloniality of knowledge that refers to the practice of holding 
Western concepts as universal (a process that is closely related to the constitu-
tion and the elaboration of European modernity/rationality). In short, as 
 Quijano argues, the intellectual concept of the process of modernity, which pro-
duced Eurocentrism as “a perspective and concrete mode of producing 
knowledge,” was made globally hegemonic, colonizing and overcoming previ-
ous or different knowledge, and “gives a very tight account of the character  
of the global model of power: colonial/modern, capitalist, and Eurocentered.”5
Humanitarianism enters the discussion to maintain an illusion of social care and 
to enable the maintenance of hierarchy on a global scale. It establishes, or 
more precisely maintains, an asymmetry and inequality of positions—of those 
(weaker) who are determined to receive and those (powerful) who are inter-
vening and acting since they are “obliged” to provide assistance and give (life 
or death). In contemporary settings, humanitarianism intensifies with necro-
politics, when governing over death becomes one of the main governmental 
activities of neoliberal global capitalism.6
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276 277
forth. It seems that everyone had something to say about the assassination,  
the war, and the centenary. Actually, this was also an opportunity for a number 
of cultural institutions and individual artists to receive some money to put  
toward their work—mostly from European, but also (although small) from local 
funds. This does not apply only to the local scene. A number of international  
institutions and individuals produced and presented their artworks for the cen-
tenary as well. 
Two central commemorative events, with EU funding, were held in Sarajevo  
on June 28, 2014. These were: a concert by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra 
and the huge epic spectacle titled “A Century of Peace after the Century of 
Wars.” Both events were produced to mark the end of a century of war, to opti-
mistically and naively conclude that the worst is behind us, and to send a 
message of peace, love, and solidarity to the world.
Concert by Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra at Vijećnica
The major event was held at Vijećnica, the former city hall and national library 
that was built during the Austro-Hungarian rule, but destroyed during the 
siege of Sarajevo in 1992. Vijećnica has been renovated in stages over the past 
fifteen years, funded by donations from several European countries and the 
Euro pean Commission. On June 28, 2014, Vijećnica was again symbolically 
opened, but this time to bring together the diplomatic core and the ruling elite, 
as part of an event that was organized to mark this centenary. As a matter of 
fact, there were several official openings of this building (inaugurated on  
Europe Day, May 9, 2014, and it was opened for general public on July 17, 2014, 
with out any special significance of the chosen date).
in the 1990s was the “bloody messenger of the new nomos of the Earth.”10  
Already for this reason, it is important to look at what is happening in the coun-
try now, and what role the politics and cultures of remembrance play in it. 
Also, how did Europe commemorate the centenary in Sarajevo and what does 
this tell us?
“Sarajevo, Heart of Europe”
I argue that practices and forms of knowledge production and of visibility linked 
to the memorial events in Sarajevo are in the service of de-contextualization, 
de-historicization, and de-politicization that are at the core of current neoliberal 
governmentality.
Although some European countries have organized programs of commemora-
tion, and virtual memorizations (the construction of virtual environments  
for educational purposes on memory) of the centenary of the World War I were 
launched in their countries, the idea of a common European commemoration  
in some European capitals was not welcomed (if we exclude summits of EU heads 
of state and government). However, it appears that some EU member states 
were willing to carry out the first major common commemoration to mark the 
one hundredth anniversary of the start of World War I and the “end to a cen-
tury of war” in Sarajevo—the city that brings to mind the outbreak of the World 
War I. This included the establishment of the special foundation called “Sarajevo, 
Heart of Europe,” by the French Mission du Centenaire, joined in 2013 by six 
other EU member states (Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Spain, Belgium, 
and Italy) and the city of Sarajevo, to organize various cultural, sport, and  
educational programs within this framework to commemorate a century of 
European history. As the initiators explained, it was Europe’s duty to speak up 
and deliver a message of solidarity, peace, and reconciliation one hundred 
years later.11
These European countries have been working together to place Sarajevo once 
again at the center of European concerns. Sarajevo, Heart of Europe, was or-
ganized as a multidisciplinary festival, included a number of events. A huge num-
ber of exhibitions, movies, and large-scale performances were produced to 
transmit the above-mentioned message and to reflect on this past.12
Apart from this European program, there were also a number of other cultural 
projects and interventions. For example, some movies were produced that  
reflected on the assassination and on the commemoration by reputable direc-
tors.13 Also, there were a huge number of other Austro-Bosnian initiatives and  
local and international exhibitions that dealt with these topics. These included 
exhibitions of art and design, but also the display of archival materials, and so 
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“A Century of Peace after the Century of Wars” 
Apart from this event, the EU has also thought of the “folk” in Sarajevo and 
has invested one million euros in the epic spectacle for the broad masses of  
people called “A Century of Peace after the Century of Wars,”15 held a few 
hundred meters from Vijećnica at the bridge next to the place where Gavrilo 
Princip (a young Bosnian Serb) assassinated Franz Ferdinand and his wife  
on June 28, 1914. The bridge is today called Latin Bridge, although from 1918 
to 1992 it was named Princip’s Bridge. 
At the site of assassination, there is a museum called the Sarajevo Museum 
1878–1918, and it displays what Sarajevo was like during the Austro-Hungarian 
period (also its presentation stresses the “civilizing mission” of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in Sarajevo’s development).16 Prior to that the museum was 
called the Museum “Mlada Bosna” (named after the organization to which 
Princip belonged), and the narrative of the museum was different. In front of 
the museum, from 1956 to 1992, there were the plaque and footprints marking 
the exact spot from where Princip fired his shots. Written on the plaque was 
the following: “From this place, on 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, expressed with 
his shot the people’s revolt against tyranny and their centuries-old struggle 
for freedom.” At beginning of the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, the plaque and 
the footprints were removed by authorities in Sarajevo. In front of the museum 
today there is a new plaque with a text that doesn’t include previous “ideo-
logical” messages.
In 2014, from this very site, the message that had to be sent was that after a 
century of war, it was time for a century of peace (with the idea that the worst 
is behind us) and that should now celebrate peace and love. The public who 
were targeted for this event was local. It had to be epic and spectacular, with 
a clear and unquestionable message—that of peace and love from Bosnia to 
the rest of the world.
It was a grand, multidisciplinary open-air show combining dance, music, theater, 
and video, bringing together more than two hundred artists from nine coun-
tries. This one-hour long show was directed by local, well-known director Haris 
Pašović. Based on the common theme of war songs that spanned the century, 
it addressed the wars of the twentieth century through three acts: 1) before 
The program of the concert by the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra was “Euro-
pean,” and included pieces by famous Austrian, German, and French com-
posers, followed by the EU anthem and anthem of Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 
The direct enjoyment of the concert was reserved for elites (more interna tional 
and less local), while the local population was left, on the other side of the 
river bank, to enjoy it on an outdoor screen (or eventually watch it on TV) that 
was installed in a parking lot. Thus, at a safe distance from the elite. The  
concert was broadcast by the European Broadcast Union, directly to European 
audiences as well.
Although, the nature of these events was confusing because it was not clear if 
we were celebrating or mourning something, or how we were to deal with  
this past, the message from Vijećnica, the symbol of the Austro-Hungarian rule 
in Bosnia, was clear. What was celebrated and promoted at Vijećnica was  
the cultural superiority and survival of the so-called European values and Euro-
pean identity.
The values often referred to as distinctly European are: respect for human 
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, solidarity, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of minorities. However, as we can see  
in the past and present, these values are reserved only for some forms of life and 
some Europeans. In reality, discourse on European values (as a mode of orga-
nizing knowledge, ideas, and experience) is employed in order to reproduce the 
differences between us and them, and is employed in the racialization of  
the Other (which is represented in terms of unpleasant cultural differences that 
are condemned as being harmful for the so-called European values). Such 
discourse is the foundation of the project that erases the whole history of Euro-
pean colonial dominance in the world, as well as the links to racism, fascism, 
and capitalism within it.
It should also be mentioned that among a huge number of people in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—there is a percep-
tion that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was on a civilizing mission, and that 
the EU continues that mission today. There is a kind of a “mourning” linked to 
the fantasy that we would have been much better, would have been part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Europe), if we had stayed under their rule.
Between the lines of this colonial narrative on the civilizing mission of this cen-
tral event, there was a promise that maybe one day, although it seems so  
impossible, this region would join Europe, would be recognized not as “junk” 
or “barbarian,” but as a part of this elite club too. However, this integrating, 
civilizing process is not expected to go through critical re-articulation of the 
past and present. Capital is supposed to civilize us/them.
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no matter what is the will of the people. The council only takes into account 
what benefits global neoliberal capitalism, regardless of what will happen with 
the local community, the people, and their lives.
What Was Evacuated from and to Sarajevo in 2014 and Why?
As remembrance is always a matter of political struggles, it is important to look 
at which perspectives and narratives were excluded in 2014. What was erased 
and silenced in Sarajevo in 2014?
I can state that in the last few years, ethno-nationalistic ideology and neoliberal 
capitalism have taken over all of the social, political, and economic reality in 
Bosnia. Therefore in the summer of 2014, we were not supposed to question the 
system and what the transition and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina took 
from us. Much was “forgotten” while remembering the outbreak of World War I. 
In fact, a few months prior to these “spectacles” in February 2014, Bosnia  
and Herzegovina (including Sarajevo) was at the center of the world’s attention 
because of the wave of the biggest social uprisings in the postwar period. 
Furthermore, in mid-May 2014 (thus, two months prior to these spectacles), huge 
floods devastated a major part of the country and once again confirmed  
that citizens were totally abandoned—all of that had to be erased. What was 
on stage was necropolitics.
Although it would be important to critically reflect on the similarities and differ-
ences between 1914 and 2014, on changing sovereignty, and new/old orders, 
such critical reflections were far away from the spectacles of the EU regime of 
power. We have to remind ourselves that in 2014, the Mediterranean was al-
ready a huge mass grave for refugees and migrants trying to reach Europe—the 
Europe that denies colonialism as being the cause of the production of the 
so-called refugee crisis, while, at the same time, messages of love, solidarity, 
and peace were being sent from Sarajevo by the organizers of the celebration, 
which means they were also being sent by Austria and the EU. The result was 
that discussions on the crisis of Europe, on the legacies of colonialism, racism, 
the past, and current fascisms were silenced. 
(Dis)placement of the Rotten Heart of Europe
Although Europe has invested huge efforts to present racist politics, conflicts, 
and fundamentalism as categories that do not belong to its heritage today,  
its treatment of refugees clearly shows that the idea of racist and fascistic supe-
riority of Europeans and of European culture, and of “pure” Europe, is not only 
alive but is actually institutionalized—through official representatives and poli-
the war; 2) during the war; 3) an ode to life. Lyrics and imagery were a total mix 
of everything and anything: local and international poets, French chansons, 
Turkish songs, Greek mythology, a Russian Cossack choir, Dalmatian Klapa sing-
ing, black angels, Auschwitz camp detainees, and even a film that shows  
the delivery of twin babies—all of this was mixed up to send a message that 
tolerance and life are beautiful, in contrast to war that is grotesque and awful. 
Finally, this pathetic and empty spectacle concluded with songs and reunions of 
the Serbian and Bosnian pop-folk stars Šaban Šaulić (singing a song “Vjerujem 
u ljubav” [I believe in love]) and Dino Merlin (singing “Je l’ Saraj’vo gdje je 
nekad bilo” [Is Sarajevo where it once was]), accompanied by a huge shining 
heart rising over the bridge where the spectacle took place. Both events  
were organized to obscure the local disputes and the European silence over 
the past and present of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The assassination, which has been presented as the event that triggered World 
War I, is a subject of antagonism and dispute in Bosnia (just as other historical 
events and their legacies that dominate the sphere of public remembrance and 
have different interpretations (e.g., the 1992–95 war and World War II). Al-
though narratives about the role of Princip were less disputed before the 1990s, 
today they are replaced with new and diverse ethno-national interpretations. 
These ambiguities show that culture is in the center of identity politics and strug-
gles. Huge ethno-nationalistic efforts have been invested to control national 
narratives and the culture of remembrance through continuous historical  
revisionism and controlled memorization by right-wing regimes since the ’90s. 
Simultaneously, the concept of the culture of remembrance, as related to  
the idea of truth and reconciliation, was promoted as integrative aspect of the 
“transitional justice” in the process of the so-called normalization of transi-
tional societies.
However, today, in line with the process of de-historicization, new politics and 
cultures of ignorance actually aspire to liberate our societies from history  
in order to clear the pathway for capitalism’s profit. This tendency is linked to 
the new idea that reconciliation is achievable if we forget the past and focus 
on economic development. In fact, who needs transitional justice and truth any-
more, since these chapters are closed and these societies are now integrated  
in global capitalism?
It should be stressed that while disputes over Gavrilo Princip in the local com-
munity are presented as related to the question of national awareness, in  
the current form of capitalism, in this shift from nation-state to war state, sov-
ereignty has changed too. Bosnia is a country where sovereign power of  
the so-called international community is institutionalized in the figure and the 
office of the High Representative and the Peace Implementation Council,  
who have the rights and the power to intervene (or not) and govern as they wish, 
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cies. What continues to be ignored is the fact that just as the historical fascism 
was closely related to the capitalism in the previous century (and the colonial 
past), contemporary fascistic politics are directly related to the current state of 
capitalism and its coloniality of power. Actually, there are much more similari-
ties between historical fascism and our contemporary fascism than Europe is 
currently willing to recognize. Although fascism in different societies has  
its specificities, its major task has been to grow and secure national capitalism 
(from inner and/or outer enemies). Furthermore, racism and fascistic politics 
are now uniting Fortress Europe under a “war on migrants” in order to protect 
its purity, capital, and the current order of things.
A common European past was not recalled in Vienna, Berlin, or some other 
European cities, but in Sarajevo—the capital of the “failed state” and the heart 
of “wild and bloody Balkans”—thus, far enough from the European center.  
Sarajevo is a perfect site, if we want to close our eyes to the rise of racism,  
fascism, and the legacies of colonialism all around Europe and the world. Ironi-
cally, Sarajevo was proclaimed the heart of Europe but it was not named the Euro-
pean Capital of Culture (the EU explained that a city whose state is not an  
EU member cannot be named the European Capital of Culture). It was just not 
possible to name it “European” or a “cultural capital” because that would be 
too much. 
Therefore, the metaphor of the heart was more appropriate, suggesting that 
Sarajevo is part of Europe, actually its most important part, though still not 
European enough. Furthermore, the heart inside the Western tradition relates to 
emotions, and this might also suggest that Sarajevo is a big pot of emotions  
(or rather an emotional bomb, as the sovereign power sees it through colonial 
lenses). The true nature of the European “concern” for Sarajevo (being at/in  
the heart of Europe) was again revealed two days after the closing of the major 
commemoration; what remained after the mass media, the EU elite, inter-
national diplomats, intellectuals, and international artists had left was a void 
and silence. 
What is obviously in crisis are the so-called European values and democracy 
(reserved for Europeans only, or rather for some forms of life) that depart from 
the racist presumption of the European cultural superiority. Racism is at the 
heart of Europe and its policies. Actually, it is exactly the fascistoide politics 
toward migrants and the Other that are reuniting Europe today.
Instead of these de-contextualizing cultural projects and spectacles that partici-
pate in silencing the relation between necropolitics and current practices  
of visi bility, the living legacies of coloniality, erasure of memory, and of our 
contemporary horror, we desperately need practices and “new visibilities” 
(Gržinić) that will contextualize and politicize all that has been swept under 
the carpet of the so-called culture of remembrance.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998. 
Buden, Boris. “The Post-Yugoslavian 
Condition of Institutional Critique: An 
Introduction.” Transversal (2007). http://
eipcp.net/transversal/0208/buden/en.
Gržinić, Marina. “Contextualisation of  
the Notion of State and of Contemporary 
Art in Global Neoliberal Capitalism.”  
In State in Time, edited by IRWIN, 53–69. 
New York: Compositions, 2014. https://
emancipationofresistance.wordpress 
.com/grzinic/.
———. “The Emergence of the Political 
Subject.” Lecture given at the conference 
“Emancipation of Resistance,” organized  
by NGO Kontrapunkt, Skopje, Macedonia, 
March 5–7, 2013. https://emancipation 
ofresistance.wordpress.com/grzinic/.
———, ed. “Biopolitics, Necropolitics, and 
Decoloniality.” Special issue, Pavilion: 
Journal for Politics and Culture 14 (2010): 
9–93.
Mbembe, Achille. “Necropolitics.” 
Translated by Libby Meintjes. Public 
Culture 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.
Quijano, Aníbal. “Coloniality and Modernity/ 
Rationality.” Cultural Studies 21, nos. 2–3 
(2007): 168–78.
———. “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, 
and Latin America.” Nepantla: Views from 
South 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80.
Literature
285Hiroshi Yoshioka
What I attempt to do in this essay is to focus on several different images and 
narratives related to nuclear power, radiation, explosion, and nuclear disasters 
in the context of postwar Japan. They include visions inspired by atomic 
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the diffusion of a legend hiding a 
possible atomic bombing, and images representing both the hopes and fears 
about nuclear experiments and construction of nuclear power plants during the 
period of postwar economic growth after the 1950s. And today we find various 
images and narratives related to the Fukushima nuclear crisis caused by the 
earthquake and tsunami in 2011. 
My argument is not so much about nuclear issues but about the domain of imag-
ination and fantasy, which I believe is as important as the real politics. Many 
people in Japan in the 1950s who longed for industrial development were con-
vinced that nuclear power would be okay because it would be used for  
peaceful purposes and because experts assured it was technically safe, although 
they were all still haunted by nightmarish memories of the nuclear attacks  
exerted on the nation only a decade before. Their mind was, in a way, split into 
two totally different perceptions of nuclear power. We can say a kind of psy-
chological “border” was set in people’s mind, a border dividing the “good” 
nuclear energy from the “bad” one. In the realm of imagination, however, this 
border is sometimes transgressed in unexpected ways, and we find such 
transgressions in images in popular culture as well as in works of art.
Earlier Representation of Hiroshima in Art  
and Popular Culture
Images of nuclear power are found in a large number of artworks such as paint-
ings and novels, as well as in works in popular culture such as comics (manga), 
animation, films, and many other forms. Since it is not my intention here to 
list all of them, I would like to mention only a few that represent Hiroshima in 
a strong and direct way, and have more or less determined which dominant 
images and narratives about Hiroshima exist today.
The Hiroshima Panels by Iri and Toshi Maruki is perhaps one of the most well-
known paintings depicting the horrifying consequences of the atomic bombing 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The artists had started to work on it in 1950 and 
completed it in 1982, over a period of thirty-two years. They used the Japanese 
painting style called nihonga, and the work has the format of folding panels,  
a traditional form for Japanese painting. The work belongs to the Maruki Gallery 
in Saitama Prefecture, which was established in 1967 to house this piece that,  










sions are so direct and strong that many viewers cannot help but cry. On the 
other hand, we should note that these works have not always been treated in 
the same way as other paintings or manga. They are regarded as something 
special because of their direct relation to the subject, and this has sometimes 
kept general audiences away. What I mean by the expression “nuclear imagi-
nation” is not only related to works such as these but to the much wider range 
of works and cultural images reaching a greater number of people, where 
imagination about nuclear issues sometimes functions in an unconscious way.
“Nuclear Imagination”
One of the reasons I think it is significant to focus on imagination in relation  
to nuclear issues is that it could allow more people to join in the discussion. Dis-
cussing nuclear issues requires quite a lot of technical knowledge. However, 
regardless of how and what we imagine about nuclear energy, many of us feel 
we have something to say about it. I believe this is also a cru-cial part of dis-
cussions about nuclear issues.
In seventeenth-century Europe, scientific thinking originally meant democratic 
thinking—thinking independently from religious authorities. But in the age of 
the industrial revolution, with specialization of scientific knowledge, science 
itself often functions as an authority, and is often used by political leaders to 
coerce people into remaining silent. That is what happened in the period 
when nuclear power plants were first introduced in Japan in 1960s. Those who 
feared nuclear energy by naturally associating it with the atomic catastrophe 
were denounced as outdated and unscientific. Experts against the construction 
of nuclear power plants were labeled radical leftists. Both were regarded as 
obstructing economic growth, which was at the top of the agenda of postwar 
Japan.
This is why I find it very important to focus on collectively shared images  
and narratives. Imagination is the faculty that allows us to integrate fragmented 
perceptions and pieces of knowledge into a single, widely shared symbol,  
image, or figure. Such a figure often shows ambiguity, containing contradictory 
The A-bomb victims depicted in the panels not only include Japanese citizens 
but also Koreans and Americans (who were war prisoners), and the panels 
also represent scenes from the nuclear contamination of the Daigo Fukuryū Maru.1 
Images depicted in the panels give the viewer such strong emotional effects 
that he or she can hardly think quietly, but the main intention of the work  
is not to blame the decision of the United States to drop atomic bombs, but to 
show the truly hellish outcomes caused by nuclear explosions, no matter 
whether they were attacks or accidents. The core message of this work is a 
universal one: the total abolition of nuclear weapons.
We find that the work has the style of Jigoku-e (vision of hell), a traditional 
genre of painting that depics torments in the Jigoku, or hell, the lowest world 
in Buddhist cosmology where sinners are supposed to go after death.2 We  
understand that the unspeakable agony following atomic bombings was repre-
sented as an updated version of a genre in the traditional Buddhist painting 
because it was perhaps the best way to make images be understood by a wider 
public. In so doing, however, it may have weakened its historical aspect. By 
presenting images as a modern Jigoku-e, it may look as though atomic bomb-
ings were a universal punishment on human beings for their sins, instead of 
an atrocity that happened at a particular historical time under particular polit-
ical conditions.
Perhaps a more widely known work describing Hiroshima after the bombing 
is neither a painting nor a novel but a manga.3 It is a comic book titled Hadashi 
no Gen (Barefoot Gen) written by Keiji Nakazawa (1939–2012), who experi-
enced at the age of six the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, which killed his father 
and his brother.
The work can easily be read by readers of all ages because of its manga format, 
and it is regarded as one of the anti-war classics of the genre. At the same 
time, it sometimes stirs up political controversies because of its direct expres-
sions. Recently, there was a case in which the education board in a local city  
of Matsue (Shimane Prefecture) decided to remove these comics from an open-
shelf area in the library of public elementary and junior high schools in the 
city because it was thought the comics contained inappropriate language and 
that the images were too graphic for young pupils. The comics also depicted  
a barbaric mass murder committed by the Japanese army, and the characters 
call the Emperor Shōwa a “murderer” because the war fought under his  
name finally led to the atomic bombings.
The paintings by Iri and in Yoshi Maruki and the story comics by Nakazawa, 
like many other earlier works on the subject of Hiroshima, contain harsh accu-
sations of the cruelty of the atomic bombings. Most of these works are done 
by victims (like Nakazawa) or by first-hand witnesses (like Maruki). Their expres-
1 This is the name of the Japanese fishing 
boat exposed to fallout from the nuclear 
weapon experiment by the United States 
at Bikini Atoll, in 1954.
2 In ancient times Jigoku­e was often used 
to teach illiterate people not to commit  
a sin by showing how they would be 
tormented after death.
3 I should add that manga is a form of 
popular art quite common in Japan, which 
is read by all generations. To some extent 
it can be regarded as equivalent to film  
in Western cultures.
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2 Kyoto as an A-Bomb Target
In the 1990s, when people in the United States were allowed access to secret  
information about the Pacific War, it became clear that Kyoto was one of the  
primary targets of the atomic bombing. I was really shocked when I first saw  
the planned center of explosion on a map, because it was only three kilometers 
from my mother’s house. Yoshida argues there were several reasons for 
choosing Kyoto. From a geographic point of view, Kyoto is a basin surrounded 
by hills. That means the attack would be more effective because the radio-
active air produced by an A-bomb would stay longer. It would be psychologically 
effective, too, as the city is the old imperial capital of Japan and was thought 
by many as a symbol of Japanese culture. Finally, there lived a number of  
intellectuals who could scientifically estimate the overwhelming power of the 
bomb and persuade the government to surrender.
This is the true reason for fewer air raids in Kyoto. Just like Kyoto, the city of  
Hiroshima also had fewer air raids before the atomic bombing. We now know 
from the documents that the US war office ordered not to attack A-bomb  
target cities with normal bombing because it would make it hard to measure 
the exact destruction caused by the atomic bomb itself. This is how Kyoto 
was saved.
Why, then, did they finally choose Hiroshima and Nagasaki instead of Kyoto? 
The reason is related to one of the reasons why they originally picked Kyoto as 
a target. Destruction of Kyoto would be too effective, especially in a psycho-
logical sense. It would be too devastating for the Japanese nation if the United 
States annihilated the cultural symbol of Japan. The United States feared that  
by dropping an A-bomb on Kyoto the Japanese would keep a strong anti-American 
feeling after the end of the war for a long time and could become politically 
closer to the Soviet Union.
It is important to know that the legend of saving Kyoto has survived even after 
the facts about Kyoto as an A-bomb target were revealed. It is confined in the 
historical imagination of the general people. The legend is still heard and people 
seem to like thinking that Japanese culture is worth being saved by Americans, 
even in the time of war. When I recently discussed this topic in a college class, 
some students told me they heard the story from parents or teachers and 
they themselves had believed it until they took my class. As for me, after I knew 
the truth, I started feeling as if I lived in a parallel world, while in another 
world Kyoto was destroyed in a moment in the summer of 1945, and my mother 
feelings in it such as hope and fear, attraction and disgust, or inclusion and 
alienation. It is also amazing to see how people invent and spread alternative 
stories and legends as a sort of psychological defense to avoid facing a nuclear 
menace, which can be considered as the other side of nuclear imagination.
A-Bomb on Kyoto
1 Legend of Protection
Kyoto is one of the most popular historical cities in Japan where you find a  
lot of old temples, Shinto shrines, and other historical buildings. One of the rea-
sons that the city has been preserved with all these cultural heritages, most  
of which are built of wood, is the fact that there were fewer air raids by the US 
forces in the last months of the Pacific War (1945–52). The city did experience 
some air raids but they were on a much smaller scale compared to those  
in other major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. In spite of its vulner-
ability, Kyoto somehow survived the furious attacks from shell bombs that  
destroyed most of the big Japanese cities.
It is hard to believe Kyoto was just lucky. There is a popular explanation why the 
city was not attacked in the same way as Tokyo or Osaka. I am from Kyoto  
and as a child I heard the story told by many adults, including my family, school 
teachers, people on TV, and so on. The story says that the United States re-
frained from attacking Kyoto because of its historical importance. They valued 
culture in Kyoto and wanted to keep it, even in time of war. I believed this story 
that was told by my elders very seriously and very often. Some told the story in 
a cynical way, saying that though it was culture, not people, that America  
intended to save; we survived anyway because of their decision. This story 
planted a feeling of gratitude toward the United States for having exempted the 
city from destruction. To give a little more detail, the story tells of a particular 
American scholar, Dr. Langdon Warner, who proposed that people working  
in the headquarters of the US army not to bomb Kyoto. We actually find monu-
ments honoring Warner for this in several places in Japan. 
According to the historian Morio Yoshida, however, there had existed rumors 
even before the end of the war that America would not attack Kyoto and other 
historical cities because of their cultural importance.4 It is surprising to know 
that Japanese people somehow believed in the kindness of their enemy they 
were supposed to hate and who saw them as “brutal savages.” It was shortly  
after the war when the story about Warner started being publicly mentioned 
in major newspapers, and it came to be known to many people in Japan. In 
my childhood, in the 1960s, it seemed to be one of the standard popular stories 
about Kyoto.
4 Morio Yoshida, Kyoto ni Genbakuwo Tsuka 
seyo: Warner Densetsu no Shinjitsu [Drop 
the atomic bomb on Kyoto: The truth of 
“Warner legend”] (Tokyo: Kadokawa 
Publishers, 1995).
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Princess Mononoke,7 there is a gigantic “forest spirit,” or Daidarabotchi. It is 
misleading to call it simply “a demon” because the spirit is neither good nor bad 
in nature. Rather, it is supposed to be an apparition of the pure power of  
nature, which has existed long before humans and is beyond the judgment of 
good or evil, as decided upon by humans.
 
So we can look at Godzilla from two different aspects: on one hand, it is a 
monster symbolizing the nuclear age, representing the dark, uncontrollable side 
of modern technology. On the other hand, however, Godzilla was an updated 
god of the ancient animistic world. As the result of this ambivalence, the image 
of nuclear technology was somehow neutralized, naturalized, and depoliti-
cized. The monster came from the people’s unconscious, from those who wel-
comed the peaceful use of nuclear power for national industry, while being 
obsessed by a curse of the ghosts of those who died in war, especially those 
killed by nuclear explosions. In the mid-1950s, the government urged the nation 
to forget about the political controversy about the “Nichbei Ampo Joyaku  
(US-Japan security treaty)”8 and to concentrate on business and industry.
A lot of Godzilla films have been produced since then. As the monster has be-
come more popular, first among Japanese audiences and later (since the  
Hollywood version in 1998) worldwide, it seems to have lost its ambivalent char-
acter. In a Godzilla series produced in Japan, the vision of the monster seems 
to have lost its direct association with nuclear technology and has become 
sim plified as a kind of guardian of Japan (or of Earth) against invaders from the 
outside (or from outer space). In a 1998 American version, Godzilla was inter-
preted as a typical Hollywood monster, a threat to a human being who will 
end up conquering it. I won’t discuss them in detail, but maybe it is worth men-
tioning briefly the latest Godzilla film made in Japan, which is titled Shin 
Godzilla.9 This film is still very new and the evaluation of it is not yet settled. 
But here I only pay attention to one point: What does this latest incarnation of 
the monster represent?
In the last scene of the film, Godzilla is frozen solid after a coagulating agent is 
injected into its mouth (the research team in the film found out that Godzilla’s 
blood works as a cooling system, and they theorized that through the use of  
a coagulating agent, they could trigger a reaction and cause it to freeze). It is a 
was killed at the age of fifteen and I was not born. That’s sad, but I believe  
this imagined situation is more suitable and even more encouraging when living 
and thinking in the nuclear age, than believing in a heartwarming legend.
Mutation and Ambivalence
1 Godzilla
In the world of popular science-fiction films, we often see nuclear imagination 
in the form of a monster. Unlike such monsters depicted in Hollywood movies, 
those produced through in Japanese films have characteristically had ambiva-
lent meanings. The idea of mutation and enlargement caused by nuclear  
radiation fascinated the audience, with its mixed feelings of horror and empow-
erment. Gigantic monsters that have mutated by radiation are both victims  
of and menaces against civilization, gods and devils, or saviors and destroyers. 
Godzilla is one of the most popular monsters of this kind created in postwar 
Japan. It is impossible to think about this favorite monster of mine without 
thinking about nuclear experiments and the fear of radiation.
The first Godzilla appeared in a 1954 film.5 In the film, however, the monster was 
not affected by nuclear radiation itself but was an ancient sea creature awak-
ened by an underwater hydrogen explosion experiment, in a similar way as its 
predecessor in film, the monster in the 1953 American sci-fi movie The Beast 
from 20,000 Fathoms. But the film Godzilla was advertised as an “unexpected 
child of the nuclear age” to attract an audience who associated the appear-
ance of the monster with the fate of human beings, who have reached the stage 
of civilization that is affected by nuclear technology. It is clear that people  
associated the image of Godzilla with nuclear energy itself. In the early 1950s, 
nuclear power plants existed in the US and USSR, yet people in Japan knew 
about nuclear power mainly from images of the explosions that happened in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and from experimental explosions done by the United 
States, the USSR, and United Kingdom.6
But the reference to nuclear technology was not the only thing we find in 
Godzilla. At the same time, the monster was accepted as a latest version of the 
traditional gigantic Yokai, or demon, in the indigenous, animistic understanding 
of nature. In Japanese mythology and folklore, we find a gigantic super natural 
being called Daidarabotchi, which was imagined to be as big as a mountain. 
Legend says that what people think is a mountain range is actually the body of 
a sleeping Daidarabotchi. It is believed that it wakes up in the night and starts 
wandering around while people are asleep. I don’t have space here to give  
further details on this myth but I will look at one recent example to see how 
this type of imagination is still alive in people’s minds. In the animated film 
5 Godzilla, directed by Ishiro Honda, 
produced by Toho, 1954. 
6 The first nuclear power plant in Japan was 
built in 1966. For those who saw the film 
Godzilla from 1954, nuclear power meant 
the power of explosions only.
7 Princess Mononoke, directed by Hayao 
Miyazaki, produced by Studio Ghibli, 1997.
8 This refers both to security treaty between 
Japan and the United States enacted in 
1952 and Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between Japan and the 
United States in 1960.
9 Shin Godzilla (Godzilla Resurgence), 
directed by Hideaki Anno, produced by 
Toho, 2016.
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Nuclear Imagination Today
Finally, I will briefly mention two artistic projects that have recently attempted 
to respond to the Fukushima crisis, which occurred in 2011.
1 Presence of the Past: Hiroshima by Miyako Ishiuchi
Miyako Ishiuchi is not an artist who started with the subject of Hiroshima or 
nuclear issues. Her earliest works are photographs taken of ruined buildings in 
the city of Yokosuka, a city where a US navy base has been located. Through 
her youth, she was strongly attracted to the crumbling walls and rusted doors 
of restaurants, amusement centers, and brothels that soldiers used to visit 
during the period of occupation after the Pacific War. As a small girl, the artist 
was forbidden and afraid to visit that area. When she got a little older, she  
decided to go there, which was by then partly deserted, with a camera. But she 
says she did not intend to photograph the past but the present—the way 
those places look like now, with all their memories. She has maintained this 
attitude all through her photographic works since then.
The same intention led Ishiuchi to photograph scars on human bodies. She 
feels scars are “beautiful” even though they are normally supposed to be kept 
secret. By photographing scars without showing faces and any personal  
iden tities, and showing them as photographic images in books and shows, she 
liberates scars from individual bodies and makes them into something shared  
by viewers. By showing them publicly, scars start to belong to the universe, 
instead of a particular person, she says. Since I was deeply impressed by  
Ishiuchi’s approach to photography, I invited her to participate in an interview, 
which was published in the first issue of the critical journal Diatxt, which I  
edited in Kyoto.11 At that time Ishiuchi had started photographing articles left by 
her mother who had just passed away. Again, it is not any past or memories  
of her late mother, but the presence of such intimate belongings, such as lip-
sticks or lingerie. With this work she was nominated to represent Japan at  
the Venice Biennale in 2006.
The subject of Hiroshima came to the artist in quite an unexpected way. When 
she started working on Hiroshima around 2007, Ishiuchi told me she had  
never been interested in the subject of Hiroshima and that she had actually never 
been to the city. I can understand how she felt. Hiroshima is of course a name 
known all over the world as a place where an unimaginable misery caused  
by nuclear bombing occurred. The image of Genbaku Domu (Atomic Bomb 
surprising ending for a long-term Godzilla fan like myself to find it defeated in 
such an unusual way, considering the monster remained intact with missile 
attacks from the US Air Force. The reason is clear. What this Godzilla repre-
sents is actually Fukushima Daiichi, the damaged nuclear power plant we still 
cannot control, or know what’s going on inside it even today. In spite  
of this fact, the Japanese government, leading politicians, and the media have 
propagated an image of it as if the plant is already under control. Many of  
us have been made to believe that Fukushima is okay now. The message of the 
film is: No, it’s not okay! The film seems to camouflage the topic of Fukushima 
crisis by using the image of Godzilla: it talks about Fukushima without men-
tioning it; if the nuclear crisis was mentioned directly in the title and theme of 
the film, it would not attract as many moviegoers in Japan. With this film, we 
can at least say that Godzilla is once again associated with the nuclear crisis.
2 An Innocent “Atom”: Astro Boy by Osamu Tezuka
Another hero representing nuclear energy in Japanese pop culture is Astro Boy, 
the comics and animation series by Osamu Tezuka. Astro Boy is in many ways 
the opposite of Godzilla, especially in their relationship to nuclear energy. 
Godzilla is a monster whose internal mechanism is unclear. We don’t know, for 
example, why the monster is able to emit a radioactive ray from its mouth.  
We don’t know its intention, or whether it has any intention at all. On the other 
hand, Astro Boy is a robot created by a human scientist. 
Though he looks like a young, innocent boy, he has an enormous power gener-
ated by a super-small-sized nuclear reactor embedded inside his body. Since 
he is a robot, all of the mechanisms are logical, and his electronic brain gener-
ates consciousness and emotion that makes the Astro Boy a friend of human 
beings.10 Astro Boy is good-natured, has a strong sense of justice, and is ready 
to fight against evil humans and robots, though it destroys evil robots but 
never kills humans, perhaps under “Three Laws of Robotics,” by Issac Asimov.
Astro Boy was created in the 1960s when people hoped for economic growth 
based partly on nuclear power. He represents the positive and promising  
side of nuclear technology. I should add that the English title, Astro Boy, is 
not a direct translation of its original Japanese title: Tetsuwan Atom (Iron arm 
atom). With the original name, the association to nuclear technology is very 
obvious. A lot of combats fought between a super hero and a monster in sci- fi 
cartoons or animations in the 1960s and ’70s in Japan were those between 
the “good” and “bad” nuclear powers, as both are empowered—either driven 
by or mutated by—nuclear energy.
10 Unlike in the Christian countries, robots 
with consciousness and emotion mean no 
threat in Japanese culture. 
11 Miyako Ishiuchi, “SCARS: Visualizing 
‘Time,’” interview by Hiroshi Yoshioka, 
Diatxt 1, Kyoto Art Center (2000): 10–27.
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“cool Japan,” which is used to promote Japanese pop culture. Takamine showed 
several different aspects of Fukushima crisis in the exhibition.
There he developed a series of video works titled Japan Syndrome. The title 
reminds us of “China syndrome,” a phrase that describes serious nuclear melt-
downs.15 Takamine’s video does not directly refer to the nuclear disaster itself, 
but to how people talk about it in their everyday situations. This  performance / 
v ideo was created in a quite interesting way. First, the artist recorded inter-
views he made with people in towns in various parts in Japan, asking questions 
about nuclear radiation from Fukushima. For example, in one interview he 
asked a shopkeeper where a certain fish came from. When the shopkeeper 
answered that it was from Chiba, Takamine asked, “I wonder if it is safe because 
Chiba is close to Fukushima.” Then the shopkeeper answered: “It is perfectly 
safe. It passed the inspection, of course!” The artist made a transcription from 
such conversations and let professional actors to reenact the scenes onstage.
Watching Takamine’s Japan Syndrome, the layers of feelings people have about 
the influence of radiation on their life is noticeable. Apart from the direct  
victims of Fukushima who were forced to evacuate, the majority of people in 
Japan find it hard to judge how serious this invisible menace is to their own life. 
Some make an ominous prediction that it will be the end of the country,  
while others say it will be perfectly alright as we have already experienced much 
more serious exposure to radiation because of nuclear testing and have sur-
vived. Japan Syndrome is not simply a documentary of people’s voices about 
the nuclear issue; because it is interpreted and played by actors, we can  
see more clearly how people suppress their fear by saying, “It’s okay, it’s safe”— 
without evidence that this is true. It seems the shopkeeper says what he does 
in order to sell his fish by assuring customers. But from the uneasy tone in  
the actor’s voice as he plays the shopkeeper, we see how the shopkeeper is try-
ing to reassure himself with his own words.
Another distinguished insight I find in this work is that Takamine combines the 
nuclear issue with a question about the Japanese nation—about the way  
people understand their own country. Hence the title Japan Syndrome, I guess. 
The nuclear imagination I find in this work by Takamine implies an association 
between nuclear issues and Japanese society. The work seems to say that it 
Dome, which is the common name for Hiroshima Peace Memorial) has been so 
widely published and stays in the imagination of many.
At the same time, we can point out that the name and images of Hiroshima have 
been used and interpreted in a particularly fixed way, more or less. It is with-
out a doubt that Hiroshima is important for antinuclear politics, but we can also 
say that the name Hiroshima itself confines our imagination. That’s why Ishiuchi 
had never been interested in the city as a photographer. But once she was  
invited to Hiroshima and looked at the Atomic Bomb Dome, she found it  
so small and beautiful,12 something totally different from what she had seen in 
media before. She thought she should do something about Hiroshima and 
she started photographing the clothes of atomic-bomb victims. 
The intention of these photographs is to show the beauty of these clothes, not 
the misery caused by the atomic bomb. I honestly was surprised to see these 
images for the first time, because I had never imagined that girls in Hiroshima, 
at eight o’clock in the morning on August 6, 1945, wore such colorful blouses 
and dresses. In most stories, TV dramas, and films focusing on Hiroshima,  
the victims are described as wearing shabby wartime uniforms. Looking at 
Ishiuchi’s Hiroshima,13 the viewer suddenly knows his or her stereotypical per-
ception about the past was wrong, by understanding that even in the last  
period of the Pacific War, girls in Hiroshima liked to dress themselves up as 
much as they could. This understanding brings Hiroshima back to the present 
time. I highly appreciate Hiroshima as a work expanding our nuclear imagi-
nation, because the work shows these clothes don’t belong to the past but are 
present and in front of us.
2  Nuclear Crisis and the Japanese Mind: Japan Syndrome  
by Tadasu Takamine 
Tadasu Takamine is an artist who combines social and political questions with 
his own private or intimate subjects in a unique way. In Lover from Korea,14 
Takamine decided to live in a cave that is one of the old mines in the northern 
part of Kyoto. The mine had been used to mine manganese, and especially 
during the time of the Pacific War a lot of Korean workers were forced to work 
hard labor there. Takamine mixed his view of the relation between Korea  
and Japan as two countries with his personal relation to his Korean girlfriend, 
and presents the history of nations superimposed with his straightforward 
individual feeling about Korea.
After the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and the Fukushima disaster, Taka-
mine had a solo show at Mito Art Tower in Ibaraki, the area also affected by the 
disaster. The show was titled “Tadasu Takamine’s Cool Japan.” There he com-
bined images of people’s fear of the nuclear crises with a controversial phrase 
12 She said she had found it kawaii (cute) in a 
dialogue with me. See “Photograph and 
the Difficulties to Talk About It,” Semiotopos 
5 (2008).  
13 Miyako Ishiuchi, Hiroshima (Tokyo: 
Shueisha, 2008).
14 Exhibited at Kyoto Biennale 2003, an art 
festival based at Kyoto Art Center, 
directed by Hiroshi Yoshioka in 2003.
15 It is also the title of 1979 American film, 
which coincidentally predicted Three Mile 
Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania 
that occurred twelve days after the film 
was released.
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16 This association between the nuclear 
problem and national mentality reminds 
us of the conclusion of the final 
investigation report written by Kiyoshi 
Kurokawa, the chair of the Investigation 
Committee on the Accident at the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of 
Tokyo Electric Power Company. The report 
published in 2012 is available at: https://
www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads 
/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
was the character of Japanese society that has allowed for the construction  
of so many nuclear power plants on areas with high danger of earthquakes and 
tsunamis. Especially during the age of “Japan’s economic miracle”(in the  
late 1950s and the and ’60s), the whole nation was encouraged to believe in  
the bright future opened up by nuclear power, and most people thought they 
would be ostracized if they objected to that collective hope.16
It is not even seven years since Fukushima. But many people in the country are 
made to feel as if the crisis has already passed, and that it was a problem  
only for the direct victims. Most people seem to lose sight of the fact that the 
whole country, at least for several months after the Fukushima disaster, were 
also concerned about the effects of the nuclear disaster all over Japan. In  
art and pop culture, however, we still observe the activity and development of 
nuclear imagination, which can widely be shared and discussed by those  
living inside and outside the country.
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